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Foreword
The United States today possesses a capable fleet of cargo and crew-carrying launch
systems, managed by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the Department of
Defense, and the private sector. Emerging technologies offer the promise, by the turn of the
century, of new launch systems that may reduce cost while increasing performance, reliability,
and operability~__····
.
Continued exploration and exploitation of space will depend on a fleet of versatile and
reliable launch vehicles. Yet, uncertainty about the nature of U.S. space program goals and the
schedule for achieving them, as well as the stubbornly high cost of space transportation, makes
choosing among the many space transportation alternatives extremely difficult. Can existing
and potential future systems meet the demand for launching payloads in a timely, reliable, and
cost-effective manner? What investments should the Government make in future launch
systems and when? What new crew-carrying and cargo launchers are needed? Can the Nation
afford them?
This special report explores these and many other questions. It is the final, summarizing
report in a series of products from a broad assessment of space transportation technologies
undertaken by OTA for the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
and the House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology. In the course of the assessment,
OTA has published the special reports, Launch Options for the Future: A Buyer's Guide and
Round Trip to Orbit: Human Spaceflight Alternatives; the technical memorandum, Reducing
Launch Operations Costs: New Technologies and Practices; and the background papers, Big
Dumb Boosters: A Low-Cost Space Transportation Option? and Affordable Spacecraft:

Design and Launch Alternatives.
In undertaking this effort, OTA sought the contributions of a wide spectrum of
knowledgeable individuals and organizations. Some provided information, others reviewed
drafts. OTA gratefully acknowledges their contributions of time and intellectual effort. OTA
also appreciates the help and cooperation of NASA and the Air Force. As with all OTA reports,
the content of this special report is the sole responsibility of the Office of Technology
Assessment and does not necessarily represent the views of our advisors or reviewers.
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Legislative Options for Space Transportation
Space Program Futures
Congress could choose to support the development of one or more of many different types of sp:
transportation systems. To determine which of these alternatives is most appropriate, Congress must first Irli
some broad decisions about the future of the United States in space. A commitment to key space program g(
will entail a similar commitment to one or more launch systems.

If Congress wishes to:

Then it should:

Limit the expansion of
NASA and DoD space
programs:

Maintain existing launch systems and limit expenditures on future deve!lj
ment options. Current capabilities are adequate to supply both NASA.
DoD if the present level of U.S. space activities is maintained.

Develop the capability to
launch small- and intermediate-size payloads
quickly and efficiently to
support DoD and civilian
needs:

Continue to support the development of small and intermediate capa(
launch systems. The U.S. private sector has the financial and techni
capacity to develop such systems on its own if a market for launch!
small payloads exists.

Deploy Space Station Freedom by the end of the
century, while maintaining an aggressive NASA
science program:

Continue funding improvements to the Space Shuttle and other existing spa
transportation systems and/or begin developing Shuttle-C: The existil
Space Shuttle can launch the Space Station, but will do so mo
effectively with improvements or the assistance of a Shuttle-C. AlthoUl
Shuttle-C might not be as economical as other new cargo vehicles at h~
launch rates, it would be competitive if only a few heavy-lift missi9ns II
required each year.
.

Continue trend oflaunching heavier communications, navigation, and surveillance satellites and/or
pursue an aggressive Strategic Defensive Initiative
test program:

Commit to the development of a new cargo vehicle for use early in the 2
century. Although existing launch systems could be expanded to m.
such growth in payload weight, if demand is high, new, advanced systel
would be more reliable and cost-effective.

Deploy a full-scale spacebased ballistic missile defense system and/or dramatically increase the number and kind of other military space activities:

Commit to the development of a new cargo vehicle such as the Advanc~
Launch System. Current launch systems are neither sufficiently econOR
cal to support full-scale space-based ballistic missile defense deploymel
nor reliable enough to support a dramatically increased military spa
program.

Establish a permanent
base on the Moon or send
humans to Mars:

Commit to the development of a new cargo vehicle(s) (Shuttle-C, Advancffl:l
Launch System, or other system) and continue funding advanced, crew~
carrying launch systems. Any major initiative beyond the Space Statio~
involving humans in space will require new launch systems.
'

viii

Improving U.S. Space Transportation Systems
Whichever broad program goals are selected, if Congress wishes to continue to improve the safety,
reliability, performance, and/or economy of U.S. launch systems, it has a number of possibilities from which
to choose. Several are listed below; they are not mutually exclusive, nor is the list exhaustive. Congress could
decide to proceed with one or more from each list of options. Because of the long lead times for the
development of space transportation systems, some decisions will have to be made in the next year or two.
Others can wait until the middle of this decade or later.

Near-Term Decisions
If Congress wishes to:

Then it could:

Improve cargo launch
system reliability or
performance:

• Fund development of technologies in the Advanced Launch System and
other programs.

Improve Space Shuttle system safety, reliability:

• Fund development of Liquid-fueled Rocket Boosters (LRBs).
• Fund continued development and improvement of Advanced Solid Rocket
Motors (ASRMs) and alternate turbopumps for the Space Shuttle Main
Engines.
• Fund installation of built-in test equipment in the Shuttle and more
automated test equipment in launch facilities.

Maintain a sustainable Shut-

tle launch rate of 9 to 11
launches per year:

• Fund the purchase of at least one additional orbiter to be delivered as soon
as possible (1996), and direct NASA to reduce the number ofShuttle flights
planned per year. NASA could reduce Shuttle flights by:
a. postponing or cancelling some planned Shuttle launches; or
b. relying more on cargo-only launch vehicles, such as Titan IVs.

Reduce risks to successful
Space Station assembly:

• Direct NASA to develop and use Shuttle-C to carry some Space Station
elements to orbit. (This would reduce the total number offlights required.)

Develop the technology base
and plan for building new
crew-carrying launch
systems:

• Continue to fund planning and technology development and test efforts
such as:
a. the Advanced Manned Launch System studies;
b. the National Aero-Space Plane program (NASP); or
c. the Advanced Launch System (ALS) program.

Provide for emergency crew
return from the Space
Station:

• Fund a program to develop a U.S. crew emergency return vehicle.
• Support joint development with Space Station partners of vehicle for
emergency return.

Far-Term Decisions
If Congress wishes to:

Then it could:

Build safer, more reliable
crew-carrying launch
systems:

• Fund development of safer, more reliable launch systems to augment or
succeed the Shuttle. These might include:
a. a Personnel Launch System (PLS), or
b. an Advanced Manned Launch System (AMLS), or
c. vehicles derived from the National Aero-Space Plane (NASP) program.

Improve cargo launch
system reliability and
reduce costs:

• Fund development of launch vehicles or systems (e.g., ALS engines) that
could be manufactured, integrated, and launched by highly automated
methods with improved process control.

Increase operability:

• Fund development of vehicles designedfor quick turnaround, such as those
considered for an Advanced Manned Launch System or possible successors to the proposed National Aero-Space Plane test vehicle (X-30).
ix

Major Launch Systems Discussed in This Report:
Existing Systems
Delta II Expendable Launch Vehicle
(ELV)-manufactured by McDonnell
Douglas, it is capable of lifting over
11,000 pounds to low Earth orbit (LEO).
Developed for the U.S. Air Force from
earlier Delta versions, the Delta II is also
available commercially from McDonnell
Douglas. Its first launch took place in
August, 1989.

!

Atlas II ELV--capable of lifting about
14,500 pounds to LEO. Manufactured by
General Dynamics under contract to the
Air Force, the Atlas is also available in a
commercial version from General Dynamics. Its first commercial launch is
scheduled for summer, 1990.
Titan III ELV-a commercial launch
vehicle capable of lifting up to 32,500
pounds to LEO, manufactured by Martin
Marietta. Its first commercial launch
occurred on December 31, 1989.
Titan IV ELV-manufactured by Martin Marietta under contract to the U.S.
Air Force, it is capable of lifting about
39,000 pounds to LEO. It was first
launched on June 14, 1989, and carried a
military payload.
Space Shuttle-a piloted, partially reusable launch vehicle capable of lifting
about 52,000 pounds to LEO. The Shuttle fleet now consists of three orbiters; a
fourth is being completed.

Potential Future Launch Systems
Shuttle-C-an unpiloted cargo vehicle,
derived from Shuttle systems. with a
heavy-lift capacity of up to 150,000
pounds to LEO. It would use the existing
expendable external tank and reusable
solid rocket boosters of the Shuttle. but
replace the orbiter with an expendable
cargo carrier.

x

Advanced Launch System (ALS~
totally new modular launch system
study by the Air Force and NASA. A!
would be capable of launching a range'j
cargos at high launch rates and redud
costs.

un4

Cr~w Emergency Return vehic::1.'."
vehicle that would provide for ere
escape andretum from the Space Stati . "
independent of the Shuttle, in case'~
crew medical emergencies or major Spaoij
Station f a i l u r e s . : 1
Personnel Launch System. (PLSH
new concept for a crew-carrymg vehicle
launched atop expendable launch vehicles. It would be less complex and less
expensive than the Shuttle. A PLS could
transport crew to and from space, and
might also serve as an emergency return
vehicle.
Advanced Manned Launch System
(AMLS)-an advanced successor to the
Shuttle, available after the year 2005.
System concepts vary from partially
reusable through fully reusable vehicles;
National Aero-Space Plane (NASP)

-a proposed reusable vehicle that could
be operated like an airplane from conventional runways, but fly to Earth orbit
powered by air-breathing, or air-breathing/
rocket engines. The Air Force and NASA
are working on designs for an experimental version of this vehicle, the X-30.
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Chapter 1

Executive Summary

'1...."'-'...." - - - Photo credit: National Aeronautics and Space Administration

The Apollo 11 spacecraft lifts off from Kennedy Space Center atop the Saturn 5 launcher. July 16. 1969. on its way to the Moon.
Four days later the United States landed two men on the Moon. The Saturn 5 launch vehicle was capable of lifting
more than 200.000 pounds to low-Earth orbit.

Chapter 1

Executive Summary

INTRODUCTION
BJ!x.l;.,tt."""'01:tlS,.~''ft'a''$~"

The Nation's recovery from the space transportation crisis of 1986, which brought the U.S. launch
fleet to a standstill, is well under way. The United
States now has an operating, mixed fleet (figure 1-1)
comprised of reusable Space Shuttle orbiters and
expendable launch vehicles (ELVs). The government and the private sector have invested in new
launch technologies and established a fledgling
private launch services industry. Yet concerns over
launch system reliability, operability,1 capacity, and
cost remain. Over the next few years, Congress will
be faced with making critical decisions affecting the
future of U.S. space transportation systems. 2 Congress' decisions will depend directly on:
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THE U.S. FUTURE IN SPACE
Except for the field of satellite communications,
essentially all U.S. space activities continue to be
characterized and managed by the Federal Government and supported with public funds. The Federal
Government invests in space activities in the expectation that they will serve U.S. interests by:

• what future course the Nation wants to follow
in space; and
• understanding whether existing and planned
launch systems, and their component technologies, are adequate to support the chosen direction.

• demonstrating international leadership in space
science, technology, and engineering;
• contributing to economic growth;
• enhancing national security;
• supporting the pursuit of knowledge; and
• prompqng international cooperation in sci-

This report summarizes OTA' s assessment of
advanced space transportation technologies; it was
requested by the Senate Committee on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation and the House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology. Previous
publications from this assessment (box I-A) have
examined a range of U.S. launch options, ways of
reducing launch operations costs, the "Big Dumb
Booster" concept, crew-carrying launch systems,
and spacecraft design.

ence~3./

Over the years, the United States has pursued a set
of goals for its civilian and military space programs
that derive from these broad policy principles. It has
established systems in space for worldwide communications, global Earth observation, and scientific activities, including solar system exploration
probes and landers. It has also sent men and women
to work in space. Space transportation systems are
critical elements in realizing these missions.

The report examines the space transportation
needs of publicly supported space programs, as
executed by the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) and the Department of
Defense (DoD). However, private sector space
activities are slowly growing in importance. Hence,
the report also explores aspects of the private
sector's role in space transportation, both as contractor for the government's needs and as commercial
supplier of launch services.

The U.S. future course in space is uncertain,
especially in light of the tremendous political and
economic changes in progress around the world and
the strong pressures to reduce Federal spending.
Will the Government cut back on civilian and/or

ll.e .• flexibility and ability to meet a schedule.
2A space transportation or

launch system includes the launch vehicle. the buildings. launch pad. and other launch facilities. and the technologies and

methods used for launch.

~~ational Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958. sec. I; U.S. Congress. Office of Technology Assessment. Civilian Space Policy and Applications.
OTA-STI-I77 (Washington. DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. 1982). pp. 35-38.
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Figure 1-1-Primary Launch Vehicles of the World
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Vostok
Soyuz
Proton
Energia
(SL-3)
(SL-4)
(SL-12/13)
(SL-17)
11,000 Ibs. 17,000Ibs. 43,000Ibs. 220,000Ibs.
NA
NA
8,000 Ibs.
NA

KEY: GTO =Geostationary Transfer Orbit; LEO =Low Earth Orbit
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Energia
(SL-17)
66,000 Ibs.
NA

Ariane 3

Ariane 4

Ariane 5

NA
7,000 Ibs.

14,000Ibs.
9,000 Ibs.

44,000 Ibs.
15,000Ibs.

Long
March 3
NA
3,000 Ibs.

Long
March 2E
19,000Ibs.
7,000Ibs.

H-2
18,000Ibs.
9,000 Ibs.

Chapter

military space programs, or will it continue to build
steadily on our previous accomplishments? Alternatively, will the United States embark on sharply
expanded programs of human exploration (box I-B)
or space-based defense? This report provides a guide
to the opportunities for, and impediments to, supporting a range of goals with existing and future
launch systems. Because the lack of a clear future
course for U.S. space activities makes the scale and
character of future demand for space transportation
highly uncertain, it is not sensible to choose among
space transportation options without first selecting
the specific goals to be served. OTA concludes that
a national dialog is urgently needed to establish
the future course of the publicly supported space
program and to outline the preferred means of
accomplishing program goals.
If Congress and the Executive decide to follow
the current course of steady growth in civilian

l~xecutive
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and military space activities, no new launch
systems" would be needed before the first decade
of the next century to meet demand for launch of
cargo and people.5 Taken together, the existing
launch fleet is capable of launching at least 900,000
pounds6 to low Earth orbit (LEO) per year, which is
about 37 percent more payload than the United
States expects to launch in 1990,7 the first year that
all of its .major launch systems will be fully
operational. 8 Nevertheless, new systems may be
desirable to meet specific needs, such as crew
rescue, or to reduce the dependence of the Space
Station project on the Shuttle. Even if the steady
growth in payload demand is limited to a few
percent per year, the Nation's space transportation systems could be managed to reduce average
launch costs. The Government spends at least $5
billion per year on space transportation for civilian
needs alone. It would be prudent to place greater

4However. additional Shuttle orbiters or new facilities to launch existing systems may be needed, as explained later.
SFor a 3 percent per year growth rate or Ie&'!.
6In 1992-based on 9 Shuttle, 18 Delta n. 4 Atlas II, 4 Titan III, and 6 Titan IV launches per year, at a 9().percent manifesting effICiency.
70rA assumed 8 Shuttle, 12 Delta II, 2 Atlas II, 1 Titan III. and 2 Titan IV flights.
'The years of 1984 and 1985 were the last two in which U.S. launch systems were fully operational. It appears that 1990 will mark the first year since
1985 that all major U.S. launch systems can be expected to operate on a sustained schedule. In addition, new private launch systems will be tested in
1990.
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emphasis on improving the reliability, operability,
and payload capacity of existing launch systems, for
example, by incorporating new technologies into
launch vehicles and launch operations procedures.
If, on the other hand, the Nation decides to invest
in a permanent lunar base, exploratory missions to
Mars, or a large-scale, space-based ballistic missile
defense, new cargo launch systems would be necessary, including a heavy-lift launcher.9 Either a lunar
base or a mission to Mars could also require new
crew-carrying launch vehicles, and would necessitate systems capable of transferring payloads and
people between orbits. New, advanced launch systems could add $10 billion to $20 billion in
development costs alone to the price tag for any
major space program initiative.1O The timing and
scale of government investments in new space
transportation systems will depend directly on the
commitment to the goals being defined for public
space programs.
Because the Nation cannot afford to invest in all
the good ideas proposed for improved or new launch
systems, Congress and the Administration will have
to choose from among a wide range of options. Some
choices must be made in the next 2 to 3 years. Others
can wait longer. However, as argued earlier, all
space transportation decisions will depend directly on the Nation's vision for its future in
space. The following sections present options to
meet a range of near-term and far-term space futures.

Near-Term Space Transportation Options
For the coming decade, the primary space transportation issue is how to enhance U.S. access to
space by improving the reliability and operability of
existing systems-the Shuttle and ELVs. Whether
the future launch rate is high or low, higher
reliability for all launch systems (box I-C) and
improved safety and operability for the Shuttle
would increase the ability of current systems to meet
program needs. Reducing launch costs would also

reduce the impact of space transportation on the
Federal budget (for equivalent demand levels)
and might lead to more etTective use of space. To
be most useful to the Nation, decisions about the
following options should be made within the next
2 to 3 years.

• Fund improvements in expendable launch vehicles (ELVs). Improved assurance against program cost overruns and delays can be gained by
improving the reliability and operability 01
existing ELVs, which are based on designs
originally developed in the 1950s and 1960s,
The Advanced Launch System (ALS) Prograrr:
has been studying technologies and methods tc
enhance launch system operability, reliability
and payload capacity. Incorporating the mosl
promising of these technologies and method!
in existing ELV systems,ll if feasible, woul~
improve the ELV fleet and give launci
manufacturers and operators valuable ex,
perience in using them.

• Limit the Shuttle's launch rate to a regular
sustainable rate. Attempting to meet NASA'!
goal of 14 Shuttle launches per year 12 woul<
increase the cumulative risk to orbiter crews
and to space program costs and schedules
Furthermore, because it is reusable anc
carries a crew, the Shuttle is not necessaril:
the most appropriate choice for launchinl
satellites and space probes, and for doinl
many space science observations and exper
iments. The presence of a crew necessaril:
shifts NASA's primary concern from the mis
sion's scientific objectives to the safe launcl
and return of its crew. Hence, additional, costl:
requirements are added to the payload, and tl
the mission as a whole. The Shuttle launc
schedule could be limited to a regular, sustainable rate of 8 to 10 launches per year13 by
restricting Shuttle flights to payloads requiring
human crews. NASA is already pursuing a
strategy of restricting Shuttle payloads to those

9NASA's recent Report of the 90-Day Study on Human Exploration of the Moon and Mars (Washington. DC: National Aeronautics and Space
Administration, November 1989) states that supporting the development and operation of a lunar base and the exploration of Mars would require .,space
transportation capacity of two to four times the mass that can now be delivered to orbit per year.
'
10As noted later in this report. these new launch systems might nevertheless make it possible to achieve sharply reduced operating costs.
lISome of these improvements, such as fault-tolerant subsystems and artificial intelligence process controls, may also be appropriate for inclusion
in the Shuttle system.
12After orbiter Endeavour (OV-105) enters service in 1992.
i30TA 'sestimate is based on the need to maintain a rate high enough to maintain flight-ready launch operation crews but low enough to avoid stressing
those same crews. Such a rate should also allow for occasional surge to meet civilian or military needs and provide sufficent down-time to make major
changes to the orbiters as required.
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Box l-C-CopingWith Launch Risks
Launching payloads to orbit has always carried a high degree of risk-to people, cargo. and financiers. One
of the critical near-tenn needs for space transportation will be to reduce these risks. As .demonstrated by the long
standdown following thelosses of Challenger and the Titan and Delta expendable launch vehicles in 1985 and 1986,
major launch failures will have a Significant negative impact on public and private space activiti,es, causing loss of
income for private companies that depend on space assets for their business, reduced effectiveness of national
security programs. and erosion of public confide~ce in U.S. space efforts. OTA estimates that the standdown and
recovery from Challengeralone costU.S. taxpayers more than $15 billion.
Demonstrated success rates fOJ'U.S.·launch systems, including the Shuttle. range between 85 and 97·percent,
yet U.S. plans, in both NASA and DoD, are optimistic and make little allowance for launch failures. In particular,
the heavy U.S. dependence on the Space Shuttltr1 raises questions concerning the ability ·ofthe existing Shuttle
fleet to meet its allocated share of .the demand for space trallsportation services. The Shuttle fleet has never
met projected flight rateS and the existing fleet is unlikely to meet NASA's goal of 14 nights per year in the
199Os, as a result either of launch operations delays, or orbiter attrition as a result of Shuttie faUures.
Attempting to meet such a high rate increa~s the risk to human lives, to NASA's budget, and to other NASA
programs, especially Space Station.
The United States should expect the partial or total loss of one or more Shuttle orbiters so~etime in thenext
decade. Public reaction .to the loss of Challenger demonstrated again that there are qualitative differences between
public attitudes toward launching people and launching cargo into space. If the United States wishes to send people
into space on a routine basis. the Nation wOl have to come to grips with the risks of human spaceflight Airl~s
occasionally fail catastrophically but people continue to fly. The United States should exert its best efforts to ensure
flight safety and prepare itself for handling further losses that wiUlikely occur. Ifthe Nation perceivesthatthe ri~ks
are too high, it may decide to reduce the current emphasis on placing humans in space until more reliable launchers
are available.
IThe Shuttle accounts for more than half of the Nation's existing payload capacity.
SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1990.

requmng the Shuttles' unique capabilities.
However, this curtailment will take several
years to execute because payloads already
designed for Shuttle launch cannot, without
excessive modification and reintegration costs,
be launched on an ELV.14 The restriction will
also cost more in the short run than launching
on the Shuttle because the Government will
have to purchase ELV launch services 15 entailing substantial redesign and re-integration
costs. 16 However, if NASA can establish a
Shuttle launch rate that improves the probability of recovering the orbiter after each launch,

in the long run the Government could save
money and also reduce the risk to Shuttle
crews.1 7
• Fund additional orbiters. Even if NASA sustains a Shuttle rate of 8 to 10 launches per year,
because of the risk of Shuttle a.ttrition, additional orbiters may be needed just to carry out
current plans, including construction of the
planned Space Station (box 1-0). The actual
reliability of the Shuttle system is unknown,
but may lie between 97 percent and 99
percent. If reliability is 98 percent, the
Nation faces a 50-50 chance of losing an

14The size and/or weight of some payloads require them to be laWlched on the Shuttle. OpponWlities for Titan IV to carry civilian payloads appear
to be severely limited, the result. in part. of limited production and launch facilities. Planned DoD payloads currently fill the Titan IV manifest through
the year 2000.
lSNote that flying payloads on ELVs would not necessarily reduce the risk of losing the payload. Demonstrated launch success rates for EI..vs are
slightly lower than for the Shuttle. LaWlch services on the commerciallaWlchers. Delta. Atlas Centaur. and Titan III. are available for NASA's purchase.
16For example. the COSlllic BackgroWld Explorer (COBE) Satellite, which was originally scheduled for laWlch on the Shuttle. was redesigned to fit
anELV at a cost of $30 million to 40 million. COBE was laWlched into a 900-kilometer polar orbit on Nov. 18.1989. on a Delta ELV. Among other
astrophysical observations. COBE will make two total surveys of the sky of the faint backgroWld radiation that scientists believe is a remnant of the
original Big Bang. some 15 billion years ago.
OIl

17Developing a Shuttle-C cargo vehicle based on the Shuttle system would also make it possible to off-load certain payloads from the Shuttle (see
Shuttle-C option below).
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additional orbiter in the next 34 flights (3 to
4 years). To reduce the risk of attempting to
carry out the Nation's goals with only a
3-orbiter fleet, Congress may wish to purchase
one or more additional orbiters. A new orbiter
would cost between $2 billion and $2.5 billion,
and if ordered in fiscal year 1991, could be
ready no earlier than 1996 or 1997 .
• Fund a program to improve the safety and
reliability of the Shuttle. In many respects, the
Shuttle is not yet operational and can still be
improved in a variety of ways. Much like the
B-52 bomber, which has steadily grown more
capable and remained operational for over 30
years, the ability of the Shuttle orbiters to stay
in service can theoretically be extended for
another two decades. NASA is working on
technologies that could enhance Shuttle safety
and reliability as well as longevity. For example, NASA is improving the construction of the
Shuttle main engines, has begun a program to
build more reliable, higher capacity, Advanced
Solid Rocket Motors, and is installing new,
more fault-tolerant computers. A long-term,
integrated program of improvements to the
orbiter and other subsystems would be more
effective in fostering Shuttle reliability and
safety than a piecemeal program. An integrated
improvement program should also devote resources to enhancing the management of
launch operations, which would increase Shuttle's operability and might reduce operations
costs. Congress may wish to require NASA to
prepare an integrated plan for accomplishing
these objectives .
• Fund development of the Shuttle-C. For launching payloads that exceed the payload capacity
of the Shuttle and the Titan IV, the Nation will
eventually need a heavy-lift launch system. It
could build a heavy-lift cargo system in the
near term by developing a cargo launcher based
on Shuttle technology (Shuttle-C). Shuttle-C
would generally reduce the risk to the
orbiter fleet of flying large payloads. Because it would be capable of lifting heavy
payloads, Shuttle-C could also reduce the
total number of flights required to construct

Photo credit: General Dynamics Corp.

An Air Force Atlas lifting off from the launch pad.

the Space Station. In the far term, a Shuttle-C
could carry a variety of large payloads for
building a lunar base or supporting an exploratory mission to Mars. NASA asserts that
developing a Shuttle-C would cost about $1.1
billion 18 and could be completed by 1995, if
started in 1991. 19 Infrastructure costs, which
are included in this figure, would be minimal
because Shuttle-C would use the same launch
pads and many of the same facilities as the
Shuttle. 20 However, launch costs would be

18Jn 1991 dollars. This figure does not include the estimated $480 million for the first Shuttle-C launch.
19NASA officials appear to be divided over the advisability of pursuing Shunle-C. some believing that the Shunle will be adequate. others concerned
that new systems. including Shuttle-C. should be developed.
20ifthe Shuttle launch rate were kept at about 8 to 10 launches per year. 2 to 3 Shuttle-C launches per year could be accommodated if improvements
to existing facilities. costing about $300 million. were made.
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relatively high, so the Shuttle-C would be most
cost effective at relatively low launch rates (2-3
per year). NASA estimates each launch of a
Shuttle-C would cost over $400 million.
• Develop a crew rescue vehicle for Space
Station. Crews living and working in the
planned Space Station could be exposed to
substantial risk from major failures of the
Station. Because the Shuttle cannot respond in
a timely manner to emergencies, the United
States may need a means independent of the
Shuttle to rescue crews from the Space Station.
A rescue vehicle would add $1 billion to $2
billion in development and procurement costs
to the Space Station. Additional costs would be
incurred in developing the necessary support
infrastructure, which might include ground
operations hardware and personnel at the mission control site, landing site crews, and the
necessary subsystems and logistics support to
resupply, replenish, and repair a rescue vehicle
on orbit. To decide whether a risk-reducing
effort is worth the investment required,
Congress must be advised about how much
the investment would reduce the risk. Even
if an alternate crew return vehicle were
built, and worked as planned, it would not
eliminate all risks to station crewmembers.

To assist in making such a decision, the risks
and costs of building a rescue vehicle should
be weighed against the risks and costs of
other hazardous duty in the national interest. Th reduce costs that would accrue to Space
Station development, it may be prudent to
cooperate with one or more of our Space
Station partners in jointly developing a crew
rescue vehicle, or adapting one of their crewcarrying vehicles, now under development, for
the purpose.

Far-Term Space Transportation Options
Although upgrading the current fleet ofELVs and
the Shuttle would improve their operability and
might even reduce space transportation costs, new
systems will ultimately be needed if the Nation
wishes to improve the U.S. capacity to launch
payloads and crews. Emerging technologies otTer
the promise of new launch systems and of
significant evolutionary improvements in existing systems during the early decades of the 21st
century. These improvements could reduce the
costs of manufacturing, logistics, and operations
while increasing reliability, operability, and performance. Developing new systems that use advanced technology would entail high cost risk and
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Photo credit: National Aeronautics and Space Administration
ThA nthitAr A''''n'I.. lift~ nfffrnm

Kennedv Soace Centercarrvino the Galileo spacecraft on the first stage of its journey toward Jupiter.

technical risk and would require a sustained technology development program. Yet new systems could
also bring substantial benefits to U.S. launch capabilities. The appropriate time to start development of any new system will depend on the
perceived future demand for space transportation services, the readiness ofthe technology, and
the system's cost in competition with alternative
means of performing comparable missionsincluding existing launch systems. The long lead
times necessary to develop a new system and
construct necessary supporting facilities require

begining development some 5 to 10 years before a
system is needed. 21
Congress could fund the development of:
• Advanced Launch Systems (ALS). Through the
ALS program, the Air Force and NASA seek to
develop a reliable, flexible family of mediumand high-capacity, low-cost launch vehicles to
serve government needs. They expect to capitalize on advanced materials and manufacturing and launch processing technologies, to
increase launch rate and reduce acquisition,
maintenance, and operational costs. They also

21For example. the decision to begin development of the Space Shuttle was made in 1fJ72. and the orbiter Columbia made its fU'St flight in April 1981.
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plan to include the ability to launch vehicles at
a higher than average rate for a short time (i.e.,
surge). A decision to proceed with ALS
development would depend on whether
there will be sufficient anticipated demand
to justify development and procurement of a
new, high capacity launcher, or whether the
value of improved efficiency in launching
currently planned payloads would justify
investing in new systems. Because it would be
significantly different in design and operation
than current launch systems, and would use a
wide variety of new technologies, development
of an operational ALS carries a significant cost
and schedule risk. 22
The ALS program has been funded almost
entirely by DoD, which has decided not to
pursue development of the ALS at this time;
DoD plans to continue technology development of propulsion and other crucial enabling
technologies. If ALS technology development
continues to be funded by Congress and the
Executive, the DoD could be in a position to
start full development of the ALS in the mid or
late 1990s, if necessary.
• A Personnel Launch System (PLS) or Advanced
Manned Launch System (AMLS). Even if
NASA makes substantial improvements to
the Shuttle, eventually a replacement will be
needed if the United States decides to continue its commitment to maintaining crews
in space. A decision to replace the Shuttle
should be based on the age and condition of the
Shuttle fleet and the estimated benefits to be
gained from developing a new crew-carrying
launch system. NASA is exploring the technologies, systems, and costs required for development of two new launch systems. Although
concepts for the two proposed systems overlap,
their general focus is different. PLS designers
are considering several concepts, ranging from
ballistic entry vehicles to a small "spaceplane." A PLS vehicle would carry very little
cargo and could be launched atop a large
expendable booster. AMLS designs favor a
reusable vehicle larger than the PLS, but
smaller and easier to refurbish and launch than
the Shuttle, and capable of carrying both crew

and cargo (about 20,000 pounds). An AMLS
might be launched by a reusable booster.
A PLS could be developed and tested sooner
than an AMLS and might be needed to back up
or replace the Shuttle. Developing and operating a PLS would likely cost less than an AMLS.
If it entered the fleet before the Shuttle is
retired, a PLS could assist in providing more
reliable access to space for humans. In addition,
a version of the PLS vehicle might serve as a
Space Station crew escape vehicle. The choice
between an AMLS and a PLS will depend on
cost and the need for an alternative to the
Shuttle.
• An Aerospace Plane. Developing a fully reusable piloted vehicle that could be operated like
an airplane from conventional runways, but fly
to Earth orbit powered by a single propulsion
stage, as envisaged for the· National AeroSpace Plane (NASP), would provide a radically
different approach to space launch and a major
step in U.S. launch capability. If successful, an
aerospace plane could provide increased flexibility and reduced launch costs. NASA and the
Air Force are jointly developing the technology
base that could lead to an X-30 experimental
aerospace plane, which would incorporate advanced air-breathing propulsion as well as
rocket propulsion. Developing a successful
X-30 test vehicle may cost more than $5
billion. 23 Proponents argue that benefits to U.S.
industry and U.S. competitiveness may more
than repay that investment.
Until an X-30 flies successfully to orbit and
back, estimated costs for building an operational vehicle based on technology demonstrated in the X-30 will remain highly uncertain. At the present time, the Air Force has
shown the greatest interest in an operational
aerospace plane, primarily because it would
provide quick response to emergencies and fast
turnaround in preparation for reflight. While
very attractive from an operational point of
view, building such a vehicle poses large
technological and cost risks. Either a PLS or
AMLS could be developed sooner than an
aerospace plane based on X-30 technology.
Other proposed launch systems, including

22As noted earlier. reducing launch costs by means of ALS or any other new launch system may require increased payload demand.
23The NASP Program Office estimates X·30 costs for two test vehicles and supportive infrastructure at $3 billion to $5 billion. OTA regards these
estimates as a lower limit.
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small launch systems and the ALS, may
provide stitT economic competition to an
aerospace plane, because they may also
serve DoD needs for launching most payloads quickly at much lower investment cost.
• Other Advanced Concepts. NASA and 000 are
funding studies of a variety of highly advanced
launch concepts, including all-rocket, singlestage-to-orbit vehicles, laser propulsion, and
chemical ram accelerator techniques. Although
each of these concepts has strong proponents,
each will also need considerable additional
study before its costs and benefits will be
sufficiently understood to determine whether or
not it is an appropriate candidate for developm~nt. Nevertheless, research on advanced concepts and related technologies could eventually
lead to a cost-effective future launch system
and will be of broad importance in maintaining
U.S. innovation in launch technologies. For
example, previous studies of single-stage-toorbit vehicles have cast doubt on their ability to
perform efficiently because the necessary lightweight, high-strength materials were not available. However, recent advances in the development of the necessary advanced materials in the
NASP program suggest that single-stage-toorbit rocket-propelled vehicles may yet prove
feasible.

REDUCING SPACE
TRANSPORTATION COSTS
Reducing launch costs and improving operability are the two most important issues to
address as the Nation considers the development
of any new launch systems. Launching payloads to
low Earth orbit on existing launch systems costs
from $3,000 to $10,000 per pound. Placing them in
geosynchronous orbit can cost up to $20,000 per
pound. Thus, reducing launch costs will play a
critical role in making space activities more affordable and productive. It is especially important in this

era when there are strong pressures to reduce Fede3
budget deficits. Making launch systems more flexi,"
ble and more capable of meeting a schedule coul"
also contribute to reduced operating costs. Howevet1
the costs of designing and procuring spacecraft llI1
often much higher, per pound, than launch costs!
Attention should also be given to decreasing space:
craft costs (box I-E).
'
NASA, the Air Force, and the private sector have
been working on methods of reducing both nome
curring and recurring launch costs. For example
new manufacturing and construction methods cou14
lower the cost of building new launch vehicles. Yet¥
because launch and mission operations ma,
constitute a sizable fraction of the cost of launch;:
ing payloads into orbit,24 system designers anel
policymakers must give greater attention ttl
launch operations and support, and to ho\'l
launch vehicle and payload designs interact. Fo
many aspects of launch operations, the broad opera
tional experience of the airlines and some of thl
methods they employ to maintain efficiency rna;
provide a useful mode~ for space operations (00",.
I-F). However, even If the launch systems artS;·
designed for reduced operational costs, it will ~i;
difficult to improve operations and support without',·
making significant changes to the institutions cur-"
rentlY responsible for those operations. 25
Harnessing industry's innovative power in a
more competitive environment could lead to
reduced launch costs and more etTective use of
U.S. resources for outer space. By promoting
private sector innovation toward improvements in
the design, manufacture, and operations of launch
systems, the Government could reduce the cost of
Government launches, yet relatively few incentives
to involve private firms exist today. Current U.S.
space policy, which directs NASA, and encourages
000, to purchase launch services rather than laund
vehicles from private firms is a promising frn'
step.26 Yet, despite the fact that both agencies arc
moving toward purchasing launch services, change

24The cost of operations range from 15 to 45 percent of launch costs. depending on the complexity of operations. For example. operations costs fc
the Atlas or Delta ELV are about 15 percent of launch costs; operations costs of the Space Shuttle. which also include costs of flight operations as we
as launch operations. because the orbiter is reusable and piloted. reach at least 45 percent of the total. See U.S. Congress. Office of Technolol!
Assessment. Reducing Launch Operations Costs: New Technologies and Practices, OTA-TM-ISC-28 (Washington. DC: U.S. Government Printill
Office. September 1988). p. 13.

2SReducing Launch Operations Costs: New Technologies and Practices, op. cit.. footnote 21. Adapting airline practices. which have been develope
over several decades of experience. and based on millions of hours of flight time. will take considerable imagination and innovation.
26When the Government purchases launch systems. it must maintain a large staff to operate the launchers. or to oversee contractors who do so. f
purchasing launch services. the Government gives up most of the responsibility (and therefore cost) for overseeing details of launch manufacture and
operation.
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Bqx l-E-Retlucing Spac't"'/(Cjf~
Although reducing the costs of space transportation is extre~ly~~inbringingdOwn~costs of
exploring and exploiting outer space. reducing payload costs,especiallyfor ~~sateUites. isalso vitally important.
For these payloads,·launch.cos~ are .• wical1yonly.a small petcelltageof ... · . costs of a program•.beCJusethe
costs of designing and building spacecraft are extremely high. NASA-and... . acecraft typically COil between
$160,000 and $650.000 per pound. 1 For commercial satellitelaunc:hesto~~~cbronQUSQrl>it. where spacecraft
costs. and launch costs arecompJlfabl~.reducing both is important~Pri~~~tition between fit:ler optics cable
systemS and satellite communications systems for the highly com~tive.f\tl!lJltic and .Pacific routes ~e the
.
reduction of overall program costs especially important to co~unic::Ilti~~ll:ite companies.
Spacecraft COsts can be reduced by· innovative design:
• allowing them to· be much heavier. so ~xpensive weight reductiOntec~ues are not.need.ed (fatsats);2
• making them very light and litpiting them to fewer tasks (lightsats)j
• building very small spacecraft (microspacecraft) that could be launchei:llike cannon shells for specialized
tasks.
Each of these appr()aches wouldimpose different requirements on launchs~~~s. ~ongtess may wish tootder
a comprehensive study of th*and other innovative approaches tOsp~raft desip.
IThese estimatesinelude amOl1izedspacecraft pro.-ameosts. . .
.• . . .. .. ••.. . . ••..
2The gains acnieved1tetc ilPpear to betelatively smaUcmnpared to the overallcostoj'~:paylo4ld andlauncb~ce:U;S.Congress,
Office of Technology Assessment, Ajfordable Space.craft: De.sign and lm,I/lCh, Alter.itt!,f. PTA-BP-1SC-«l <WasbingtoQ,.OC; U.S,
Government Printing Office. January 19!}(l),pp. 12-16.
.
SOURCE: Office of Te~hnOlogy.Asse~t, 1990.

Box I-F-Airlines OpertltW_,Precepts
• Involve operations petsqnnel jn <iesign changes,
• Develop detailed· ·c,peraUons.cost .esti~tion
models.
• Stand down to traceandrepairfailur~sonlywhcm
the evidence points to.a.major ~e.neric failure.
• Design for fault tolerance.
• Design for maintainabi,lby.
• Encourage competitive pricing.
• Maintain strong training prqgnuns.
• Use automatic built7in ¥he.ckout of subsystems
between flights.
SOURCE; Office of Technology Assesstnent,l990.

is relatively slow, in part because NASA and DoD
managers are reluctant to cede greater control over
the fate of extremely expensive payloads to the
private sector. 27
Low-cost space transportation options that are
designed to achieve minimum cost rather than

maximum perfonnance28 may merit further study,
particularly if their development meshes with other
space transportation efforts such as those to develop
a liquid rocket booster for the Shuttle, or new
engines for the ALS.
One way to stimulate the private sector's innovative creativity would be to issue a request for
proposal for ALS-type launch services and have
industry bid for providing them. Such an approach
assumes minimum government oversight over the
design and manufacturing processes. It would also
require the aerospace community to assume much
greater financial risk than it has taken on in the past.
Another option that might lead to lower launch
costs would be for the government to issue space
transportation vouchers to space scientists whose
experiments are being supported by the government. 29 These vouchers could be redeemed for
transportation on any appropriate U.S. launch vehicle, and would free scientists to choose the vehicle
they thought most suitable to the needs of the

27Bruce D. Berkowitz, "Energizing the Space Launch Industry," Issues in Science & Technology, Winter 1989-90, pp. 77-83.
28~.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment. Big Dumb Boosters: A Low-Cost. Space Transponation Optwn?~ackground Paper
(Washington, DC: International Security and Commerce Program, 1989).
29Molly Macauley, "Launch Vouchers for Space Science Research," Space Policy, vol. 5, No.4, pp. 311-320.
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spacecraft. This policy would free space scientists
from dependence on the Shuttle, and might increase
opportunities for researchers to reach space.
The small launch vehicle concepts being developed by the private sector in response to the Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency's Advanced
Satellite Technology Program ("lightsats") promise
another avenue for cost reductions. They provide the
means for small payloads to reach orbit for a
relatively low cost per launch. 3o In this case, the
Government provided a market sufficiently large to
induce private firms to develop the vehicles using
private funding. 31

LIFE-CYCLE COSTS OF SPACE
TRANSPORTATION OPTIONS
Estimates of life-cycle costs, which include the
nonrecurring costs required to develop and build a
new launch system as well as future recurring
procurement and operating costs, provide the best
economic measure of the worth of a new investment
compared to other possible options. The overall cost
of Earth-to-orbit transportation over the next three
decades will include, at minimum, the costs of
launching vehicles of existing types, at least until
they are superseded. Almost certainly, some vehicles will fail catastrophically, leading to direct,
indirect, and intangible costs. If the Government
elects to launch at higher rates, additional facilities
will be needed to prepare and launch vehicles.
If the Government elects to develop and use new
types of launch vehicles, U.S. taxpayers must fund
their development, production, and operation, as
well as construction or modification of the facilities
that would be needed to launch them. Nextgeneration vehicles will also incur some risk of
failure, although how much cannot now be estimated
with confidence. Nevertheless, investment in developing new types of vehicles could yield later payoffs
in performance, operability, and safety, as well as
lower cost of operation and risk of failure, compared
to current vehicles.

To decide whether proposed investments inl
proving the Nation's Earth-to-orbit transportaij
system could be justified on economic ground~;
predicted savings in the out-years, OTA estim_
the life-cycle cost of each of several alternativej
The life-cycle cost includes costs of developingri
types of launch vehicles (if any), purchasing reu
ble elements of launch vehicles, building ~
additional launch facilities required, launch opE
tions (including purchase of expendable law
vehicle elements), expected costs oflaunch vebl
failures, and the risk of cost overrun ("cost ris)
OTA considered only expenditures that would
incurred between 1989 and 2020. 33 OTA calculi
the present value of the estimated life-cycle COSI
discounting future expenditures to reflect the 10'
opportunity cost of obligating a future dol
relative to spending a dollar now.
Figure 1-2 presents OTA's estimates of •
present value of life-cycle cost of each of 'j
alternative vehicle mixes for each of three s~
transportation demand scenarios. The rankingi
alternatives according to present value of life-cy~
cost, and the net benefit of each alternative relati'
to continued use of current vehicles, depends on ~
demand for space transportation. The differences
life-cycle cost are small in the low-growth demaJ
scenario, especially when compared to the unc~
tainty represented by cost risk. However, the c~
estimates clearly favor the Advanced Launch Syl
tern in the expanded demand scenario, which
eludes low-growth demand plus rapidly increas~
demand for launches of heavy cargo, such .• ~
formerly contemplated for deployment of a Ph~i
Strategic Defense System (SDS). Options for al~
base or a Mars expedition could result in denuuj
analogous to the expanded demand scenario. Al~
natives for a lunar base and Mars expedition 8j
currently being weighed by the National Spac
Council, NASA, and others. The DoD continues ,I
assess options for development and deployment~
SDS.

I

3OFor many small launch systems. the cost to launch a pound of payload is relatively high. Nevertheless. small systems may provide a cost-efJcctl
launch for owners of small payloads who would otherwise have to launch their payload as a secondary payload on a multiple-payload launch into all
optimum orbit.
'
31Initial flights of Orbital Sciences Corp. Pegasus. an air-launched vehicle capable of carrying 600 to 900 pounds into low Earth orbit. are schedul
for spring 1990.
32por additional details on space transportation costs. see box I-G.
330TA has little confidence in projections of demand to or beyond 2020. but chose 2020 as an accounting horizon to capture most of the discoun
out-year savings (5 percent real discount rate) from vehicles that would not be operational until about 2005.
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Box l-G-Additio1ltlllnjo17lUllion on Costs in Other OTA Reports
LaunCh Options for the Future describes in greater detail the· mission 1llOOeis and launch system options. OTA
• considered and the methods OTA used to estimate the life-cycle costs.quoted in.this report.
• Reducing Launch Operations Costs. di$cusses criteria used for comparing space tran/iPortatlon options, and
confidence bounds on launch vehicle reliabilities.
• Big Dumb Boosters assesses proposals for designing unmanned. expendable launch vehicles to minirnizecost.
• Round Trip to Orbit discusses additional options for piloted launch. vehicles, and uncertainties in estimates of
Shuttle reliability, on which expected Shuttle failure costs depend $eDsitively.
.
• Affordable Spacecraft discusses payload costs, assesses proposals for reducing them, and discusses their effects
on demand for space transportation.
SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1990.

INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION
AND COOPERATION
This decade has seen the rise of intergovernmental
competition in space transportation (figure 1-1). The
Soviet Union. Europe, Japan. and China operate
launch systems capable of reaching space with
sizable payloads. A number of experts have raised
doubts about the capability of the U.S. private sector
to compete for launch services in the world market.
especially in the face of a relatively small market for
commercial launch services and competition from
some foreign companies, which receive greater
government subsidy than do U.S. firms. The U.S.

Government could assist the U.S. private sector
by negotiating with the governments of other
nations to ensure a competitive environment for
launch services in which prices and other economic factors reflect the true costs of providing
those services. Alternatively. the U.S. Government
could assist U.S. industry to the same degree and in
a similar manner as other nations assist their own
launch services industry. The U.S. Government also
has a stake in reducing its own costs for space
transportation. It could therefore provide modest
funding to encourage private sector innovation for
s.treamlining the manufacturing and launch operahons processes and improving productivity.
Although the United States has always main~ne~ a vigorous program of international cooperahon m space in order to support U.S. political and
economic goals, it has cooperated very little with
other countries in space transportation, in large part

because most launch technology has direct military
applications. In addition, before other countries had
developed indigenous capabilities, the United States
was pleased to have them depend on us for launch
services. If launch demand does not increase markedly by the turn of the century, and the U.S. supply
of launch vehicles remains sufficient, there may be
little reason to change the U.S. stance toward
cooperation in space transportation. However, if the
Nation wishes to expand its activities in space, the
costs of space endeavors would quickly reach the
level where a much greater degree of international
cooperation, including cooperation in space transportation, could be highly desirable.

As it debates the direction and magnitude of
the space program, Congress will have to decide,
as a matter of policy, how much of our publicly
supported space program we want to pursue
alone and how much we wish to involve foreign
partners. International cooperation lessens our ability to use space to demonstrate national technological prowess, but can place the United States in a
position to help guide the direction of global space
development. Cooperation could also reduce the
cost to the United States of a particular project,
though it would generally increase the project's total
cost. However, for potential foreign partners to

join with the United States in such projects, the
United States will have to demonstrate that it not
only has the willingness to cooperate on major
projects but the institutional mechanisms to
follow through. Our partners' recent experience
with the United States on Space Station34 and on

di 34~ome .Euro~an and Japanese delegates to the 40th Congress of the International Astronautical Federation, October 1989, expressed considerable
ssattsfaction WIth U.S. actions in Space Station development and worried that the United States was becoming an unreliable partner.
13 3sJeffrey M. Lenorovitz, "Europe Delays Soho Spacecraft Work Until U.S. Approves Joint Project MOU," Aviation Week andSpace Technology, Nov.
1989. See U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment,lnternational Cooperation and Competition in Civilian Space Activities (Washington,
: U.S. GOvenunent Printing Office, 1985), for a general discussion of U.S. cooperative agreements, mechanisms, and problems.
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This figure shows the present value, in fiscal year 1989 dollars, of the estimated life-cycle cost of
each of six space transportation options in each of three scenarios· for growth of U.S. Government
demand for transportation to and from low Earth orbit:
• Low-Growth: launch rate grows about 3 percent per year to 41 launches per year by 2010, then
remains constant through 2020.
• Growth: launch rate grows about 5 percent per year to 55 launches per year by 2010, then
remains constant through 2020.
• Expanded: launch rate grows about 7 percent per year to 91 launches per year by 2010, then
remains constant through 2020.
All options assume continued use of current vehicles-Titan IVs for heavy cargo, Delta II and/or
Atlas-Centaur II Medium Launch Vehicles for light cargo, and Space Shuttles for round-trip
miSSions (piloted launches or return of cargo to Earth)-except as noted:
• Titan IV: no exceptions.
• Enhanced Baselme: upgrade Titan IVs and Shuttles to increase reliability and reduce cost.
• Low-rate Shutt/e-C: develop the Shuttle-C expendable, unmanned, heavy-cargo launch vehicle,
and launch three per year starting 1995.
• High-rate Shuttle-C: develop the Shuttle-C and launch them at whatever rate is required to
replace Titan IVs, starting 1995.
• Advanced Launch System: develop unmanned Advanced Launch System (ALS) vehicles and
launch them at whatever rate is required to replace Titan IVs, starting 2005.
• Advanced Manned Launch System: develop Advanced Manned [aunch System (AMLS)
vehicles and launch them at whatever rate is required to replace Shuttles, starting 2005.
*Demand for piloted and light-cargo launches is the same in all scenarios; the scenarios differ
only in demand for heavy-cargo launches.
SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1990.
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·
missions 35 may diminish their interest in
sCIence
. ' h h U' ed
pursuing cooperative projects WIt t e O1t
States.
Potential areas for cooperation in space transportation include:
• The use of European and Japanese vehicles to
supply Space Station. The European Space
Agency has developed a capable launch system
(Ariane IV) and is now developing a much
more powerful Ariane V. Either vehicle could
be used to supply the Space Station. Japan is
developing its H II launch system, which will
be roughly comparable to the existing Ariane
IV. The United States could benefit by
sharing responsibility for resupply of the
Space Station with its international partners.
• Cooperation with the Soviet Union, Europe,
and Japan in space rescue.IThe Soviet Union
is presently the only country beyond the United
States with the capability to launch people into
space. However, as noted, Europe and Japan are
working on crew-carrying systems. Agreements on docking standards, and procedures for
space rescue, could increase astronaut safety
for all nations and lead to more extensive
cooperative activities in the future. Initial
meetings have been scheduled to discuss the
nature and extent of such cooperation. Both this
cooperative project and the use of foreign
vehicles to supply the Space Station have the
advantage that they risk transferring very little
U.S. technology to other participants.
• Joint development of a crew rescue vehicle for
the Space Station. The United States could be
even more innovative in cooperating with other
countries. For instance, as noted earlier, it may
decide to provide an emergency crew escape or
return vehicle for the Space Station. If properly
redesigned and outfitted, the European spaceplane, Hennes, might be used as an emergency return vehicle late in this century. Early
in the next century, the planned Japanese
HOPE spaceplane might also serve that same
purpose. 36 However, such international cooper-

Photo credit: Japa"... National $pac» Development AgtIncy

A Japanese Mu-3S-3 solid rocket launches the
interplanetary probe SUISEI toward Halley's
comet in 1985.

ation would also require a degree of international coordination and technology sharing for
which the United States has little precedent.
• Joint development of an aerospace plane. With
strong encouragement from their private sectors, Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom
are working separately toward development of
aerospace planes. The level offoreign sophistication in certain areas of advanced materials,
advanced propulsion, and aerodynamic computation is on a par with U.S. work. A joint
development program with one or more of
these partners might allow the United States to
achieve an aerospace plane faster and with
lower cost to the United States than the United
States could on its own. Although a joint

3SJeffrey M. Lenorovitz, "Europe Delays Soho Spacecraft Work Until U.S. Approves Joint Project MOU," Aviation Week andSpace Technology, Nov.
13, 1989. See U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, International Cooperation and Competition in Civilian Space Activities (Washington,
DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985), for a general discussion of U.S. cooperative agreements, mechanisms, and problems.
~HOPE is not currently being designed to carry crew. If the Japanese were interested in cooperating with the United States in this area, it may be
feastble to redesign HOPE for the purpose.
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project would risk some technology transfer, if
properly structured, such a joint project could
be to the mutual benefit of all countries
involved.
• U.S. use of the U.S.S.R. Energia heavy-lift
launch vehicle. The U.S.S.R. has offered informally to make its Energia heavy-lift launch
vehicle available to the United States for
launching large payloads. As noted throughout
this report, the United States has no existing
heavy-lift capability. Thus, the Soviet offer
could assist in developing U.S. plans to launch

large, heavy payloads, such as fuel or or othel
non-critical components of a Moon or Mars
expedition. Concerns about the transfer of
militarily useful technology to the Soviet
Union would inhibit U.S. use of Energia for
high-technology payloads. As well, NASA
would be understandably reluctant to propose
use of a Soviet launcher because such use might
be seen as sufficient reason for the United
States to defer development of its own heavylift vehicle.

Chapter 2

Space Program Futures

Photo credit: National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Earthrise as seen from above the Moon on Apollo 17, the last crew-carrying lunar flight. If the United States establishes a lunar base
sometime at the beginning of the next century, Earthrise would be a familiar sight for the inhabitants of such a base.

Chapter 2

Space Program Futures
Later chapters present launch technologies and
systems and assess their economic and technological
implications for the future of U.S. space activities.

INTRODUCTION
A the result of long-term constraints on the
Fed:ral budget, the Nation can ~ursue only a few of
th many good space transportatIon concepts that are
e posed today. Until the Nation chooses what it
P~nts to accomplish in space, and what the U.S.
:Xpayer is willing to pay for, neither the type nor
number of necessary launchers and facilities can
be estimated with accuracy. Possibl~ driving
forces behind additional space transportatiOn capabilities to support publicly funded space activities
include the Space Station, space-based ballistic
missile defense, a permanent lunar base, and landing
people on Mars. Some hav~ suggested that ~ore
modest Government expendItures are appropnate,
especially in the face of pressing domestic needs,
until we have reduced our current budget deficit and
reversed our foreign trade imbalance. Congress, the
Administration, and the American people as a whole
are faced today with making choices among these or
other, alternative options for the U.S. future in space.

SPACE PROGRAM OPTIONS
The choice among policy options such as those
summarized below will determine the demand, and
hence costs, for U.S. space transportation. The
options are not necessarily exclusive; for example,
Options 2 and 4 could be pursued at the same time.
Option 1: Continue Existing NASA and DoD
Space Programs.
This option assumes that NASA would continue
with its current plans to build the planned Space
Station and launch several large space-based observatories and robotic planetary spacecraft by the end
of the century. It also assumes that no DoD or NASA
spacecraft would weigh more than current launch
vehicles could lift.
The United States possesses a capable fleet of
launch vehicles and the facilities necessary to
meet current launch demands and provide for
limited near-term growth. By 1992, the year the
Shuttle orbiter Endeavour comes on line, planned
space transportation capability (table 2-1) would be
sufficient to lift about 900,000 pounds of payload
into low Earth orbit (LEO) I per year, assuming there
are no major delays or failures. 2 By comparison, in
1984 and 1985, the last years all U.S. launch systems
were fully operational, the United States launched an
average of about 600,000 pounds into orbit.

The tremendous economic and political changes
now taking place in the Soviet Union, Eastern and
Western Europe, the Pacific Rim nations, indeed in
the entire world, suggest that charting a course will
be fraught with considerable uncertainty about the
future, and the United States' place in the world
economy. It will be important to weigh the future
course of our Government's space activities in the
context of these uncertainties. A failure to debate
these choices vigorously and to select among them
decisively will nevertheless result in some sort of
national space program, but one that may not serve
the long-term political and economic interests of the
United States as well as a carefully considered
policy.

Launching 900,000 pounds to LEO each year
would cost the Nation about $7 billion per year for
transportation alone, assuming no major failures
occur.3 However, as the launch failures of 1985,
1986, and 1987 illustrate,4 space transportation is
risky. No launch vehicle is 100 percent reliable;
launch success rate, which is an indicator of
reliability, varies from 85 to 97 percent (table
2-2). If space transportation capacity is limited to

This chapter focuses on the broad implications for
space transportation of following specific space
program futures; they were chosen by OTA to span
the range of policy options open to the United States.

Ilb a reference orbit 110 nautical miles high, inclined to 28.5' from the equitorial plane.

~To reach 890,000 pounds per year the United States would have to launch payloads equivalent to 9 Space Shuttle flights, 6 Titan IVs, 4 Titan Ills,
5 Titan lIs, 4 Atlas Us, 12 Delta lIs, and 12 Scouts.
3This estimate, in fiscal year 1989 dollars, includes the expected costs of operations and failures. but no amortized nonrecurring costs or cost risk.
4Between November 1985 and March 1987. the United States had lost two Titan Ills. one Delta, one Atlas Centaur. the orbiter Challenger, and their
~YlOadS as a result of technical or hwnan failures. Loss of Challenger also resulted in a loss of seven crewrnembers. These failures, and the recovery
3 c:m them, cost the United States an estimated $16 to $18 billion. Arianespace, the French launch company, also sustained a launch failure of an Ariane
m May 1986. which cost insurers, Arianespace, and the European Space Agency well over $100 million.
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Table 2-1-Maxlmum Lift capability of U.S. Launch Vehicles Using Existing Manufacturing and Launch FaCilities
Launch vehicle
Mass delivereda
Production rate b
Launch ratee
Scout ............................ .
12
570
18
5,500
Titan II ........................... .
5
5
7,600
Delta II (3920)"': .................... .
12
18
AtlaslCentaur .......... , .......... .
13,500
5
4
Titan III .......................... .
27,600
10
4
Titan IV ......................... ..
39,000
6
6
Space Shuttle .................... .
52,oooe
n.a.f
9
Total .......................... .
x90 percent manifesting efflCiency!l = 890,000 pounds

Capability«!
6,840
27,500
91,200

54,000
110,400

234,000
486,460
992,400 pounds

Bpounds delivered to a 110 nm circular orbit at 28.50 inclination, unless otherwise noted.
bMaximum sustainable production rate with current facilities, in vehicles per year.
!:Maximum sustainable launch rate with current facilities, in vehicles per year.
dMass delivered X the lessor of the maximum production rate or the maximum launch rate.
8"fhis figure is an average of the three existing orbiters' performance to a 110 nm circular orbit (OV102: 45,600 pounds; OV103 and OV1 04:49,1 00 pounds).
fNot applicable since the orbiter is reusable. No orbiter production is currently planned beyond the Challenger replacement.
9Vehicles often fly carrying less than their full capacity. Manifesting efficiency is the amount of lift capability that is actually used by payloads or upper stages.
Volume constraints, scheduling incompatibilities, or security considerations often account for payload bays being less than full by weight.
SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1990.

Table 2-2-Launch Vehicle Success Rate
Launch vehicle
Scout ...................... .
Delta· ..................... .
Atlas Centaur·· .............. .
Titan ....................... .
Shuttle .................... ..

Total launches

Overall

112
182

93

Percentage successful
Last 20 attempts
95
95
85
85
95

88

66

85
95
97

145

33

·Does not include flights of Delta II.
"Does not include flights of Atlas II.
SOURCE: National Aeronautics and Space Administration & U.S. Air Force.

Lower COnfidence Bounds on Reliability for 95 Percent Confldence (in percentage)'
Launch vehicle
Scout .................................... .
Delta ..................................... .
Atlas Centaur .............................. .
Titan ................... ~ ................ .
Shuttle ................................... .

Based on all launches

Based on last 20 launches

82
89
76
91
86

78
78

66
66
78

• Exact, nonrandomized, one·sided lower confidence bounds.
SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1990.

vehicles currently in the fleet and on order, the
United States runs a significant risk that some
planned missions-most notably the Space Station--could be delayed, disrupted, or lost because of technical difficulties or accidents. If such
risks are deemed too high, additional space
transportation capacity may be needed before the
end of the century just to carry out current
plans.s Near-term additional :apacity could be
provided by one or more additional Shuttle
orbiters or a Shuttle-C.

Even if growth of the Nation's space programs is
moderate (less than 3 percent per year in terms of
total mass lifted to low Earth orbit), it would be
prudent to continue to improve the reliability and
capacity of current systems by incorporating new
technologies into launch vehicles and launch operations. A continuing program to make such improvements to systems and facilities could cost a billion
dollars per year. In addition, the United States
may need a means independent of the Shuttle for
returning crews from the Space Station in case of

SNote, however, that purchasing extra space transportation capacity carries a certain cost risk. If the extra capacity were not needed, the expenditures
would have been wasted.
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A crew emergency return vehicle and

etne~ge~~J~s to support it would add between $1

t1!e. ac I d $2 billion in development costs to
bdbon an
.
d
th
NASA'S space transportauon bu get over. e next
dec ade, Plus an unknown amount of operaung costs.
Option 2: Limit growth of NASA's activities for
humans in space.
This option would defer beginning construction
of the Space Station until the early part of the. 21 st
ntorY and place greater near-term emphasIs on
'
It
ceace science and robouc
. p1anetary expl
oratIOn.
~ould require only six to eight Shuttle flights per
year and reduce NASA's need for a heavy-lift launch
vehicle such as Shuttle-Co
Limiting Space Shuttle flights to eight per year
would reduce space transportation costs for 19892010 by about $10 billion, compared to space
transportation costs for OTA's Option I, in which
the Shuttle flight rate would increase to 12 per year
by 2005. 6 Probably, even more would be saved on
other NASA accounts, because 65 to 70 percent of
NASA's budget goes to support space activities
involving people in space-a fraction that will
increase as Space Station funding grows.
The United States possesses the technology to
improve the capabilities of existing launch vehicles
and facilities through evolutionary modifications.
Even if overall space transportation demand fell well
below U.S. capability, the incremental improvement of current vehicles and facilities could
provide a low-cost means to enhance U.S. launch
capabilities. Evolutionary improvements will be
most effective if they are guided by a long-term
plan that includes both a concrete goal and the
steps to reach it.
Option 3: Establish a lunar base or send crews to
Mars.
On the 20th anniversary of the Apollo Moon
landing, President Bush announced his intention to

support "a sustained program of manned exploration of the solar system and the permanent settlement of space."7 His vision includes the construction
of the Space Station during the 1990s and the
establishment of a permanent lunar base, as well as
human exploration of Mars sometime in the next
century (box 2-A).
A long-term program of this magnitude would
require building new heavy-lift cargo systems, such
as the Shuttle-C or the Advanced Launch System
now under study, or even larger ones,s and would
require new crew-carrying systems. It would also
need orbital maneuvering vehicles and reusable
orbital transfer vehicles. 9 In addition to scientific
instrumentation, crew accommodations, and propulsion units, cargo would consist of large amounts of
fuel and supplies to support both Moon or Mars
crews and the necessary Earth-orbit infrastructure. 10
Such a program would continue the strong dominance of government in the development and
deployment of space infrastructure and require
considerable growth in the U.S. budget for the
civilian space program.
Option 4: Continue the trends of launching
increasingly heavier payloads and/or pursue
an aggressive Strategic Defense Initiative
(SDI) test program.
The size and weight of spacecraft for communications, navigation, reconnaissance, and weather observations have been increasing slowly and have
been forcing the lift capacity of launch systems up
with them. An aggressive SDI test program would
also require vehicles of greater weight capacity than
we now possess.
Although it would be feasible to expand the lift
capacity of current launch systems to meet such
growth in payload weight, if demand is high, new,
advanced systems may be more reliable and costeffective. This option would require moderate
growth in the Nation's capacity to launch payloads.

6U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Launch Options for the Future: A Buyer's Guide, OTA-ISC-383 (Washington, DC: U.S.
Government Printing Office, July 1988). However, the average cost per launch would increase somewhat.
1President George Bush, Speech at the Smithsonian Institution's National Air and Space Museum, July 20,1989.
8National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Report of the 90-Day Study on Human Exploration of the Moon and Mars (Washington, DC:
November 1989), sec. 5.
9 An orbital maneuvering vehicle is designed to move payloads around in space within a single orbit. An orbital transfer vehicle would transfer
payloads from one orbit to another, e.g., from low-Earth transfer orbit to geosynchronous orbit.

IOJ.e., orbital maueuvering and orbital transfer vehicles, and other supporting elements.
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Box 2.A-5pace Transportation and the Human Exploration InitilltiJle
On July 20, 1989, 20 years after man first set foot on the Moon, President Bush announced
his intention to support" a sustained program of manned exploration of the solar system and the
permanent settlement of space."! In particular, the President suggested establishing a permanent
base on the Moon after the tum of the century and exploring Mars sometime later. The President's
initiative follows through on a recommendation first made to President Nixon by the Space Task
Group in 1969,2 and reexamined in the 1986 report of the National Commission on Space, 3 and
in NASA' s "Ride" report of 1987.4
Shortly afterward, NASA began a 9O-day study to frame alternative strategies for
accomplishing these goals. NASA's report starts with the assumption that "reliable access to
space will be provided through a mixed fleet of launch vehicles that includes the Space Shuttle,
existing expendable launch vehicles, and planned heavy-lift launch vehicles."s It also assumes
that the Space Station will serve as an orbital space transportation node.
The transportation needs of the Human Exploration Initiative would be substantial. NASA
estimates that in order to establish the lunar outpost, it would need a vehicle having a lift capacity
of about 60 metric tons (132,000 pounds), capable of launching a payload 7.6 meters in diameter
and 27.4 meters long. With three Space Shuttle Main Engines, the proposed Shuttle-C could carry
such a payload. NASA estimates total payload mass per year necessary to support construction
and operation of the lunar outpost would equal 110 to 200 metric tons, depending on whether or
not the lunar transfer vehicle is reusable, and whether those missions carry cargo and crews, or
cargo only. About three Shuttle-C flights would be sufficient to accomplish this task.
For the Mars mission, NASA estimates it would need a vehicle capable of lifting 140 metric
tons (308,000 pounds). This large heavy lift vehicle is about 50 percent larger than any vehicle
yet proposed for the ALS program and about twice as large as the largest Shuttle-C NASA has
contemplated. Building such a vehicle would require a new development effort, including
development of high-thrust liquid engines. Yearly masses delivered to orbit to support the Mars
mission are estimated to range between 550 and 850 metric tons (1,210,000 to 1,870,OOOpounds)
depending on mission type and the place in the overall mission schedule.
According to NASA, the existing ELY fleet, with a few enhancements, could support "all
the robotic lunar and Mars missions that are required before the human missions begin.'t6
However, some of these missions might be made cheaper or simpler if a heavy-lift vehicle were
already available. For heavy-lift capacity prior to the end of the century, NASA expects to use
its planned Shuttle-Co After that, larger, cheaper vehicles would be required to carry out the
Human Exploration Initiative.
Other groups, including the Aerospace Industries Association, and the American Institute
of Aeronautics and Astronautics, are exploring space transportation and other requirements for
the initiative. For example, a group working at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory has
suggested that the mass requirements for a Mars mission might be vastly smaller than NASA has
proposed.7 As these and other interested groups develop their proposals, space transportation
requirements will be an essential pan of planning for a return to the Moon or the exploration of
Mars.
IPresident George Bush. Speech at the Smithsonian Institution's National Air and Space Museum. July 20.1989.
2Space Task Group. The Post-Apollo Space Program: Directions for the Future. September 1969.
3Nationai Commission on Space, Pioneering the Space Frontier (New York. NY: Bantam Books, May 1986).
4Sally K. Ride. Leadership and America's Future in Space. a report to the Administrator (Washington. DC:
National Aeronautics and Space Administration. August 1987).
5Nationai Aeronautics and Space Administration. Report of the 9O-Day Study on HUlNJn Exploration of the Moon

and Mars. p. 5-1.
6Ibid .• p. 54.
7 Lowell Wood. "The Great Exploration: Assuring American Leaderhsip in Manned Exploration of the Solar
System," briefing presented to the National Space Council. Nov. 29. 1989.
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5. Develop the capability to launch
OP:~I_a~d intermediate-size payloads quickly
and efficiently to support DoD needs.
DoD space policy calls for the developme~t of a
stem or systems, to launch satellites at
h sy
lau
nc'
·th .
ed
substantially reduced c~sts. ~l lO~re~. resp~n. ess capability, rehablhty, avmlabllIty, mmnSlven, and flexibilIty,
. . . pIus the a.b'l'
tainability,
I Ity to operate
. peace, crisis, and war. The Arr Force Space
~ommand (AFSPACEC?M). has stated ~at to
perform its mission, pnmanly the operauon of
satellites, it would need the ability to schedule a
launch within 30 days, change out. pay~oads on 5
days' notice, and launch 7 satellItes 10 5 days.
AFSPACECOM noted that "the DoD's inability to
provide launch support at heighten~d conflict l~vels
has been highlighted by both polIcy emphasis on
warfighting capability and by the constriction of
DoD's launch capability caused by recent Space
Shuttle and expendable launch vehicle groundingS."ll The proposed Advanced Launch System
(ALS), with its family of launch vehicles, could help
meet the requirement for responsiveness-at least in
peacetime. ALS is also being designed for a "surge"
rate higher than average in order to recover from a
backlog or to respond in crisis.
It may be impractical to assure launch support in
wartime,12 but if such support proves practical, it
would probably require additional launch systems to
complement the ALS. For example, the National
Aero-Space Plane (NASP) Program is examining
the potential for building a highly responsive launch
system that could fly to orbit with a single propulsion stage from a conventional runway. If the
experimental X-30 that would be built in this
program proves successful, it might lead to opera-

tional vehicles that are more responsive than an ALS
and potentially as survivable as, say, SR-71 aircraft.
Small, transportable rockets, such as the Pegasus
or Taurus,13 could provide a survivable, responsive
capability to launch payloads, such as "lightsats"14
much sooner, but neither they nor operational
aerospace planes could launch the largest satellites
that have been proposed. U.S. Space Command is
currently conducting an Assured Mission Support
Space Architecture study to evaluate the potential
role of lightsats and survivable launch.

Option 6: Deploy a full-scale space-based ballistic
missile defense system and/or dramatically
increase the number and kind of other military
space activities.
Deployment of a full-scale, space-based missile
defense l5 would require large cargo vehicles that are
relatively inexpensive to launch. In 1988, the Air
Force Space Command stated that:
... deployment of a [SOl] Strategic Defense System ... will require payload capability and launch
rates beyond the capacity of present systems.
... even if available, such lift capability and launch
rates would not be affordable at today's launch
cost. 16

This remains true in 1990. The Administration has
not yet decided on the form a Strategic Defense
System would take, but AFSPACECOM established
its requirements for ALS payload capability per
launch (220,000 pounds l7 ) and per year (over 5
million pounds) to accommodate the numerous
payloads that a Phase I Strategic Defense System
might require and the very heavy payloads that a
Phase II Strategic Defense System might require. 18
A Phase I Strategic Defense System, by itself, might

IlAir Force Space Command,AFSPACECOM Statement ofOperational Need (SON) 005-88 for an Advanced Launch System (AU), Aug. 12, 1988.
lZThe Air Force Space Command recognizes that a wartime launch capability is not the only means of providing wartime mission capability;
alternatives include proliferation, hardening, or defense of satellites, or reliance on· terrestrial systems. None of these, including wartime launch, can
assure capability to perform all missions in wartime; see U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Anti-Satellite Weapons, Countermeasures,
and Arms Control, OTA-ISC-281 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing OffIce, 1985).
13See later section (ch. 4) entitled Small Launch Systems. Pegasus is being designed to launch up to 900 pounds to a 110 nautical mile orbit inclined
to 28·. Taurus should carry up to 3,000 pounds to a similar orbit.
14See U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Affordable Spacecraft--Design and Launch Alternatives, OTA-8P-ISC-60 (Washington,
DC: U.S. Government Printing OffIce, January 1990), ch. 4.
ISUnder current plans, the full-scale, space-based ballistic missile defense structure would only be undertaken in Phase II of deployment.
16Air Force Space Command, op. cit., footnote 11.
22017Specifically, AFSPACECOM requires launch of 160,000-pound payloads to polar orbit; a rocket that could do that could also launch 200,000 to
,000 pounds to a low-inclination, low-altitude orbit.
DC I8por examples, see U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, SD/: Technology, Survivability. and Software, OTA-ISC-353 (Washington,
: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 1988), pp. 148-153.
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require much less capacity,19 especially if a limited
system intended primarily for protection from a few
accidental launches is deployed. Current U.S.launch
systems can launch only about 52,000 pounds per
launch and 890,000 pounds per year. 20

In some form or another, each ofthese alternatives has been championed by one or more
advocates. Choosing among them and following
through with the necessary funding will require
political and economic consensus on the part of
the American people and continued, focused
attention from Congress and the Administration.
Meeting the space transportation needs of specific
programs is only part of the reason for making
changes to the current launch systems. Other, more
qualitative, goals serve to guide policy choices, and
may be even more important in setting the Nation's
agenda in space. For example, Congress may wish to
fund the development of critical new capabilities or
improvements to the quality of space transportation,
or Congress may wish to ensure that funding serves
a broad national objective of maintaining leadership
in space activities.

PEOPLE IN SPACE
One of the distinguishing characteristics of the
U.S. civilian space program is its emphasis on
activities by people in space, to demonstrate U.S.
leadership in the development and application of
high technology. Since the early days of the Apollo
program, the "manned" space efforts of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA) have served as a major driver of the
direction and spending of its space activities. Today,
NASA's projects involving people in space, primarily the Space Shuttle and Space Station programs,
consume about 70 percent of NASA's budget.
Critics of NASA's emphasis on humans in space,
especially individuals in the space science community, have questioned the wisdom of continuing to

emphasize these aCUVIUes because of the heavy
explicit and implicit demands they place on the.
civilian space budget. 21 In particular, critics note that
using the Shuttle to launch the Hubble Space
Telescope and large solar system probes, like
Galileo and Ulysses, subjects space science to
unnecessary reliance on the Shuttle's ability to meet
a launch schedule, and exposes the crews to unnecessary danger. Costs for launching such payloads are
generally higher on the Shuttle than with ELVs.
These critics point out that Europe and Japan, while
spending considerably less on space than the United
States, have nevertheless achieved noteworthy scientific and technological results. However, supporters of maintaining the human presence in space
argue that such activities provide essential visibility
for the U.S. space program and underscore America's international technological leadership:
The [manned] space[flight] program is a visible
symbol of U.S. world leadership; its challenges and
accomplishments motivate scientific and technical
excellence among U.S. students; and it provides for
a diverse American population a sense of common
national accomplishment and shared pride in American achievement. 22

Current administration space policy calls for
demonstrating U.S. leadership by expanding
"human presence and activity beyond Earth orbit
into the solar system," and developing "the Space
Station to achieve permanently manned operational
capability by the mid-1990s. "23 This policy directs
NASA to improve the Space Shuttle system and start
the Space Station by the mid-1990s. It also directs
NASA to establish sustainable Shuttle flight rates
for use in planning and budgeting Government space
programs, and to pursue appropriate enhancements
to Shuttle operational capabilities, upper stages, and
systems for deploying, servicing, and retrieving
spacecraft as national requirements are defined. 24
Recently, President Bush announced his intentions
to complete the Space Station before the end of the
century, establish a permanent Lunar base at the

19In u.s. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Launch Options for the Future: A Buyer's Guide, OTA-ISC-383 (Washington, DC: U.S.
Government Printing Office. July 1988), OTA assumed that 50 Titan IV launches per year, in addition to launches for other missions. would suffice to
deploy and maintain a representative Strategic Defense System. This corresponds to 2 million pounds per year.
2IlIbid., p. 3, table 2-1.
21Robert L. Park. "America's $30 Billion Pie in the Sky," Washington Post, Jan. 21, 1990, p. B3; Robert Bless. "Space Science: What's Wrong at
NASA," Issues in Science and Technology, winter 1988-89, pp. 67-73; Bruce Murray. "Civilian Space: In Search of Presidential Goals." Issues in Science
and Technology, spring 1986, pp. 25-37.
22John M. Logsdon, "A Sustainable Rationale for Manned Space Flight," Space Policy, vol. 5,1989. pp. 3-6.
23The White House. Office of the Press Secretary, "National Space Policy," Nov. 2,1989.
24Ibid.
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of the next century, and later send crews
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to explore Mars.
hi ving each of these goals would be expen. ~ I e the Apollo era, the Nation had the wellSlve.
fin dn political goal 0 f 1and'mg a man on the Moon
d~~ a decade and returning him safely, a goal that
WI .ed the rest of the space program and a large
~m; et commitment with it. If the budget for space
uti~itieS were unlimited and if the needs of the
8C
arious space interests could all be met equally well,
~en many space program goals might be usefully
ursued at the same time. However, as a result of the
~urrent budgetary stringency, and many demands on
the Federal budget, Congress must choose among
competing ideas for the United St~tes to demonstrate
its leadership, rather than attemptmg to demonstrate
leadership across the board as it once did. 26
In contrast to U.S. civilian activities, the military
space program has spent relatively little on crews in
space, despite numerous efforts over the years by
some to identify military missions that would
require crews. Indeed, DoD has recently reaffrrmed
that it has no requirements for crews in space,
although the Air Force has articulated requirements
for piloted aerospace vehicles. Production of a
piloted aerospace plane for military use, such as is
contemplated for a follow-on to the current National
Aero-Space Plane Program, would reverse DoD's
historical stance.
...-- Expanded commitment to crews in space, as
contemplated by NASA and the Air Force, would
require increasing budgetary outlays and require the
development of new crew-carrying space vehicles.
These systems would be costly to develop, but might
return their investment over time if operational costs
can be kept extremely low.

To illustrate the problem Congress faces, the
Space Shuttle system and the Space Station, both of
which require crews, dominate NASA's budget for
the 1990s. 27 As noted in a 1988 Congressional
Budget Office report, simply to maintain NASA's
"core program," which includes these major programs, but no large additional ones, will require
NASA's overall budget to grow from $10.5 billion
in fiscal year 1989 to about $14.4 billion in fiscal
year 1995. 28 NASA plans to spend about $2.5 billion
per year for investment in its space transportation
system, including improvements to the Shuttle, an
advanced solid rocket motor, and in-orbit transportation vehicles. Operating the Shuttle will cost at least
$2.0 billion per year. Anything new, such as an
additional orbiter beyond OV-105, major modifications to the Shuttle, a Shuttle-C, a Personnel Launch
System, or an emergency crew return vehicle, will
add to these costs.
Spaceflight is inherently risky. As noted in a
previous section, the exact reliability of the Shuttle
system is uncertain, but experts estimate that it lies
between 97 and 99 percent. Therefore, the United
States may expect to lose or severely damage one or
more orbiters within the next decade, perhaps with
loss of life. One of the major challenges for the U.S.
civilian space program will be to learn how to
reconcile America's goals for the expansion of
human presence in space with this potential for loss
oflife. In particular, if the United States wishes to
send people into space on a routine basis, the
Nation will have to accept the risks these activities
entail. If such risks are perceived to be too high,
the Nation may wish to reduce its emphasis on
placing humans in space.

2S"Remarks by the President at the Twentieth Anniversary of Apollo Moon Landing," The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, July 20, 1989.
Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Civilian Space Policy and Applications, OTA-STI-177 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government
Prin~U.s.
ung Office, June 1982), ch. 3.
.
IS

27Most of President Bush's requested 20 percent budget increase for NASA in fiscal year 1990 derived from increases to build the Space Station, which
now scheduled for completion in 1999.
2SU.S. Congress, Congressional Budget Office, The NASA Program in the 1990s and Beyond (Washington, DC: May 1988), pp. x-xiv.
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The Titan IV launch vehicle lifts off from Space Launch Complex 41 at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station.
This launcher will be the workhorse launcher for the Air Force for at least the next decade.
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Chapter 3

Space Transportation Demand and Costs
-

Projections of demand for U.S. transportation to
and from low Earth orbit vary from about 600,000
pounds to more than 4 million pounds of payload per
year. The lower projections are based on an assumption that the tonnage launched annually will grow
slowly for the next two decades.lrhe higher projections are based on an assumption that the United
States will undertake an ambitious space initiative,
such as deployment of a space-based missile defense
system, establishment of a manned base on the
Moon, or a manned expedition to Mars. Because
there is no broad consensus on the desirability of
these proposals and on the willingness to pay for
them (nor even on how much they would cost),
post-1995 demand for U.S. space transportation is
highly uncertain.! This uncertainty makes rational
choice among options for improving the Nation's
space transportation systems extremely difficult.
Nevertheless, failing to choose an alternative now
could leave the United States incapable of meeting
future needs, or paying for excess capacity.

-

deploy the Space Station in the mid-1990s
while expanding the NASA science program and continuing the trend oflaunching
heavier military satellites (options 4 or 5),
or
send humans to Mars and establish a base
on the Moon, or deploy a layered ballisticmissile-defense system in orbit (options 3
or 6).

The mission models differ only in demand for
heavy-cargo launches; they are identical in postulated demand for light-cargo launches and piloted
missions. By largely ignoring the weights, sizes, and
destinations of individual payloads, these simplified
mission models help focus OTA's broad-brush
analysis on the sensitivity of costs to gross demand.4
OTA calculated the life-cycle cost of servicing the
demand postulated by each mission model with each
of five different combinations of types ("fleets" of
launch vehicles-box 3-A).5 Although intangible
benefits such as "space leadership" may be
weighed in comparing the options, the most appropriate economic yardstick is life-cycle cost (box
3-B), discounted to reflect the opportunity cost to the
Nation of diverting funds from competing demands
on the Federal budget.

In the face of such uncertainty, OTA analyzed the
space transportation needs for three scenarios (called
mission models) for growth of demand:

• Low-Growth: launch rate grows about 3 percent per year to 41 launches per year by 2010,
then remains constant through 2020.

• Growth: launch rate grows about 5 percent per
year to 55 launches per year by 2010, then
remains constant through 2020.
• Expanded: launch rate grows about 7 percent
per year to 91 launches per year by 2010, then
remains constant through 2020. 2

THE MOST ECONOMICAL
OPTIONS
Figure 3-1 shows OTA' s estimate of the discounted life-cycle cost of each of five space transportation options in each of the three OTA mission
models. Estimated life-cycle costs increase with
increasing demand, even though cost per pound of
payload (not shown) would decrease with increasing
demand.

These mission models represent, respectively, the
approximate demand that would likely result from
efforts to:
-

maintain the existing course of NASA and
DoD space programs (option 1),3

lEstimates of demand through 1995 are relatively accurate. because the lead time for payload development is so long.
2Presumably. Govenunent demand for space transportation would depend on space transportation costs. but there have been few efforts to forecast
the price elasticity of demand for space transportation. For two examples. see DoD and NASA. National Space Transportation and Support Study
1995-2010. Annex B: Civil Needs Data Base. Version 1.1. Volume I-Summary Report. Mar. 16. 1986. pp. 3-31.3-32: and Gordon R. Woodcock.
"Economics on the Space Frontier: Can We Afford It?" SSI UpdJJte (Princeton. NJ: Space Studies Institute. May/June 1987).
3Option 2 would fit within this scenario, but would save about $10 billion by reducing the total mass of payload launched to orbit.
4A more detailed analysis would examine the sizes and weights of expected payloads and match them up with expected launch vehicles. However.
in most cases. pursuing such a detailed analysis for periods beyond 5 or 10 years would yield no additional insight, as the characteristics of payloads
that far in the future are extremely poorly known.
sSee also U.S. Congress. Office of Technology Assessment. Launch Options/or the Future: A Buyer's Guide. OTA-ISC-383 (Washington. DC: U.S.
Government Printing Office. July 1988). table 1-1.
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1J~;,x 3·A-Mixed Fleet

Options

.
th"e United States will probably want to perfonn such a variety of
In the future, as 10 the ~ast. f ftypes of launch vehicles-a "mixed fleet"-will be needed, for
missions iJ1 spa~. ~at. a vanety ~n(ly. The current mixed fleet includes the Scout, Delta, Atlas, and
operational flexlb~hty I~ not ecolltd yversions of each), as well as the Shuttle and a few new, small,
Titan launchers (1Ocluding seve~ le# such as the Conestoga and Pegasu~. In the near ~ture, most
privately d~veloped l~unch vehie i~n, Shuttle, and Medium Launch Vehicles (the Medium Launch
payloads will be carned by the l' dId the Medium Launch Vehicle II from the Atlas).
y, hi I . derived from the Delta. a
.
ul be
e eels
. 'Iflg these launch systems, or develop1Og a new one wo d
To estimate wheth~r Improv~ compared the life-cycle costs of servicing postulated Gove~ent
economical, OTA has estimated a 11 n'lixed fleets. OTA considered using one of the mixed fleets 10 two
demand with each of five diffe~flt p xed-fleet options were considered (see figure 3-1). Although most
different ways; hence a total ofsl" 111"stem under consideration, or the primary cargo vehicle (e.g., Titan
options were named after the neW S~anned launch vehicles would be used in each option:
.
IV) a mixed fleet of crewed and U
'
.
'1"t~~m IVs for heavy cargo, Delta II and/or Atlas-Centaur II Medium
• Titan N: Continue to use ~go and Space Shuttles for round-trip missions (manned launches
'
Launch Vehicles for light C
.
.
.
Sh tl
.
Or return of cargo to Eartlt)·
'.
edi ,ately begm upgrading Titan IVs and Space ut es to 10crease
• Enhanced Baseline. IJ1lITl ~eanwhile, use Titan IVs for heavy cargo, Delta II or Atlas-Centaur
reliability and reduce co.st.
for light cargo, and Space Shuttles for round-trip missions.
II Medium Launch Vehicles ,
.
,
d h
di~tely begm develop1Og Shuttle-C expendable, unmanne , eavy• Low-rate Shuttle-.C: Imm~ 9~5, begin launching three per year to carry some cargo that would
cargo l~unch vehicles. In Ti-1an IVs, Medium Launch Vehicles, and Space S~~ttles. .C~ntinue
otllerwlse be launched. 011 ~unch Vehicles, and Space Shuttles for the remaIn10g missions.
to use Titan IVs, MedlUJll cJJately begin developing expendable, unmanned, Shuttle-C heavy• High-rate Shuttle~C: lnuJl~~95, begin launching them at whatever rate is required to replace
cargo launch vehicles. III
carry some cargo that would otherwise be launched on Medium
Titan IVs. They would also Shuttles. Continue to use Medium Launch Vehicles and Space
. Launch Vehicles an~ ~pac~Ssions.
..
Shuttles for the remaInIng. :;6egin developing unmanned Advanced Launch System (ALS)
• Adv?nced Laun~~ .Sy~te"i~~ for them to supersede Titan IVs in 200~. They would also carry
vehtcles and factittles 10 t er.vise be launched on Medium Launch Vehicles ~n~ Spa~ ~huttles.
some cargo that woul~ othLa,..nch Vehicles and Space Shuttles for the remaImng mtSSlons.
Continue to use Medium ch System: Begin developing Advanced Manne~ Launch Sy~tem
• Advanced M~nned Lau"UitJes in time for them to supersede S~a~e Shuttles 10 2005. Contmue
(AMLS) vehicles and fa c . r1l Launch Vehicles for one-way miSSions.
use Titan IVs and MedlU
to
.
h ~ the Scout, Conestoga, and Pegasus-are expected to carry a small
Small launch vehicles-suC a?i and contribute a small fraction oftotallaunch cost. They were not
fraction of. total Go~ernment'paY~~eet options for this reason, not because of any judgment that they
explicitly 10cluded 10 the mtxed cl missions.
would be uneconomical for selecte
SOURCE: Office of Technology AssessJ1l

en~' 1990.
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Figure 3-1-Dlscounted Llfe-Cycle Costs of Space Transponatlon Options
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This figure shows the present value, in fiscal year 1989 dollars, of the estimated life-cycle cost of
each of six space transportation options in each of three scenarios' for growth of U.S. Government
demand for transportation to and from low Earth orbit:
• LDw-Growth: launch rate grows about 3 percent per year to 41 launches per year by 2010, then
remains constant through 2020.
• Growth: launch rate grows about 5 percent per year to 55 launches per year by 2010, then
remains constant through 2020.
• Expanded: launch rate grows about 7 percent per year to 91 launches per year by 2010, then
remains constant through 2020.
All options assume continued use of current vehicles-TItan IVs for heavy cargo, Delta II and/or
Atlas-Centaur II Medium Launch Vehicles for light cargo, and Space Shuttles for round-trip
missions (piloted launches or return of cargo to Earth)--except as noted:
• Titan IV: no exceptions.
• Enhanced Baselme: upgrade Titan IVs and Shuttles to increase reliability and reduce cost.
• LDw-rate Shuttle-C: develop the ShutUe-C expendable, unmanned, heavy-cargo launch vehicle,
and launch three per year starting 1995.
• High-rate Shuttls-C: develop the ShutUe-C and launch them at whatever rate is required to
replace Titan IVs, starting 1995.
• Advanced Launch System: develop unmanned Advanced Launch System (ALS) vehicles and
launch them at whatever rate is required to replace TItan IVs, starting 2005.
• Advanced Manned Launch System: develop Advanced Manned launch System (AMLS)
vehicles and launch them at whatever rate is required to replace ShutUes, starting 2005.
"Demand for piloted and light-cargo launches is the same in all scenarios; the scenarios differ only in demand
for heavy-cargo launches.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1990.
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Box 3-B--Cost Components

Life-cycle cost-appropriately discounted to reflect risk and opportunity cost-is the most important
economic criterion by which to compare different launch vehicle architectures. For each mission model examined
here, the option that has the lowest discounted life-cycle cost would be most economical, if the assumed discount
rate were appropriate and if the required funding were available. However, the most economical launch architecture
might be deemed unaffordable if it would require more spending in a particular year than the Executive would
budget or than Congress would authorize and appropriate for the purpose.
Life-cycle costs include both nonrecurring and recurring costs. The nonrecurring costs include costs of design,
development, testing, and evaluation (DDT &E), production of reusable vehicle systems, and construction and
equipping of facilities. The recurring costs include all costs of platmed operations, including production of
expendable vehicle systems, as well as expected costs of failures. In general, early nonrecurring investment is
required to reduce total discounted life-cycle cost.
Failure cost, a component of life-cycle cost, deserves special mention because: 1) it can be as great as the
balance of life-cycle cost, 2) it is sometimes excluded from cost estimates, and 3) it is random-hence
uncertain-and depends sensitively on the reliabilities of the launch vehicles used. These reliabilities are themselves
very uncertain-even for vehicles that have been launched more than a hundred times, and especially for vehicles
that have never been launched. Expected costs of failures are calculated from estimates of vehicle reliabilities and
estimates of the costs that would be incurred in the event of a failure (see box 3-C).
Cost risk is included in the cost estimates quoted here. Cost risk was defined in the Space Transportation
Architecture Study (STAS) as a subjectively estimated percentage increase in life-cycle cost (discounted at 5
percent) that the estimator expects would be exceeded with a probability of 30 percent, assuming certain ground
rules are met. Basically, cost risk is intended to represent likely increases in life-cycle cost caused by unforeseen
circumstances such as difficulties in technology development or facility construction. However, cost risk as defined
in the STAS does not include risks of cost growth due to mission cancellations, funding stretch-outs, or standdowns
after failure, which were excluded by the ground rules of the study. The cost risk estimates by OTA also exclude
risks of mission cancellations, funding stretch-outs, and standdowns after failures; estimation of these risks in a
logically consistent manner will require more sophisticated methods than were used here, or in the STAS. However,
OTA's cost risk estimates do include the risk of greater-than-expected failure costs.
SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment. 1990.

Box 3-C-Failure Costs
The cost of failures makes a substantial contribution to understanding the life-cycle costs of a launch system
relative to any other. A system with a high purchase cost may nevertheless be cheaper in the long run than a
lower-cost system if the former exhibits much high~r reliability. Even if both reliability and acquisition costs are
equivalent, the life-cycle costs could be very different if one system requires a much longer standdown for analyzing
and correcting a failure than another.
The expected cost of failures of launch vehicles are calculated by multiplying the number of launches planned
by the estimated probability offailure on a single launch (one minus the estimated reliability), then multiplying the
result by the estimated cost per failure. Cost per failure will generally include cost of accident investigation and
corrective action. It may also include costs of replacing and reflying lost payloads, replacing reusable vehicle
components, and delays pending completion of accident investigation.
In the Space Transportation Architecture Study (STAS), operations costs were estimated assuming that
operations would be continuous (i.e., no "standdowns"), and failure costs were estimated assuming that all lost
payloads would be replaced and reflown. The same assumptions were made in this report. Accident investigation
costs were included, but launch operations were not assumed to be suspended pending their completion. To assume
that a fleet would stand down pending completion of accident investigation requires that the opportunity costs of
delaying missions be estimated. Moreover, because some missions would be canceled as a result of the delay,
life-cycle costs would have to exclude missions not flown.
SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment. 1990.
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If facilities and fleets are sized for demand
appropriate to the Low Growth scenario, all of the
options OTA considered6 would have comparable
life-cycle costs. The estimates of expected life-cycle
costs of different options differ by only a few percent
of the estimated uncertainties ("cost risk") in those
estimates. Moreover, the theoretically most economical choice depends on the accounting horizon
assumed (Le., the last year for which estimated
recurring costs are cumulated). Building an Advanced Launch System (ALS) to supersede Titan
IV s is most economical for the nominal accounting
horizon (2020), but improving current vehicles7
would be most economical if the accounting horizon
were instead 2010 (see figure 3-2).
The probability that building an ALS would be
most economical increases with increasing demand.
In the Expanded demand scenario, the ALS is
estimated to yield savings (relative to continued use
of Titan IVs) comparable to the estimated cost risk
of the ALS option.

If demand for cargo flights were as in the
Low-Growth mission model but crew-carrying
flights were limited to 8 per year (policy option 2),
all mixed-fleet options would cost between $9
billion and $10 billion less than indicated in figure
3-1 for the Low-Growth mission model, except that
the AMLS option would cost about $7 billion less.
Thus demand for launch services is the most
important determinant of the economic value of
investing in new launch systems. An ALS is likely
to be most economical at high launch rates, but if,
instead, demand grows slowly above current launch
rates, all of the options OTA considered would have
comparable life-cycle costs. The reader is cau-

tioned that current methods of estimating launch
system costs are subjective and unreliable, and
that large development projects for new space
transportation systems are not likely to achieve
their cost or technical objectives without continuity in commitment and funding.
The costs of options that include operational
aerospace planes are highly uncertain and should be
estimated by methods designed specifically to account for such uncertainties (see below).

Cost Estimation
OTA derived the estimates in figure 3-1 using the
methods described in Launch Options for the
Future. s The nominal cost-estimating relationships9
were used, but those for Shuttle-C, the ALS, and the
AMLS have been revised.
OTA now assumes Shuttle-C development will
cost $985 million, in fiscal year 1988 dollars.1O A
Shuttle-C could be launched with two or three
engines; if it carries no more payload than a
two-engine Shuttle-C could carry, a three-engine
Shuttle-C could tolerate a failure of one of its Space
Shuttle Main Engines (SSMEs) and hence could be
more reliable than a two-engine Shuttle-C. OTA' s
cost estimates are for a three-engine Shuttle-C,
which NASA estimates would cost $424 million per
launch, if launched with engines that have been used
one time on a Shuttle flight. ll NASA has not
estimated the reliability of a three-engine ShuttleC;l2 OTA's cost estimates are based on an assumed
reliability of 97 percent. l3 NASA estimates a first
launch could be attempted 54 months after authority
to proceed (with development) is granted;14 OTA
assumes operational launches will begin in 1995.

6Congress prohibited development of the Transition (or Interim Advanced) Launch System; see 101 Stat. 1066.
7The Shuttle, Titan IVs, and Delta lIs or Atlas-Centaur lis.
sU.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, op. cit., footnote 5. Launch Options/or the Future contained some errors, most notably: (1) The
inadvertent use of Design, Development, Testing and Evaluation (DDT&E) cost for the cost of procuring reusable hardware led to overestimation of
the costs of the Transition, ALS, and Shuttle options. The magnitude of the errors in life-cycle cost estimates was smaller than the estimated uncertainty;
correcting them did not change the rank of the most economical option for each mission model. OTA is indebted to Mitch Weatherly of General Dynamics
Space Systems Division for pointing out anomalies that led to OTA's discovery of this error. (2) The statement on p. 40 that "Shuttle-C would pay for
itself after being used for Space Station deployment alone" is incorrect; cf. box 7-3 on p. 69: "Shuttle-C ... could provide useful flexibility ... at a small
premium in life-cycle cost."
9lbid., table A-I. p.82.
10$1.114.3 million in fiscal year 1991 dollars-Jack Walker, MSFC, facsimile transmission. Jan. ll. 1990.
11$479.5 million in fiscal year 1991 dollars-ibid.
12Ed Gabris. NASA HQ. Code MD. personal communication, Jan. 17. 1990.
13"Shuttle/Shuttle-C Operations. Risks. and Cost Analyses." LSYS-88-008 (El Segundo, CA: L Systems, Inc., July 21. 1988), postulated a reliability
between 97.5 and 98.9 percent, with 98 percent the "average." OTA multiplied this "engineering estimate" by 99 percent to account for the unreliability
of humans and other unmodeled systems and processes. See U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment. footnote 5, p. 85.
14Ed Gabris, NASA HQ. Code MD, personal communication, Jan. 17. 1990.
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Figure 3-2-5ensitlvlty of Life-Cycle Costs to Accounting Horizon
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OTA now assumes ALS development will cost
$7.3 billion (in fiscal year 1988 dollars), facilities
(including one pad) will cost $3.9 billion plus $150
million times the peak annual ALS launch rate in
excess of 25 per year, operations will cost $70
million per launch (of which about $17 million will
be for the expendable launch vehicle), and the
"engineering estimate" of reliability on ascent is
98.4 percent. 15 The estimates of recurring cost per
launch and reliability are for a liquid-fueled version
of the proposed ALS expendable launch vehicle at a
rate of 10 per year. 16

OTA assumes Advanced Manned Launch System
(AMLS) costs will be as estimated for the proposed
Shuttle II described in Launch Options for the
Future but now assumes AMLS will begin operating
in 2005. NASA is considering several alternative
concepts as follow-ons to the Shuttle, including the
AMLS and Personnel Launch System (PLS)P
NASA has awarded Rockwell International a contract to flesh out several alternatives, estimate their
costs, and help weed out the less promising ones.
The estimates in figure 3-1 include costs incurred
from 1989 to 2020. In Launch Options for the

15The ALS Joint Program Office estimates that operation could begin in 1998. but a recurring cost of $70 million per launch would not be achieved
until 2005.
16As before. and as for other launch vehicles, OTA assumes the operational reliability on ascent will be 99 percent of the engineering estimate of
reliability, and the operational reliability on return, given successful ascent, will be 99 percent.
17See ch. 7. For a more detailed description of these alternatives. see: U.S. Congress. Office of Technology Assessment. Round Trip To Orbit: Human
Spaceflight Alternatives--Special Report. OTA-ISC-419 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, August 1989). pp. 53-56.
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Future, OTA did not accumulate recurring costs
after 2010, because demand after 2010 is highly
uncertain. Hjlliev~L, not aC<::J!UljJlating~Q.!its bey<mg
2010migliiunfairlypenalize options that~II!f!\!g~_
advancedn-Slenij:becauselfaIlow-s onlY-S years for
die-annual savings expected from an ALS or AMLS
to pay back the substantial initial investment that
would be required to reduce annual costs. Hence it
is also instructive to compare life-cycle costs over a
longer life cycle. Figure 3-2 shows the life-cycle
costs of the same options for accounting horizons
ranging from 2010 to 2020, and shows that extending the accounting horizon did not significantly
affect the ranking of the options: all are roughly
comparable at Low-Growth launch rates, while an
ALS is estimated to be significantly less costly than
the other options at Expanded launch rates.

AEROSPACE PLANES
OTA has considered an option for developing and
using aerospace planes incorporating NASP technology to supersede the Shuttle and complement
Titan IVs. Aerospace planes, if successful, could be
operated with greater responsiveness, flexibility,
and economy than could rocket-powered launch
vehicles.
However, it is not yet possible to estimate the
life-cycle cost of such an option in the conventional
manner, which depends on extrapolating or interpolating curves showing how subsystem costs depend
on design parameters, such as subsystem weight.
Similar curves are obtained for the costs of operational procedures as functions of labor and equipment requirements. Such curves are obtained by
fitting a curve of a given type-e.g., a line-to
points representing the costs and weights (etc.) of
technologically similar subsystems that have been
built and the costs of which are known. 18 However,
the experimental X-30 and operational vehicles
derived from NASP technology, which would use
air-breathing engines for propulsion most or all of
the way to orbit, would have systems so unlike any
previously developed that no data points exist to
which cost curves for key systems, such as engines,
could be fit. Further, the feasibility of such aerospace
planes remains unproven. Hence subjective engineering judgment must playa greater role than usual
in estimating the costs of operational vehicles.

Moreover, the reusability of operational vehicles
would make the average cost per flight extremely
sensitive to parameters such as maintenance manhours per sortie and the probability of catastrophic
failure, both of which OTA regards as extremely
uncertain. These quantities were underestimated in
the case of the Space Shuttle, the orbiter of which
was designed for 100 flights. This led to underestimation of average cost per flight. As currently
envisioned, operational aerospace planes would be
designed to last 500 flights, so their average cost per
flight will be more sensitive to greater-thanexpected probability of catastrophic failure. Currently, the NASP Joint Program Office assumes that
the probability of catastrophic failure will fall
between 0.1 percent and 0.5 percent. The average
cost per flight will also be sensitive to shorter-thanexpected wearout life. Airplanes, of course, are
designed for many more uses, but extensive reliability and maintenance data for technologically similar
airplanes is usually available.
Building and flying X-30s would demonstrate the
feasibility of single-stage, air-breathing, rocketassisted, reusable launch vehicles and would provide
data for anchoring cost estimates. It would also
provide data on which reliability estimates could be
based. Partially subjective but logically consistent
methods will be needed to predict operational
aerospace plane reliability on the basis ofX-30 flight
test data (see app. A).
Making aerospace planes extremely reliable will
be important for reasons other than cost, because
they might fly many-perhaps half-ofthe missions
that Titans would otherwise fly, as well as the
missions that the Shuttle or an AMLS could accept.
Thus aerospace plane crews would have greater
exposure to risk than would Shuttle or AMLS crews.
The life-cycle cost of an option that includes
spaceplane development, flight testing, and-if
successful-production and operation, will depend
not only on the actual reliability ofthe plane but also
on the reliability the plane is required to demonstrate
in flight tests and on the type and level of confidence
with which it is required to demonstrate that
reliability (see app. A).

18See u.s. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Reducing Launch Operations Costs: New Technologies and Practices, OTA-TM-ISC-28,
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, September 1988), app. A, for a discussion of cost-estimating relationships.

Chapter 4

Existing Launch Systems

Photo credit: u.s. Air Fo~

The first commercial Titan lifts off from space launch complex 40 at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station. This commercial Titan carried
a Japanese communications satellite and a Skynet communications satellite for the British Defense Ministry.
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Existing Launch Systems
EXPENDABLE LAUNCHERS

firms, which sell launch services to the Government
and other domestic and foreign buyers (box 4-A).
The U.S. Air Force owns and launches the Titan IV.
The Air Force also operates the launch complexes
for all medium-lift ELVs, whether for Government
or commercial launches. 2

Originally developed in the 1960s from intermediate-range ballistic missiles (lRBMs) and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), the three primary
U.S. expendable launch vehicles (ELVs) have
evolved into launchers capable of launching payloads of 7,600 pounds to 39,000 pounds into low
Earth orbit (LEO)--{figure 1-1).l Though the Delta
II, Atlas II, and Titan III were developed with
Government funds, commercial versions of these
vehicles are now owned and operated by private

Until the Shuttle was developed, these ELVs were
the only means the United States had for placing
payloads into orbit. During the early 1980s, when
the United States was pursuing a policy to shift all
payloads to the Shuttle, the Government decided to
phase ELVs out of production. Although the Government had in theory turned its ELV fleet over to
the private sector for commercial exploitation, it had
priced Shuttle launch services so low that private
launch companies were unable to make a profit
competing with the Government. 3 However, following the loss of Challenger, policymakers realized
that policies that forced reliance on a single launch
system and prevented private launch companies
from entering the market were unwise. 4 Hence, the
Nation now follows a policy requiring a "mixed
fleet" (both Shuttle and ELVs) to support Government needs, and a concomitant policy encouraging
private ownership and operation of ELVs. The
Commercial Space Launch Act of 1984 (Public Law
98-575), assigned the Department of Transportation
(DOT) responsibility for overseeing commercial
ELVoperation.

THE SPACE SHUTTLE
Designed to carry crews as well as cargo to space,
the Space Shuttle is a piloted vehicle capable of
lifting 52,000 pounds to LEO.s It is the Nation's
largest cargo carrier. It was the world's first partially
reusable Earth-to-orbit launch vehicle. Begun in
1972, the Space Shuttle was first launched in April
1981. As of February 15, 1990, NASA has launched
the Shuttle 33 times, but experienced one tragic
failure when one of Challenger's Solid Rocket
Boosters burned through in January 1986.

Photo credit: McDonnell Doug/as Corp.

Delta expendable launch vehicle, lifting off from Cape
Canaveral Air Force Station, carrying the Delta Star
("Wooden Stake") Spacecraft for the Strategic Defense
Initiative Organization.

lFor example, a series of upgrades has increased the Delta's payload capability from several hundred pounds to 7,600 pounds (for the Delta 3920).
2The launch services companies reimburse the Air Force for use of the launch complexes for cornrnerciallaunches.

3See the extensive discussion of Shuttle pricing in the mid-1980s and the contradictory policy of encouraging the private sector in: U.S. Congress,
Office of Technology Assessrnent,lnternalional Cooperation and Competition in Civilian Space Activities, OTA-ISC-239 (Springfield, VA: National
Technical Infonnation Service, July 1985), ch. 5.
4See John M. Logsdon, "The Space Shuttle Program: A Policy Failure?" Science, vol. 232, pp. 1099-1105.
sTo a standard orbit 110 nautical miles high, at 28.5" inclination.
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The United States today depends entirely on the
Space Shuttle for transporting crews to and from
space. In space, the Shuttle functions as a vehicle for
launching spacecraft, and also serves as a platform
for experiments in science and engineering. During
the late 1990s, NASA intends to use the Space
Shuttle to deploy and service the planned Space
Station.
As the Nation looks toward the future of piloted
spaceflight, it may wish to improve the Shuttle's
reliability, performance, and operational efficiency.
Eventually, additions to the Shuttle fleet or replacement Shuttles will likely be desirable. This section
summarizes the major issues related to maintaining
and improving the Space Shuttle.

Shortcomings of the Space Shuttle
The heavy U.S. dependence on the Space Shuttle
raises questions concerning the longevity of the
Shuttle fleet and the risk that orbiters might be
unavailable when needed.

• NASA's Flight Schedule. NASA has estimated
that 14 Shuttles can be launched per year from the
Kennedy Space Center with existing facilities,6
yet it has never launched more than 9 Shuttles per
year. Some experts7 doubt that 14 launches per
year can be sustained with a 4-orbiter fleet
without adding new facilities and launch operations staff.

6Enclosure to letter from Darrell R. Branscome, NASA Headquarters, to Richard DalBello, Office of Technology Assessment, Mar. 31, 1988.
'National Research Council, Committee on NASA Scientific and Technological Program Reviews, Post-Challenger Assessment of Space Shuttle
Flight Rates and Utilization (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, October 1986), p. 15; Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel, Annual Report
(Washington, DC: NASA Headquarters, Code Q-l, March 1989), p. iv.
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Keeping the ••turnaround time," or total shifts
required to prepare an orbiter again for launch
after a flight, short is essential for reducing the
cost per flight and increasing the sustainable flight
rate. NASA will have difficulty reaching and
sustaining a rate of 14 flights per year unless it is
able to tlnd ways of sharply reducing its current
turnaround time. 8 Its present goal of 14 flights per
year assumes a processing schedule having little
margin for contingencies. Yet NASA is not
achieving the reductions of turnaround time it had
anticipated, especially for the orbiter. 9 In addition,
some NASA officials have expressed concern that
the planned 90-day standdown for each orbiter
every 3 years, to make structural inspections and
modifications, may not be sufficient to accomplish all necessary work.

• Inflexibility. If NASA were to prove capable of
launching 14 Shuttle flights per year, scheduling
launches at the maximum sustainable launch rate
would leave no margin to accommodate a sudden
change in launch plans or to fly extra missions on
a surge basis. 10 If more margin were reserved in
Shuttle launch schedules, an orbiter could be on
hand to be outfitted quickly for an unplanned
mission_ However, even with more margin, preparing an orbiter for an unscheduled mission, such
as a Space Station rescue, could take as long as a
few months because of the lead time required for
mission planning, orbiter processing, and crew
training. 11 If the Nation wishes to improve the
safety of its crew-carrying space flight program while increasing its flexibUity, NASA and
the Def'ense Department will have to allow
more lDargin in Shuttle launch schedules

(which implies fewer launches per year) and
provide alternative ELVs.
• Risk of Attrition. Each time NASA launches the
Shuttle it incurs a risk of losing an orbiter from
equipment failure or human error. The Shuttle's
success rate is 32 out of 33 flights, or 97 percent
(table 2_2).12 Estimates of Shuttle reliability
generally vary between 97 and 99 percent. For
example, the late Richard Feynman, a member of
the Presidential Commission appointed to investi~
gate the Challenger accident, called the ShUttle
" ...relatively unsafe... , with a chance of failure
on the order of a percent. "13 A NASA contractor
estimated that post-Challenger Shuttle reliability
lies between 97 and 98.6 percent, with the most
likely cause of failures identified as propulsion
failures during ascent. 14 One NASA division
estimated that on the Galileo mission, which was
launched October 1989, the orbiter had a 99.361
percent probability of remaining intact Until
deployment of the Jupiter-bound Galileo space
probe began,15 yet another NASA division esti~
mated the probability would likely lie between 35
in 36 (97.2 percent) and 167 in 168 (99.4
percent).16 If Shuttle reliability is 98 per~nt,
launching Shuttles at the rates now planned
would make it unlikely that Space Station
assembly could begin before another orbiter is
lost (figure 4-1).

Options for Reducing the Risks
of Depending on the Shuttle
• Reduce the Shuttle flight rate. The Nation could
restrict Shuttle payloads to those requiring hUman
intervention, and fly other payloads on El..Vs.

&Por instance. NASA is designing the Advanced Solid Rocket Motor. which is now under development. to be capable of much quicker assembl)' than
the existing redesigned solid rocket motors.
9NASA Kennedy Space Center briefmg. Apr. 26. 1989.
10When a launch accident or other incident causes a long delay in spacecraft launches. it may become necessary or prudent to fly off any backlog of
payloads as quicldy as possible after recovery in a "surge" of launchcs.
llNonnally. Shuttle crews. payloads. and specific orbiter are chosen up to 2 years prior to a flight. in order to provide enough time for payload
integration and crew training.
12por comparison. success rates experienced by expendable launch vehicles range between 85 and 95 percent (table 2-2).
13"Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident." app. F. (Washington. DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.
1986); R.P. Feynman. What Do You Care What Other People Think? (New York. NY: W.W. Norton & Co.• 1988). p. 236.
14J..-SystelDs. Inc .• Shuttle/Shuttle-C Operalions, Risks, and Cost Analyses. LSYS-88-008 (El Segundo. CA: 1988).
15Qeneral Electric Astro Space Division. Final So/ety Analysis Repon II/or the Galileo Mission. doc. 87SDS4213 (Valley Forge. PA: General Electric
Astro Space Divisioo. August 1988). However. NASA supplied no rationale for its estimates of failure probabilities from which General Electric
calculated this probability. and NASA instructions had the effect of masking the overall W1Certainty.
16NASA Headquarters. Code QS./ndependenl Assessnumt ofShuttle Accident Scenario Probabilities/or the Galileo Mission. vol. I. April 1989. Th~
probability of orbiter recovery after the Galileo mission would be comparable to the missioo success probability. because the most likely CllUSes of a
missioo failure would probably destroy the orbiter.
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Photo credit: National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Space Shuttle orbiter Atlantis lands at Edwards Air Force Base after completing a successful 5-day mission in which astronauts
deployed the Galileo planetary spacecraft. destined for Jupiter.

This would reduce the Shuttle flight rate and
orbiter attrition. For example, the recently
launched Galileo spacecraft, which is destined to
explore Jupiter's atmosphere and moons,17 could
have been launched on a Titan III or Titan IV.
Except for many materials processing or life
science experiments, which require human attention, most payloads could be launched on unpiloted vehicles. The Air Force has now remanifested most of its payloads previously scheduled for the Shuttle on the Titan IV, which made
its maiden flight on June 14, 1989. 18

• Improve the safety and reliability of Shuttle
orbiter. Purchasing an additional orbiter of the
same design as Endeavour (OV -105), which is
scheduled for delivery in 1991, would not reduce
the risks to which Shuttle orbiters, crews, and
payloads are now exposed. However, the safety
and reliability of the orbiter could be improved
(table 4-1). In addition, the orbiter could be
modified to remain in orbit longer by adding
additional life support equipment, and to carry
additional payload by substituting lighter materials in current structures.

• Purchase one or more additional orbiters. If it is
judged more important to have four orbiters
available in the mid-1990s than to have high
launch rates now, Congress may wish to allow for
the potential loss of an orbiter by ordering one or
more additional orbiters as soon as possible and
limiting Shuttle launch rates.

• Improve the reliability of other Shuttle components. As the Challenger loss demonstrated, the
safety of the crew may depend critically on the
reliability of systems other than the orbiter and on
the practices and judgments of personnel. NASA
has already improved the design of the solid
rocket booster that failed during Challenger's last

17Launched on Oct. 18. 1989 on the orbiter Atlantis. Once Galileo was designed for launch on the Shuttle. changing it to allow launch on an ELY
would have been prohibitively expensive.
ISConsiderable additional experience with assembling. processing. and launching Titan IV will be necessary before it will be considered an operational
vehicle.
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Figure 4-1-Probablllty of Retaining 3 or 4 Shuttle Orbiters Over Time
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Shuttle reliability is uncertain, but has been estimated to range between 97 and 99 percent. 1 If the Shuttle reliability is 98 percent, there
would be a 50-50 chance of losing an orbiter within 34 flights. At a rate of 11 flights per year, there would be a 50 percent probability of losing
an orbiter in a period of just over 3 years. The probability of maintaining at least three orbiters in the Shuttle fleet declines to less than 50
percent after flight 113.
Although loss of an orbiter would not necessarily result in loss of life, it would severely impede the progress of the civilian space program,
as it would likely lead to a long standdown of the orbiter fleet while the cause of the failure as determined and repaired.
1L.Systems, Inc., Shutt/e/ShuttJe-C Operations, Risks, and Cost Analyses, LSYS-88-008 (EI Segundo, CA: 1988).
SOURCE: Office of Technol09Y Assessment, 1990

ascent and sucessfuUy employed the redesigned
solid rocket motors (RSRMs) in 8 flights since
September 1988. NASA is currently working on
an Advanced Solid Rocket Motor (ASRM) that
will replace the RSRM. It has also studied the
feasibility of replacing the Shuttle's solid rocket
motors with Liquid Rocket Boosters (LRBs).
NASA's studies indicate that developing Shuttle
LRBs might cost about twice as much ($3 billion)
as developing ASRMs. Nevertheless, LRBs may
be safer than ASRMs because liquid engines can
be ignited and checked before lift-off, then shut
off if faults appear. 19 If one, or even two, liquid
engines were to fail after lift-off, they could be
shut down, allowing the Shuttle to land at an
alternative landing site. They can even be throttled during launch without incurring loss of life.
Although a solid rocket motor could be designed
to have its thrust terminated during flight, doing
so on the Shuttle would lead to destructive thrust

Table 4-1-$elected Possible Improvements
for New Orbiters
Sillety and reliability
• Improved propulsion
• Simplified hydraulics
• Increased strength skins
• Improved attitude control
• Suppressed helium overpressure
Cost reductions
• Simplified cooling
• Modernized crew displays
• Improved tile durability
• Modernized telemetry

Performance
•
•
•
•

Extended duration orbiter
Weight reduction
Local structure strengthening
Global Positioning Satellite receiver-computer for navigation

SOURCE: Rockwell International Corp. and Office of Technology Assessment, 1990.

19Richard DeMeis, "Liquid Lift for the Shunle," Aerospace America, February 1989, pp. 22-25.
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imbalance. 2o NASA is currently conducting studies to understand the potential benefits and
drawbacks from substituting LRBs for solid
rocket motors.

A Shuttle Improvement Program
Making major Shuttle enhancements on an individual project-by-project basis may not be the most
efficient way to improve the Shuttle system. To
choose one improvement may mean not pursuing
another, worthwhile avenue. However, having a
versatile, capable launch fleet that provides reliable
human access to space will be essential if Congress
wishes to maintain a policy of supporting the human
presence in space. Hence, Congress may want to
consider an integrated approach to strengthening the Nation's space transportation capability
by funding a Shuttle Improvement Program
(table 4-2) lasting, for example, 10 years. Such a
program could include development of advanced
solid rocket boosters, liquid rocket boosters, and the
Shuttle-C, as well as additional, more modest,
improvements summarized in box 4-B. T,Q support
thi£ -SOrt of progr.am. _whi~lU;;9yJd~Q~_L~ _!!111ch_Cl$__
$~2Q ~m<>.np~J:-Yt!<l!: fQl"lQj'~a.r~ ~1?~~~_the cugellt
projected cost of th~__~hllttl~pr()grarIl, would require
S-pace program funding, scaling down
the Space Station program, or deferring other
programs. In addition to leveling out budgetary
requests for the lO-year period of the program, an
integrated improvement program could lead to the
development of technologies and systems that
would be needed for new crew-carrying systems
should Congress decide to pursue a more ambitious
space program in the future.

finding-extra

SMALL LAUNCH SYSTEMS
Most of the Government's attention has focused
on medium- or heavy-lift launch vehicles. 21 However, recent interest in lightweight spacecraft, designed for a range of specialized activities, such as
store-forward communications, single-purpose remote sensing, and materials processing research, has
generated a concomitant interest in small vehicles to

Photo credit Orbital Sciences Corp. and Hfircu/es Corp.

An artist's conception of the Pegasus air-launched vehicle
ascending to orbit after being launched from an aircraft.

launch them. Launchers of this class are particularly
appropriate for private sector development, as the
costs and risks are modest compared to higher
capacity launch systems. If small payloads prove
effective for a wide variety of military and civilian
uses, the demand for small launchers could grow
substantially.22
• Scout. Originally developed in the late 1950s

and early 1960s, the Scout launcher is capable
of carrying about 600 pounds to LEO. Scout is
a four-stage vehicle, propelled by solid rocket
motors, which is manufactured by the LTV
corporation under contract to NASA. As soon
as the remaining vehicles have been flown,
NASA will retire it from service, unless LTV,

lOSee u.s. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Round Trip to Orbit: HUTnIJn Spaceflight Alternatives, OTA-ISC-419 (Washington, DC: U.S.
Government Printing Office, August 1989), pp_45-48 and app. A, for a detailed comparison of solid and liquid engines.
21However, the relatively small Atlas-E (1,750 pounds to low-Earth Polar orbit) and Titan II (4,200 pounds \0 low-Earth Polar orbit) launchers. which
originally served as intercontinental ballistic missiles. have been used to launch a variety of Government payloads. Neither of these vehicles are available
for commercial use or for launching non-Government payloads.
22Lawrence H. Stem et. aI., An Assessment of Potential Markets for Small Satellites (Herndon, VA: Center for Innovative Technology. November
1989); "Lightweight Launches to Low Orbit: Will a Market Develop?" Space Markets. Summer 1987. pp. 54-58.
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Table 4-2-A Possible Shuttle Improvement Program
Options
Orbiter Improvements:
Develop alternate turbopumps for Space Shuttle main engines ...... .
Automate orbiter for unpiloted flight .............................. .
Extend orbiter flight duration ..................................... .
Built-in test equipmentc ........................................•
SOOtltfH'lmprovements:
Increase thrust of redesigned solid rocket motor (AS AM) ........... .
Continue to develop advanced solid rocket motor (ASAM) ............ .
Develop liquid rocket booster (LAB) .............................. .
OIher .,.",.nts:
Develop lightweight external tank .............................•..
Complementary Vehicles:
Develop Shuttle-C ........................................... .
Develop capsule or lifting body for Space Station escape ............. .

Cost
$228 million"
$200 millionb
$120 million
[?)C
$50 to $60 million
$1.3 to $1.8 billion
$3.5 billion

[?]

$1.5 billion
$0.7 to $2 billion

Benefit
Safety and economy
Safety
Utility
Safety and economy
More payload
Safety and more payload
Safety and more payload
More payload
For cargo
Safety

-Already funded by NASA.
bQnly $3OM to 140M for each additional orbiter.
CSee OTA-TM-ISC-28, Reducing Launch Operations Costs.
NOTE: Most ofthese options would increase Shuttle payload capability, but by different amounts; their other benefits and their dates of availability would differ.
Therefore, two or more options might be pursued, for example, ASRMs to Increase Shuttle payload capability and LRBs for increased safety and
reduced environmental impact.
SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1990.

or some other private finn, decides to offer it
commercially.23 On a cost per pound basis,
Scout offers a relatively expensive way to reach
space ($12,000 per pound).

• Pegasus. The Lightsat program, initiated by the
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
(DARPA), has created a market for at least one
new small launcher, the Pegasus, capable of
launching between 600 and 900 pounds to
LEO.24 Pegasus is a three-stage, solid-fuel,
inertially guided winged rocket that is launched
from a large aircraft. It is the fIrst all-new U.S.
launch vehicle design since the 1970s, though
it depends heavily on propulsion and systems
originally developed for intercontinental ballistic missiles; it uses engines designed for the
Midgetman ICBM.
Pegasus has been developed as a joint
venture between Orbital Sciences Corp. (OSC)
and Hercules Aerospace Co., and funded entirely with private capital. DARPA negotiated
a price of $6 million per launch for a possible
six launches. The Air Force has assumed
responsibility for the oversight of the launch of
Pegasus for Government payloads. To date,
two launches have been ordered; the fIrst one,

which will carry two payloads, is scheduled for
spring 1990.
A mobile launch system such as Pegasus
could provide a survivable means for
launching small military satellites in wartime to augment satellites launched in peacetime or replace any satellite damaged by
anti-satellite weapons. However, the Department of Defense has not stated a need for a
survivable launch capability. The fIrst flights of
Pegasus will employ a B-52 as the carrier. OSC
plans to acquire a large commercial aircraft,
such as a Lockeed L1011, to serve as a launch
platform for commercial flights. 25

• Industrial Launch Vehicle. The American
Rocket Company (AMROC) is developing a
family of suborbital and orbital rockets, called
the Industrial Launch Vehicle, powered by a
hybrid, solid-fuellliquid-oxygen engine.
AMROC's hybrid design uses liquid oxygen to
burn nonexplosive solid propellant similar to
tire rubber. Such hybrids would have some
safety advantages and might be allowed in
areas where conventional solid- or liquid-fuel
rockets are not. They could, for example, be
used to launch small satellites from mobile

23LTV and the Italian corporation SNIA BPD are discussing developing-an upgraded Scout II. capable of launching about 1,200 pounds to LEO at
a cost of about $15 million per mission.
24Joseph Alper. "Riding an Entrepreneurial Rocket to Financial Success." The Scienlist. July 25. 1988. pp. 7-8.
250n a per-poWld basis. Pegasus currently costs $6.000 to $10.000 perpound of payload. which is much higher than competing. larger launch systems.
However. for some customers. the ability to laWlch from many different locations and relatively quickly (once the concept bas been proven and
operational procedures are streamlined) will outweigh the relatively high per poWld cost of the Pegasus.

IT'
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Box 4-B-Maintaining and Improving the Cu"ent Shuttle System
Buying Additional Orbiters
Three basic options are available:

• Build a copy of OV-105
The Challenger replacement (OV-105), already
being built, includes several important improvements:
-addition of an escape hatch and pole;
-improved heat shielding tiles, strengthened
landing gear, wing structure, and engine pod;
-more than 200 internal changes, including
eiectrical rewiring and improvements in the
braking and steering systems.
• Implement additional improvements
-safety/reliability;
--cost reduction; and
-performance.
(Some of these upgrades may involve structural
changes, and therefore could not be made in
existing vehicles.)
• Reduce airframe weight-Orbiter airframe
weight reduction of 8,000 to 10,000 pounds could
be achieved through the use of:
--composite materials;
-alloys;
-intermetallic alloys; and
-high-temperature metallics.
Incremental Changes
Some alterations to the Space Shuttle system have
already been accomplished, or are already under way:
• Redesigned Solid Rocket Motors (RSRMs)
• Space Shuttle Main Engine ImprovementsSpecific efforts directed at longer life and higher
reliability include improved:
-welds;
-manufacturing techniques;
-nondestructive testing;
-heat exchangers;
--controllers;
~ngine health monitoring; and
-turbopumps.
• On-Board Computer Upgrades-Specific efforts
include:
-identical computer modules' 'mass-produced"
for economy,
--connection by optical fibers, and
-a high degree of fault-tolerance.
Other improvements NASA has considered or is
now working on:
• Extended Duration Orbiter (EDO)-NASA is
building in the capacity to extend on-orbit stays
from the current 7 days to 16-28 days.

• Automatic Orbiter Kit-An existing Shuttle orbiter could be given the capability to fly an entire
mission automatically without a crew.
• OperatimlS Improvements-Introducing a number of new technologies and management strategies to make Shuttle launch operations more
efficient and cheaper, e.g., improved Shuttle tile
inspection and repair, and expert systems for
control.
MlYor Changes
Some candidates include:
• Advanced Solid Rocket Motors (ASRMs)-These
would replace the existing RSRMs. Compared to
the RSRMs, they offer:
-up to 12,000 pounds additional lift capacity,
-better manufacturing reproducibility,
-reduced stress on the Space Shuttle Main
Engines,
--potentially higher reliability, and
--potential for enhancing competition.
• Improve Redesigned Solid Rocket Motors-The
existing RSRMs could be improved further by
redesigning them to increase their thrust. The
Shuttle's payload capacity could be increased by
6,000 to 8,000 pounds by substituting a more
energetic solid propellant and by making other
requisite changes to the motors.
• Liquid Rocket Boosters (LRBs)-They would
replace the solid boosters on the Shuttle. Compared to RSRMs, LRBs offer:
-safer abort modes;
-up to 20,000 pounds additional lift capacity;
-long history, potentially greater mission reliability;
--capabilitY of changing mission profiles more
easily;
-safer Shuttle processing flow;
-potential application as an independent launch
system; and
-better environmental compatibility.
• Materials Improvements-The emphasis on improved materials has focused particularly on
saving weight. For example, using aluminumlithium (Al-Li) for the external tank instead of the
present aluminum alloy could provide a 20 to 30
percent weight savings. Using composite
materials in the orbiter wings and other parts
could save an additional 10,000 pounds.
• Crew Escape Module-This would allow for safe
escape over a larger portion of the liftoff regime
than now possible. It would replace the escape
pole system presently in place, but would be
heavier and much more costly.

Chapter 4-Existing Launch Systems • 49

launchers. AMROC's first attempted launch of
its hybrid system on October 5, 1989 was
aborted when a liquid oxygen valve failed to
provide enough oxygen to support adequate
thrust. 26 Significantly, the rocket neither exploded nor released toxic fumes, demonstrating
one of the safety features of using hybrid
systems. Instead, it burned on the pad, doing
relatively little damage to the pad (between
$1,000 and $2,0(0) or to the two payloads it
was to carry on a suborbital flight. AMROC has
several customers interested in its launch vehicle, but to date has no firm launch contracts. TI

• Standard Small Launch Vehicle (SSLV). The
SSLV is being developed by the Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA).
DARPA recently awarded a contract for purchase of SSLV launch services to Space Data
Corp., a division of Orbital Sciences Corp. The
first stage of Space Data's Taurus SSLV will be
the first stage of an MX missile booster; the
three upper staJes of this vehicle will be the
same solid rocket engines that power the
Pegasus. Taurus is designed to carry a 1,500
pound satellite to a 400 nautical mile polar
orbit, or a 3,000 pound spacecraft to LEO. It
could even be used to launch an 830 pound
satellite to geosynchronous transfer orbit. 28
Taurus will be fully transportable and capable
of being launched quickly on a few months
notice from a variety of launch sites. The first
DARPA demonstration launch is scheduled for
July 1991. DARPA holds options for four
future flights on Taurus.
• Conestoga. Space Services Inc. (SSI) is developing a family of launch vehicles called
Conestoga, which will use Castor solid rocket
motors strapped together in different configurations to achieve payload lift capacities of 900 to
2,000 pounds to polar orbit and 1,300 to 5,000
pounds to LEO. Launch services to LEO will
cost $10 million to $20 million, depending on
payload size and vehicle configuration. To
date, SSI has no firm orders for launch services

on Conestoga, although it has several prospects. SSI successfully launched its Starfire I,
the first U.S. commercial sounding rocket on
March 29, 1989. However, on November 15,
1989, the second sounding rocket flight failed.
• EPAC "S" Series. E'Prlme Aerospace Corp.
(EPAC) is developing a series of ELVs propelled by rocket motors developed for the MX.
EPAC is offering seven different launch vehicle configurations capable of placing payloads
of up to 36,000 pounds in LEO. Prices charged
commercial customers will range from $18
million (for 5,781 pounds to LEO) to $84
million (for 36,138 pounds to LEO). Government prices would be 10wer. 29 Jt plans to make
its first orbital launch of the S-1 in 1991.
Other companies, both large established firms and
smaller, startup companies, have offered small
launch vehicle designs in the launch services market.
Lockheed Missiles and Space Co. has designed a
launch vehicle that would use Poseidon Fleet
ballistic missile components to carry 850 pounds to
polar orbit or 1,200 pounds to LEO. Pacific American Launch Services, Inc., is working on the design
of a single-stage, liquid oxygen-hydrogen launcher
that would carry 2,200 pounds to LEO.
In addition to these U.S. examples, several foreign
firms are offering to sell launch services on small
launchers. For example, a consortium in northern
Europe is developing a small, solid rocket-powered
launcher named LittleLeo. The Soviet Union has
suggested converting some of its SS-20 mobile
missiles for use as small commerciallaunchers. 3o
The market created by DARPA made possible the
development of Pegasus and Taurus. At this time, it
is unclear whether private sector demand for small
spacecraft will be sufficient to support a truly
commerical launch market for small launchers.
However, several aerospace companies, including
Orbital Sciences Corp., Hughes Aircraft Corp., and
Ball Aerospace Co. are working on designs for small
satellites for communications and remote sensing,
which will test market potential over the next few

Wfhe liquid oxygen valve failed to open sufficiently. probably as a result of heavy icing in the relatively humid climate of Vandenberg Air Force Base
where the test laWich was attempted. Michael A. Dornheim. "Amroc Retains Key Personnel Despite Cutbacks After Pad Fire." Aviation Week and Space
Technology. Oct. 30. 1989. p. 20.
27James Bennett. AMROC. December 1989.
28"Pegasus. MX Boosters Combined for N:w Defense Launch Vehicle." Aviation Week and Space Technology. Sept. 18. 1989. pp. 4748.
29Bob Davis. EPAC. Mar. 12. 1990.
30Marketed in the United States by Space Commerce Corporation.
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years. The construction of non-Federal launch sites
would assist the process of developing a market for
small spacecraft and launchers. 3! Groups in the
States of Florida, Hawaii, and Virginia have shown
considerable interest in constructing launch sites for
the private market.
Military demand for small launchers may be
substantial, as some elements in the services are
interested in developing small spacecraft for tactical
surveillance and communciations. SDIO may have

a near-term requirement for launching small spacecraft to support ballistic missile defense. Although
the cost per pound of payload carried on small
launchers is currently high, a large market for small
launchers may help to bring costs down over time.
However, private companies will have to amortize
their development costs, which will tend to keep
launch costs per pound of payload relatively high
compared to larger systems for which the development costs were borne by the government years ago.

31However. additional launch sites might reduce the market for Pegasus by increasing availability of alternate launch sites.
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An artist's conception of Space Station Freedom, which is scheduled for completion by theend of the century.

Chapter 5

Space Transportation and the Space Station
Shuttle, if properly designed, could be flown on
ELVs purchased competitively from the private
sector.

The planned international Space Station will
make long-term demands on space transportation for
construction, servicing, supply, and possibly emergency crew return. Current NASA plans call for
making at least 29 Shuttle flights (including several
logistics flights) between 1995 and 1999 to build the
station, and about 5.5 flights per year thereafter to
operate it. Some flights will be required to rotate
station crew, some for delivering or returning cargo.

RESCUE OR ESCAPE VEHICLES
Crews living and working in the planned Space
Station could be exposed to substantial risk from
major failures of the Station or the Space Shuttle that
transports the crew. For example, orbital debris from
previous space activities could puncture one of the
crew modules, causing a need to evacuate the crew
and return them to Earth. 2 NASA is attempting to
reduce such risk by building safety features into the
Space Station and improving the Shuttle's design.
Nevertheless, many analysts in NASA and the
broader U.S. space community believe that the
United States should develop some means independent of the Shuttle to rescue crews from the Space
Station.

SPACE SHUTTLE
Uncertainty about the adequacy of the current
Shuttle fleet for constructing and servicing the Space
Station makes station planning uncertain and risky.
Deployment, servicing, and resupply of the Space
Station face the dual risks of delayed launch
schedules and loss of one or more orbiters. In
addition, losing a critical element of the Space
Station in transit to orbit as a result of a Shuttle
failure could lead to long delays in Space Station
construction. 1

NASA is studying the possibility of building a
specialized vehicle that could be launched into space
atop an expendable launch vehicle as well as return
from the Space Station (box 5-A). Such a vehicle,
which NASA calls the Assured Crew Return Vehicle
(ACRV),3 could be used to provide:

Chapter 4 outlined options for reducing the risk of
using the Shuttle for Space Station construction and
operation. However, most of these options would
require additional funding beyond NASA's projected budget for Space Station or for space transportation. Congress may wish to postpone Space
Station construction and operation and focus on
improving the Nation's ability to place crews in
orbit safely and reliably. Alternatively, Congress
could direct NASA to fly fewer non-Space Station-related Shuttle missions in order to reduce
the risk that a Shuttle would be lost before Space
Station construction is completed.

1.
2.
3.
4.

crew emergency rescue,
access to space by crews,
small logistics transport, and
on-orbit maneuver.

Emergency rescue vehicles could be developed
and launched on a Titan III or Titan IV by 1995 or
1996. Alternatively, a Shuttle could carry two at a
time, to be docked at the Space Station.

NASA might, for example, plan to use Titan IVs
to carry some Space Station elements into orbit
rather than risking the Shuttle to do so. However, the
availability of Titan IV is highly uncertain, as the Air
Force appears to need all the Titan IVs it has
purchased for the period of station construction.
NASA might also develop the Shuttle-C for Space
Station construction. Furthennore, as noted earlier,
science payloads now tentatively manifested for the

To decide whether a risk-reducing effort is
worth the investment required, Congress lOust be
advised about how much the investment would
reduce the risk. Even if an alternate crew return
capability were provided and worked as planned,
it would not eliminate all risks to station crewmembers. To gain perspective on the decision,
Congress may wish to weigh the risks with and

tIf a Space Station element for which there was no spare were lost. replacing that element would take many mooths.
1983. a paint chip from a space object severely damaged a windshield 00 the Shuttle orbiter ChaUenger. Nicholas L. Johnson and Darren S.
McKnight, Artificial Space Debris (Malabar. Florida: Orbit Book Company. 1987). pp. 4-5.
3Note. however. that although the ACRV may provide a high probability of return from space. it does not necessarily provide assured safe return.
as there will still be a non-negligible degree of risk connected with the vehicle and the procedures required to operate it ~Iy.
2In
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Photo credit: National Aeronaulics and Space Administration

Artist's conception of an Apollo-type emergency rescue vehicle entering the Earth's atmosphere after leaving the Space Station.

without a rescue vehicle against the risks of other
hazardous duty in the national interest.4

crew-carrying space transportation systems than to
build a crew escape craft. The use of a rescue

A risk assessment of the Space Station should take
into account all phases of the crews' experience in
space, For example, if the greatest risk to Space
Station crew members were experienced during
flight to orbit, it may prove more cost-effective to
improve the safety of the Shuttle or any later

system would itself expose Space Station crewmembers to a certain element of risk, which must
also be assessed before making any decision
about whether or not to build such a system.
Finally, it would be well to remember that the Space
Station crew will be volunteers, who would will-

4por example, working on off-shore oil platforms, or piloting experimental aircraft.
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Box 5-A-Escape Vehicles
Several contingencies could require emergency escape of personnel in space. These include medical
emergencies of Space Station crewmembers, major equipment failures, damage from orbital debris, etc. Escape
could also be necessary if the Shuttle failed to meet its scheduled launch date by so long a time that the Station risked
running out of critical supplies.
Crew Emergency Return Vehicles (CERV)
NASA is considering two types of vehicles for emergency return from space to Earth:
• Capsule-This simple vehicle would have an ablative heat shield reminiscent of reentry capsules from the
early days of spaceflight, and still used routinely by the Soviet Union. A capsule, which could closely
resemble the Apollo capsule, would descend by parachute and land in the ocean. Its advantages include
simplicity, relatively low cost, and proven technology. In addition, capsules need little or no piloting, which
could be a major consideration if pilots are unavailable or unable to function as a result of injury or a long
stay in orbit. Depending on its capability, a capsule could cost $0.75 billion to $1.0 billion to develop.
• Small Glider-A small, aerodynamically stable vehicle whose shape would provide lift, and could land by
parachute or at low speed on a runway. A glider could reach a wider range of landing sites and have more
opportunities for reentry and recovery (particularly for a version with landing gear), and a softer ride than
capsules (important if an injured crew member is returning). However, a glider would cost 20 to 50 percent
more than the simplest parachute version of a capsule.
ingly, even eagerly, accept such duty despite the
inherent risks of spaceflight. Although they should
not expect to be exposed to unnecessary risks, their
duty will never be risk free.
A rescue system, if built, would be needed for the
life of the Space Station. Therefore, its total operating costs can be expected to exceed its development
costs. Before committing to a specific rescue

strategy, system designers will have to address
the costs of developing the necessary support
infrastructure, which might include ground operations hardware and personnel at the mission
control site, landing site crews, and the necessary
subsystems and logistics support to resupply,
replenish, and repair a rescue vehicle on orbit.

The NASP program is also evaluating the potential for using an operational aerospace plane for
Space Station crew rotation and rescue. Using an
aerospace plane for rescue would provide two
primary advantages: 1) there would be no need to
build and support a dedicated vehicle and its
associated infrastructure and personnel; and 2) it
could be based on Earth, rather than in space, making
it easier and cheaper to maintain. However, NASA
expects to complete Phase I of the Space Station
before 2000, and an operational aerospace plane
could not be ready before it does so. Hence, an
aerospace plane could not serve to replace or rescue
crew from the Space Station until 2005 or later, if at
all.
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Artisfs conception of an Advanced Launch System launch vehicle.

Chapter 6

Reducing Space System Costs
Table &-1-Cost-S8vlng 1Khnologles for
Launch Systems

Reducing the cost of exploring and using the
space environment is crucial to the continued
development and exploitation of outer space. America's wish list for projects in outer space far exceeds
its ability to pay, given the many pressures on the
Federal budget. Launch costs currently range from
$3,000 to $12,000 per pound to reach low Earth orbit
(LEO), depending on payload weight and the launch
system employed. Launching communications satellites into geosynchronous transfer orbit costs
between $11,000 and $20,000 per pound. If these
costs could be reduced significantly, outer space
would be more attractive to potential users, both
within Government and in the private sector. However, for many spacecraft, space transportation costs
are relatively small compared to the costs of
designing and building the spacecraft. Hence, reducing spacecraft costs plays an essential part in
bringing down overall space program costs.

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Automated manufacturing processes
Advanced, lightweight materials
Automated data management system
Automated test and inspection
Automated launch vehicle and payload handling
Modular subsystems
Database management systems
Computer-aided software development
Expert systems

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1990.

Table &-2-COSt-Rec:luclng Strategies
•
•
•
•

Reduce documentation and oversight
Create better incentives for lowering costs
Provide adequate spares to reduce cannibalization of parts
Develop and use computerized management information
systems
• Use an improved integrateltransferllaunch philosophY-

lIThe integrate/transferllaunch (lTl) philosophy refers to the practice of
separating categories of launch operations procedures to make each more
efficient.
SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1990.

SPACE TRANSPORTATION
New technologies promise to make the process of
manufacture, assembly, and processing of launch
vehicles less expensive (table 6-1). The Advanced
Launch System (ALS) program, for example, is
exploring a wide variety of technologies that could
be employed to reduce space transportation costs. 1
However, for these technologies to be effective,

Table 6-3-Launch System Design Strategies
• Engage all major segments of launch team in launch system
design process
• Design for simplicity of operation as well as performance
• Design for accessibility and modularity
SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1990.

new management practices must be introduced
(table 6-2). Launch operations, for example, tend
to be highly labor-intensive, and comprise a
significant percentage of the cost of a launch. As

6-A) in its planning, viz., the concept of designing a
launch system to achieve minimum cost, rather than
maximum performance.

the example of the Delta 180 experiment for the
Strategic Defense Initiative Office demonstrated,
sharply reducing the burden of oversight and review
in a project, and delegating authority to those closest
to the technical problems, can result in meeting a
tight launch schedule and reducing overall costs. 2 In
addition, launch system designs that reduce the
number and complexity of tasks requiring human
involvement would also contribute to reducing costs
(table 6-3). The ALS program is also assessing
various management and organizational techniques
that would speed launch processing and reduce its
complexity. It has incorporated some of the features
of the so-called Big Dumb Booster concept (box

Purchasing launch services competitively from
private firms, rather than managing launches from
within NASA or the armed services might well save
money. The intent of purchasing launch services is
to remove the Government as much as possible from
setting detailed engineering specifications for the
launch system and to reduce the burden of excessive
oversight by Government managers. Several entrepreneurial launch vehicle firms are developing
new launch systems for small or medium-size
payloads (see Small Launch Systems in ch. 4). These
projects present opportunities to incorporate low-

IU.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Reducing Launch Operations Costs: New Technologies and Practices, OTA-TM-JSC-28
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, September 1988) for a detailed discussion of these points.
2Department of Defense Strategic Defense Initiative Office/Kinetic Energy Office, "Delta ISO Final Repon," vol. 5, March 1987.
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cost approaches at little direct3 cost to the Government. However, launch fIrms complain that the cost
of continued excessive government oversight and
complicated procurement regulations4 unnecessarily raises the costs of launch services. They argue
that the cost of government oversight far exceeds the
actual cost risk of a failed mission. Launch fIrms

suggest that the government role, which may be vital
during the development and demonstration phases
of a new, complicated technology, becomes counterproductive when the basic technology has been
successfully acquired and is needed for ongoing
operations. Then, matters of cost and reliability
become paramount. However, Government users

3Private development will result in some indirect costs to the Goverrunent. However, if these finns are operating within a competitive market, the
eventual cost to the Government should be lower than if the Goverrunent paid for the improvements directly.
4For a detailed discussion of the DoD acquisition system, especially rules and oversight, see U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment,
Holding the Edge: Maintaining the Defense Technology Base, OTA-ISC-420 (Washington, DC: U.S. Goverrunent Printing Office, April 1989),
especially ch. 8.

Chapter 6-Reducing Space System Costs. 61

may fear that boosters not built to government
specifications might be too unreliable, especially for
one-of-a-kind spacecraft.
Current space policy provides for the civilian
agencies to "encourage, to the maximum extent
feasible, a domestic commercial launch industry by
contracting for necessary ELV launch services
directly from the private sector or with DoD."5
Extending this policy to all Government
launches, both civilian and military, except those
on the Space Shuttle, could also save the Government money, but only if Government oversight
and paperwork were reduced.
The Federal Government might encourage the
private sector launch industry by issuing space
transportation vouchers to space scientists whose
experiments are being supported by the government. 6 These vouchers could be redeemed for
transportation on any appropriate U.S. launch vehicle, and would free scientists to choose the vehicle
they thought most suitable to the needs of the
spacecraft. This policy would free space scientists
from dependence on the Shuttle and its schedule. It
might also increase opportunities for researchers to
reach space. By reducing scientist's dependence on
the Shuttle, such a policy should help in raising the
demand for ELVs and in bringing down the cost of
space transportation.

PAYLOADS
Dramatic reductions in launch costs will not,
by themselves, lower spacecraft program costs
substantially, because it may cost from $40,000 to
$650,000 per pound to design and build many
payloads,7 while it costs only about $3,000 per
pound to launch one to LEO. Reducing launch
costs to $300 per pound, a goal of the ALS program,8
may reduce the total cost of procuring and launching
an expensive spacecraft by less than 2 percent.
Commercial communications satellites, however,
often cost on the order of $10,000 per pound.
Because they need to be placed in geosynchronous

orbit, which is more expensive to achieve than LEO,
the cost of a launch is comparable to the cost of the
payload. Therefore, commercial operators are extremely interested in cost reductions in both areas.

To reduce payload costs, and for other reasons,
novel approaches to payload design and fabrication
have been proposed:
• Provide for Weight Margin: Designing payloads to fit launch vehicles while reserving
ample size and weight margins can reduce the
risk of incurring delay and expense after
assembly has begun.
Satellites often grow substantially heavier
than expected as they proceed from design to
construction. If a payload grows so heavy that
its weight equals or exceeds the maximum
allowable gross lift-off weight, the payload
must be redesigned, which causes delay and
increases cost. To reduce the risk of exceeding
vehicle payload capacity, program managers
could require designers to allow extra weight
margin for such contingencies. However, this
design philosophy would lead to more stringent
size and weight constraints than would otherwise be imposed. In many cases, sufficient
margin could be provided by clever design,
e.g., by designing several smaller singlemission payloads, to be launched separately,
instead of a single multimission payload.9
• Fatsats: If payloads were allowed to be heavier
for the same capability, some could cost
substantially less. For example, OTA estimates
that Titan-class payloads that cost several
hundred million dollars might cost about $130
million less if allowed to be five times as heavy.
If payloads were allowed to be much heavier, a
manufacturer could forego expensive processes
for removing inessential structural material, as
well as expensive analyses and tests. Standardized subsystems, which could be produced
economically in quantity, could be used instead
of customized subsystems. Designers could
also add redundant subsystems to increase

SWhite House. Office of the Press Secretary, "National Space Policy," Nov. 2, 1989, p. 11.
6Molly Macauley, "Launch Vouchers for Space Science Research," Space Policy, vol. 5, No.4, pp. 311-320.
7The low end of Ibis range is for payloads consisting mostly of fuel; the high end would be for some satellites carrying little or no fuel. U.S. Congress,
Office of Technology Assessment, Affordable Spacecraft: Design and Launch Alternatives--Background Paper, OTA-BP-ISC-60 (Washington, DC:
U.S. Government Printing Office, January 1990).
8101 Stat. 1067.
9Tbe number of new program starts allowed in a year tends to force program managers to add additional capabilities to the spacecraft. In addition,
in some cases, a larger spacecraft bus can accommodate more functions at a reduced cost per function compared to multiple smaller buses.

62 • Access to Space: The Future of U.S. Space Transportation Systems

reliability. An accurate estimate of potential
savings requires a detailed trade-off analysis
for each payload. Achieving these savings will
probably require giving spacecraft program
managers, and those who establish mission and
spacecraft requirements, incentives crafted specifically for the purpose, and may require
developing new launch vehicles.
• Lightsats: If allowed to be less capable, reliable, or long-lived, payloads could be both
lighter and less expensive. Useful functions
such as communications and weather surveillance could be performed by payloads small
enough to be launched on small rockets from
airborne or mobile launchers.
Small, simple, and relatively inexpensive
civil and military satellites have been, and still
are, launched at relatively low cost on small
launch vehicles or at even lower cost, sometimes for free, as "piggyback" payloads on
larger launch vehicles. DoD is considering
whether the increased survivability and responsiveness such spacecraft could provide would
compensate for possible decreased capability.
A swarm of several small satellites might
accomplish a given mission as well as a single
large one, and, in many cases, would also be
cheaper because smaller satellites typically
cost much less per pound than do large ones.
Even if the satellites are launched individually,
which would increase total launch cost, overall
mission cost could be lower.
• Microspacecraft: Spacecraft weighing only a
few pounds could perform useful space science
missions and might be uniquely economical for
experiments requiring simultaneous measurements (e.g., of solar wind) at many widely
separated points about the Earth, another
planet, or the Sun.

Each type of spacecraft-fats at, lights at, or microspacecraft-would impose unique launch demands. New, large, heavy-lift launch vehicles would
be needed to launch the heaviest satellites. Lightsats
could be launched on existing launch vehicles, but
new, smaller launch vehicles might launch them
more economically. In wartime, small launch vehi-

cles could be transported or launched by trucks or
aircraft to provide a survivable means of space
launch. Microspacecraftcould be launched on existing launch vehicles, but they might eventually be
launched by more exotic means such as a ram
accelerator, railgun, coilgun, or laser-powered
rocket (see ch. 7). Within the next decade, experiments now being planned may establish the feasibility of some of these launch systems. Their costs
cannot be estimated confidently until feasibility is
proven. However, they may prove more economical
than conventional rockets for launching microspacecraft at high rates.
If Congress wishes to promote spacecraft cost
reduction and, thereby, reduce the cost of space
programs:

1. Congress could order a comprehensive study of
how much the Nation could save on space programs
by:
• designing payloads to reserve more weight and
volume margin on a launch vehicle;
• allowing payloads to be heavier, less capable,
shorter-lived, or less reliable;
• designing standard subsystems and buses for
use in a variety of spacecraft;
• designing spacecraft to perform single rather
than multiple missions; and
• using several inexpensive satellites instead of a
single expensive one.
Lockheed completed such a study in 1972; 10 a
new one should consider current mission needs and
technology. It would complement the Space Transportation Architecture Study (STAS) and more
recent and ongoing studies 11 that compare space
transportation options but not payload design options.
As noted above, to estimate potential savings
accurately, a detailed trade-off analysis must be
done for each payload, or more generally, for each
mission. So, for greater credibility,
2. Congress could require selected spacecraft
programs-for example, those that might require a
new launch vehicle to be developed-to award two
design contracts, one to a contractor who would

1000000ckheed Missiles & Space Co., Impact of Low Cost Rejurbishable and Standard Spacecraft Upon Future NASA Space Programs, N72-27913
(Springfield, VA: National Technical Information Service, Apr. 30, 1972).
IIE.g., the Air Force's Air Force-Focused STAS, NASA's Next Manned Space Transportation System study, the Defense Science Board's National
Space Launch Strategy study, and the Space Transportation Comparison study for the National Aero-Space Plane Program.
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consider the unconventional approaches mentioned
above.
3. Congress could require both the Department of
Defense and NASA to refrain from developing a
spacecraft if the expected weight or size of the
spacecraft, together with its propellants, upper stage,
and support equipment, would exceed some fraction
of the maximum weight or size that its intended
launch vehicle can accommodate. Public Law 100456 requires the Department of Defense to require at
least 15 percent weight margin in fiscal year 1989,I2
New legislation could extend this restriction to
NASA and could require size margins in future
years.
In addition, Congress could promote the development of launch systems capable of launching small,
inexpensive spacecraft at low cost or heavy spacecraft with generous weight margins.

INNOVATION AND THE
U.S. TECHNOLOGY BASE
Building a new system, or even making substantial modifications to existing launchers, requires a
vigorous private sector, well-supported research
programs, a cadre of well-trained engineers, and an
institutional structure capable of putting a vast
variety of technologies to use in innovative ways.
According to several recent reports, our existing
space technology base has become inadequate in
recent years}3 Yet a strong technology base is an
investment in the future; it provides insurance that
the United States will be able to meet future
technological challenges.

Government Programs
Several studies have recommended greater attention to improving the Nation's technology base for
space transportation. 14 Though specific proposals
differ in detail, these studies have cited propulsion,
space power, materials, structures, and information
systems as areas in need of special attention.
In response to these and other expressed concerns,
NASA and the Air Force have initiated four programs to improve the Nation's launch system

technology base (box 6-B). As currently organized,
these programs are directed primarily toward developing new, advanced capabilities. In the existing
budgetary climate, it may be more realistic to
redirect funding toward technologies that could
be used to improve existing launch systems and
make them more cost-effective to operate. Each of
the three ALS prime contractors are exploring ways
to insert technology conceived in the ALS program
into existing launch systems.
Although launch operations and logistics are
labor-intensive and therefore expensive compared to
manufacturing or materials,launch system designers
have focused little attention on technologies that
would reduce these costs. NASA's technology
programs are addressing issues in automation and
robotics, technology areas that could Significantly
reduce launch operations costs. However, to date
NASA has spent relatively little on applying these
technologies more effectively to Shuttle launch
operations. In the yearly budget process, when
budgets are cut, technology programs tend to be cut
more sharply than operational programs because
they focus on future efforts, rather than near-term
results. Launch operations is the direct focus of
about 30 percent of the ALS program. Outside of this
effort, however, no well-organized or well-funded
plan exists to apply the technologies developed in
these programs to launch operations procedures, or
to coordinate research being carried out through the
existing technology R&D programs.
It may be appropriate to institute a long-term
National Strategic Launch Technology Plan that
would set the agenda for developing and incorporating new technologies into existing and future
launch systems. It should include work in all
development phases:
• broad technology exploration (basic research);
• focused research leading to a demonstration;
and
• implementation to support specific applications.
Even if specific applications have not been identified, the United States needs to fund basic and

12See S.Rept. 100-326, p. 36, and H. Rept. 100-989, p. 282.
13National Research Council, Ae~nautics and Space Engineering Board, Space Technology to Meet Future Needs (Washington, DC: National
~::~my Press, December 1987); Jomt DoD/NASA Steering Group, National Space Transportation and Support Study, Swnmary Report, May 14,
14Ibid.
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focused research in order to build an adequate base
for future applications.

The Private Sector's Role
In space transportation, the private sector now
serves primarily as contractor for Governmentdefined needs. It is just beginning to act as a
commercial service provider. IS Two firms launched
their first commercial payloads in 1989. 16

Private firms are unlikely to develop major new
launch systems until well into the next century
unless Congress and the Administration set a high
priority on involving them more directly in setting
the terms of space transportation development. 17
The Government controls access to spacelS and most

of the technology. It will continue to determine
launch specifications and provide most of the
funding. Government control of systems involving
crews in space will continue, in large part because
such systems are costly and represent a major
national commitment.
Harnessing industry's innovative power in a
more competitive environment could lead to
reduced launch -costs and more etTective use of
U.S. resources for outer space. By promoting
private sector innovation toward improving the
design, manufacture, and operations of launch systems, the Government could reduce the cost of
Government launches, yet relatively few incentives
to involve private firms exist today. As a result,
firms have spent little of their own money on R&D

lS'fhe Department of Transponation regulates the private launch industry.
16McDonnell Douglas (Delta) and Martin Marietta (Titan)
17The NASP program. for example. has sent a high priority on directly involving private finns and the universities in materials and other advanced
research on the X·30.
18According to the 1967 Treaty on Outer Space. which the United States signed. and to which it adheres. "States parties to the Treaty shall bear
international responsibility for national activities in outer space ... whether such activities are carried on by governmental agencies or by
non-governmental entities ... " The Commercial Space Launch Act of 1984. which sets out the basic provisions regulating the commercial launch
industry. recognizes this responsibility by stating. " ... the United States should regulate such launches and services in order to ensure compliance with
international obligations of the United States ... "
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to improve the capability of launch systems or
reduce their costs.

If outer space becomes a more important arena for
private investment, competitive pressures will provide the incentives for launch system innovation.
For the near term, however, incentives must come
from the Government because projected future
demand for commercial launch services is extremely
small compared to Government demand. 19
Incentives could include:
• direct grants to develop new technology for
launch systems specifically directed toward
saving costs rather than increasing performance;
• cash incentives to firms for reducing the
manufacturing costs of specific items procured
by the Government;20
• encouragement of industrial teaming arrangements in focused technology areas such as the
National Aerospace Plane Materials Consortium (see ch. 7).

In addition, the U.S. Government could stimulate
the private sector's innovative creativity by issuing
a request for proposal for launch systems or services
similar to the Advanced Launch System, and have
industry bid for them. Such an approach assumes
minimum Government oversight over the design
and manufacturing processes. It would also require
the aerospace community to assume much greater
financial risk than it has taken on in the past. In order
to offset that risk, the Government might have to
agree to a minimum purchase that would allow the
companies involved to earn a profit on their investment.
Finally, America's ability to foster the innovative
process depends directly on having an adequate
supply of scientists and engineers. In order to assure
that the United States has sufficient trained personnel to contribute to the development of new launch
systems and other space activities, the Government
could strengthen its support for science, mathematics, and engineering education from grade school
through graduate school. 21

l'!Richard Brackeen, Space Challenge' 88: Fourth Annual Space Symposium Proceedings Report (Colorado Springs, CO: U.S. Space Foundation

1988), pp. 76-79.
2Opor example, Rockwell International earns 20% of every dollar it saves NASA on building orbiter OV -105.
2IU.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Educating Scientists and Engineers: Grade School to Graduate School, OTA-SET-377
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 1988).
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Potential Future Launch Systems
The Space Transportation Architecture Study
:.\S)1 and later ~tudies ~onducted by NASA ~d
Force identIfied a wIde range of technologIes
~ management practices that could reduce the
of space transportation and also increase
reliability and operabi~ty. This chapter describes
several options for meeting future space transportation demand.

rAir

:Sts

CARGO ONLY
The Nation's existing fleet of expendable launch
vehicles (ELVs) can carry payloads weighing up to
39 000 pounds (figure 1-1) to low Earth orbit (LEO).
Ev~ntually, as cargoes gradually increase in size and
weight, and as the Nation seeks to do more in space
than it currently plans, new launch systems offering
higher lift capacity will become attractive, if they
can reduce costs while improving reliability and
operability.
Some have argued that the Nation needs a
heavy-lift launch vehicle (HLLV), similar in capacity to the Soviet Energia,2 which can lift about
220,000 pounds to LEO. Indeed, for tasks requiring
the launch of many pounds of cargo to space at one
time in a single package, an HLLV would be
necessary. If available, an HLLV would be useful for
building large space structures, such as the Space
Station, because 13;unching pre-assembled structures
would obviate much risky and expensive on-orbit
assembly.

As noted earlier, if the Nation were to pursue the
goals of building a permanent settlement on the
Moon and/or sending explorers to Mars, one or more
HLLVs would be required to carry the requisite fuel
and other support infrastructure to LEO (box 7-AV

Some also argue that if the United States had an
HLLV, the Government and the private sector would
find a way to use it, for example, in bringing down
launch and payload costs. OTA's analysis of future
space transportation costs indicates that average cost
per pound can be reduced substantially only if there
is a marked increase in demand-that is, the number
of pounds launched per year. Unless the Nation
plans to increase investment in space activities
Significantly over current levels, development of an
HLLV in order to reduce launch costs appears
unwarranted.

Shuttle-C
NASA has investigated the potential for building
a cargo-only HLLV, which would use Shuttle
elements and technology. As envisioned by NASA,
Shuttle-C could launch between 94,000 and 155,000
pounds to low Earth orbit (figure 7-1).4 Such a
system could lift large, heavy payloads if the risk or
cost of using the Shuttle would be high as a result of

S IU.S. Depanment of Defense and National Aeronautics and Space Administration, National Space Transponation and Support Study /995-2010,
ummary Report of the Joint Steering Group, May 1986.
2'fhe Energia can carry either cargo or the Soviet Shuttle into space. Energia may be used to lift elements of a new Soviet space station.
11 ~chard Truly, "Testimony before the Subcommittee on Space Sciences and Applications of the House Committee on Science, Space, and
~ __Ology, Sept. 26, 1989; National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Repon o/the 90-Day Study on Human Exploration oj the Moon & Mars,

•"'vcmber 1990.

4Shuttle is currently capable of lifting 52,000 pounds to 110 nautical miles above Kennedy Space Center.
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Agure 7-1-Potentlal Shuttle-C Performance

Shuttle-C Ascent Performance Capability (Ib)
ETR

WTR

220 nmi
28.5 deg.

110 nmi
28.5 deg.

110 nmi
98.7 deg.

3Ox2OOnmi
28.5 deg.

110 nmi
98.7 deg.

BASELINE DESIGN 2 SSME@ 100%
@104%
3 SSME@ 100%
@104%

82,750
88,180
141,300
145,200

93,700
99,100
151,100
155,000

n/a
n/a
53,200
57,200

105,900
112,40
162,900
167,400

57,460
62,800
111,000
115,100

BASELINE + ASRM 2 SSME @104%
3SSME @104%

99,620
156,600

110,540
166,500

13,900
68,600

124,400
179,400

74,300
126,400

KEY: ETR = Eastern Test Range (Cape Canaveral) ; WTR = \Nestern Test Range (Vandenberg Air Force Base)
SOURCE: National Aeronantics & Space Administration , 1989.

Chapter 7--1'otential Future Launch Systems. 71

"orbital assembly or multiple Shuttle launches.'>5
For example, it could enable the launch of large
elements of the planned Space Station, already
outfitted, reducing the risks that are associated with
extensive on-orbit assembly using the Shuttle, or the
Shuttle plus smaller ELVs (box 7-A).
Because the Shuttle-C would use most of the
subsystems already proven on the Shuttle, NASA
asserts that the Shuttle-C would cost about $1.8
billion to develop and could be ready for the first
flight about 4 years after development begins.
NASA planners suggest that it would serve to
"bridge the gap" in launch services for large
payloads between the mid-1990s and the beginning
of the 21st century when an Advanced Launch
System (ALS) could be available. 6
Shuttle-C would avoid some costs by using
Shuttle facilities and subsystems. For example, each
Shuttle-C would use and expend two or three Space
Shuttle Main Engines (SSMEs), but it could use
SSMEs that had been used on the Shuttle until
permitted only one more use by safety rules; these
would be almost completely depreciated. However,
Shuttle-C planners now propose to use SSMEs that
have been used on the Shuttle only once; they would
cost the Shuttlt(-C program $20 million each if they
can be procured for $25 million each (versus $38
million currently) and refurbished for $15 million
(fiscal year 1991 dollars), and if half the cost of two
flights is allocated to Shuttle-C. In this case, the
incremental cost per launch would be about 480
million fiscal year 1991 dollars 7 for a 3-engine
Shuttle-C.8

Advanced Launch System (ALS)
In 1987 the Air Force and NASA began preliminary work on the (ALS), with the goals of dramatically reducing launch costs and improving vehicle
reliability and operability. ALS program officials
expect the ALS efforts to result in a modular family
of cargo vehicles that would provide a broad range

of payload capacity (figure 7-2). The ALS program
estimates that development would cost about $7.3
billion (1989 dollars), and facilities would cost
about $4 billion.
The ALS approach is to trade launch vehicle
performance efficiency for low cost and high reliability by incorporating design and operating margins, and using redundant subsystems that are highly
fault-tolerant. In addition, ALS designs would
simplify and standardize interfaces, manufacturing
processes, and operations procedures. New technologies would be developed and used only if they
would further the goals of low cost and high
reliability. ALS managers expect these approaches
to improve the operability of the ALS compared to
existing launch systems, by providing:
• high availability and reliability;
• high throughput and on-time performance; and
• standard vehicle-cargo operations9
The ALS Program Office has defmed a reference
vehicle using liquid propulsion and capable oflifting
between 80,000 and 120,000 pounds to LEO. It
would use low-cost, 580,OOO-pound thrust engines
that would be developed specifically for the ALS.
The ALS program is also exploring the possible use
of solid rockets for strap-on boosters.
Recently, the Department of Defense decided not
to proceed with procurement of an ALS at this time,
but to continue the program as a technology
development effort. The primary thrust of the
restructured ALS program would be to develop a
new engine and other critical technolgies for an ALS
family of vehicles that could be started later in the
decade if the need for such vehicles arises. The
technology and subsystems developed for the ALS
technology development program could provide the
basis for building an HLLV system, if needed, in the
early part of the 21 st century. In the meantime, the
program could provide important improvements for
existing ELVs (table 7-1).

5NASA Marshall Space Center, "Shuttle-C Users Conference. Executive Smnmary," May 1989.
6Ibid.

About 424 million fiscal year 1989 dollars.
sTIle other half oCthe cost should be allocated to Shuttle operations. OTA's cost estimates for Shuttle assume 10 or more uses per SSME. See U.S.
Congress. OffICe of Technology Assessment, Launch Options for tM Future: A Buyer's Guide. OTA-ISC-383 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government
Printing Office, July 1988). p. 68. footnote 5.
9ALS Program OffICe briefing to OTA. September 1989.
7
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Figure 7-2-Advanced Launch System: The ALS Family
Height in feet
400,-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Reference vehicle
300~--------------------------------------------------------------~

200 -+---1

100~---F~--------~~----~

Payload
(thousands of Ibs)

80 to 120

120 to 300

40 to 80

40 to 80

80 to 110

100 to 251

Type

Stage & half

ALS-SRM

SRMU

STS LRB

ALS LRB

Propellant

L0 2/LH 2

Clean solid

Clean solid

L0 2/LH 2

L0 2/LH 2

Number

N/A

3 to 8

2 to 4

2 to 6

2 to 4

Booster:

KEY: ALS = Advanced Launch System; LRB
Transportation System.

= liquid

Rocket Booster; SRM

= Solid

Rocket Motor; SRMU

= Solid

Rocket Motor Unit; STS

= Space

SOURCE: Advanced Launch System Program Office.

Unconventional Launch Systems
A number of launch systems have been proposed
that would use "exotic" technologies to propel
payloads into space. For example, a payload might
ride to orbit on a plastic cylinder, the bottom of
which is heated from below by the beam from a
powerful ground-based laser. As the plastic on the
bottom decomposes into vapor and expands, it will
exert pressure on the cylinder, producing thrust. The
SDIO estimates development and construction of a
laser for launching 44-pound payloads would require about $550 million over 5 or 6 years. It
estimates that a laser system could launch up to 100
payloads per day-more than 20 Shuttle loads per
year-for about $200 per pound, assuming propulsive efficiencies 300 percent greater than those
achieved in lab tests. The cost would be closer to
$500 per pound if efficiency is not improved.
Railgun proponents predict a prototype railgun
capable of launching 1,lOO-pound projectiles carry-

ing 550 pounds of payload could be developed in
about 9 years for between $900 million and $6
billion, including $500 million to $5 billion for
development of projectiles and tracking technology.
If produced and launched at a rate of 10,000 per year,
the projectiles (less payload) might cost between
$500 and $30,000 per pound (estimates differ). The
cost of launching them might be as low as $20 per
pound-Le., $40 per pound of payload. 10
Several other gun-like launchers have been proposed. One is the ram cannon (or ram accelerator),
the barrel of which would be filled with gaseous fuel
and oxidizer. The projectile would fly through this
mixture, which would be ignited by the shock wave
of the passing projectile and would exert pressure on
it, accelerating it. A ram cannon designed for space
launch would be about 2 miles long.
Many uses have been proposed for such launch
systems, but to date only the Strategic Defense
Initiative Organization has identified a plausible

IGNote, however, that such rates are more than 100 times the current launch rate.
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Table 7-1-Potentlal ALS Technology
Improvements to Existing Systems
PrOpulsion
• Simplified engine designs
• Low cost manufacturing processes
• Low cost, clean solid propellants
• Automated nondestructive testing for solid rocket motors
• Enhanced liquid propulsion performance
Avionics and software
• Highly reliable avionics
• Weather and mission adaptive guidance, navigation, and
control
• Expert systems for vehicle/mission management
• Automated software production
• Electromechanical actuators
Aerothermodynsmlcs
• Engine and avionics reuse
- recovery
- landing
- maintenance
- reentry systems
Structures, materials, and manufacturing
• Low weight materials for propellants
• Composite structures for shroud and innertank
• Low cost manufacturing
- automation: welding
- processes: spinning, casting, extruSion, forging
Operations
• Automated checkout and launch operations
• Paperless management
• Expert system monitoring and control
• Engine and avionics health monitoring
• Operational subsystems
- pyrotechnic alternatives
- hazardous gas detection
- remote cable transducer
SOURCE: Advanced Launch System Program Office.

demand for high-rate launches of microspacecraft,
which could use such systems economically. However, demand for launches of scientific, commercial,
and other microspacecraft could increase, perhaps
dramatically, if launch costs could be reduced to a
few hundred dollars per pound.
Most of these exotic launch technologies are still
in the exploratory stage and therefore much less
mature than rocket technology. Because of this, the
costs cited must be regarded as highly speculative.
Nevertheless, Congress may wish to fund continued
research in order not to foreclose the opportunity
exotics may pose for reducing future launch costs,
especially for extremely small payloads such as the
microspacecraft discussed in chapter 6--Reducing

Space Space System Costs.

CREW-CARRYING LAUNCH
SYSTEMS
Even if the Shuttle is made more reliable, the
Shuttle's high operational costs will eventually
lead to a decision to replace it with a successor
capable of more effectively fitting the needs of the
Government's activities for people in space and
reducing the recurring cost of launching piloted
vehicles. The most important goal of each Shuttle
mission is to return the reusable orbiter and crew
safely to Earth. II This goal, an essential aspect of
flying human crews and an expensive reusable
vehicle, nevertheless adds to mission costs by
requiring additional attention to payload integration,
extra payload safety systems, and additional preflight payload handling. In addition, humans require
special environments not needed by many payloads.
For the 1990s, the primary need for transporting
people to and from outer space will be to operate the
Shuttle orbiters and experiments aboard them, and to
assemble and operate the Space Station. NASA now
estimates that Phase I Space Station construction
wiil require 29 Shuttle flights (including some
logistics flights) and about 5.5 flights per year
thereafter to service Space Station. If the Nation
decides to build a lunar base or to send a crewcarrying mission to Mars, NASA estimates that
additional crew-carrying capacity would be needed
to supplement or replace the Shuttle.
NASA is studying several launch concepts that
could supplement or replace the current Shuttle.
Most could not be available before the turn of the
century. NASA and the Air Force are collaborating
on the development of an aerospace plane using
advanced, airbreathing engines that could revolutionize spaceflight. However, even if development
were pushed, an aerospace plane based on airbreathing technology is unlikely to be available for
operational before 2005.

PERSONNEL CARRIER
LAUNCHED ON UNPILOTED
LAUNCH VEHICLES
NASA is exploring the possibility of developing
a personnel launch system (PLS) that would use a

llReturning the orbiter and crew safely is not necessarily equivalent to completing the mission, although it is often confused with the same. NASA
will abort the mission rather than knowingly risk crew safety, if problems appear. Launching payloads on unpiloted vehicles avoids the added complexity
and cost provided by the human factor.
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small reusable glider, capsule, or lifting body
launched atop an expendable launch vehicle rated to
carry crews. 12 This option would separate human
transport from cargo delivery, and could, in principle, be made safer than the Shuttle. The Soviet
Union,13 The European Space Agency, 14 and
Japan1S have all adopted this approach to placing
people in orbit. Candidate launchers could include a
Titan III, a Titan IV, a Shuttle-C, or perhaps anew,
as-yet undeveloped launcher such as the ALS.
The ALS Joint Program Office has recognized the
potential benefit of having a flexible launch vehicle
rated for launching crews. It has therefore required
that contractor proposals for an ALS provide for a
launch vehicle capable of meeting both the design
and quality assurance criteria for carrying crews.
Designing an ALS launch vehicle at the outset to
provide additional structural strength would be
much less expensive than redesigning, rebuilding,
and retesting it after it is developed. 16 As currently
envisioned, ALS would also provide previously
unobtainable levels of safety by incorporating faulttolerant subsystems and engine-out capability.
Having a crew-rated automated launcher in addition to a Shuttle has three strong advantages: 1) the
crew-rated vehicle could launch new orbiters designed for launch with other boosters; 2) it could
enhance crew safety (intact abort is a design
requirement for the PLS); and 3) there may be cases
where it will be necessary only to deliver personnel
to the Space Station. In that case, there is no need to
risk a Shuttle orbiter. Separation of crew- and
cargo-carrying capabilities is especially important,
as carrying both on the same vehicle adds to the
payload costs and may reduce crew safety. In view
of the concerns over Shuttle fleet attrition, it may
be important for NASA to investigate the potential for using a crew-rated ALS or other launcher
to reduce the risk of losing crew-carrying capacity early in the next century.

Advanced Manned Launch System (AMLS)
NASA's program investigating the set of concepts for an AMLS, previously called the Shuttle II,
is studying new designs with the goal of replacing
the Space Shuttle early in the next century. A vehicle
significantly different from the existing Shuttle
would result (box 7-B). If activities involving crews
in space increase markedly in the next century, an
AMLS using advanced technology might be needed.
It could offer significant improvements in operational flexibility and reduced operations costs over
the existing Shuttle. However, development, testing,
and procurement of an AMLS fleet could cost $20
billion or more (1989 dollars).
The timing of the development phase for an
AMLS should depend on NASA's need to replace
the Shuttle fleet. It would also depend in part on
progress reached with technologies being explored in the Advanced Launch System and
National Aero-Space Plane (NASP) programs. In
any event, a decision on AMLS will not have to be
made for several more years. For example, if
Congress decided that an operational AMLS was
needed by 2010, the decision to start the early phases
of development would have to be made by about
1995. By that time, Congress should have had
adequate opportunity to assess the progress made in
the NASP program (see below), which could be
competitive with an AMLS.

An Aerospace Plane
Developing a reusable vehicle that could be
operated like an airplane from conventional
runways, but fly to Earth orbit powered by a
single propulsion stage would provide a radically
different approach to space launch and a major
step in U.S. launch capability. However, building
such a vehicle poses a much larger technical
challenge than building a two-stage, rocketpropelled vehicle such as the AMLS. A successful
aerospace plane might also provide greater benefits
to industry and to U.S. technological competitive-

12A NASA or Air Force launch vehicle is said to be crew, or "man-rated," if it has been certified as meeting certain safety criteria. These include design
criteria as well as quality assurance criteria.
13Although the Soviet Union has also developed a shuttle orbiter similar to the U.S. Space Shuttle, it will continue to rely on its Soyuz vehicle for
transporting people to the Mir space station atop the Proton launcher, and on its Progress transport for launching cargo.
14The reusable, piloted Hermes spaceplane will be launched atop an Ariane V launcher sometime in the late 1990s. Ariane V is currently also under
development.
ISJapan plans to develop a small, unpiloted spaceplane, HOPE, that would be launched atop its H II launch vehicle, now under development. HOPE
may experience its first flight in the early years of the next century.
16ft would, however, add a small amount to the cost of each flight in which cargo only were carried.
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ness than an AMLS, as a result of the development
of new materials and propulsion methods. The
Department of Defense and NASA are jointly
funding the NASP program to build the X-30 (box
7-C),17 a research vehicle intended to demonstrate
both single-stage access to space and endoatmospheric hypersonic cruise capabilities.
NASP is a high-risk technology development
program. BuDding the X-30 to achieve orbit with
a single stage would require major technological
advances in materials and structures, propulsion
systems, and computer simulation of aerody-

namic and aerothermal etTects from Mach 1 to
Mach 25.1 8 The uncertainties in meeting design
goals are compounded because a successful X-30
would require many of the key enabling technologies to work in concert with one another. Because
ground test facilities cannot replicate all of the
conditions that would be encountered in ascent to
orbit, it is impossible to predict precisely how the
X-30 would perform when pilots make the first
attempts to push it far into the hypersonic realm.
If funded, the X-30 would be a research vehicle,
not a prototype of an operational vehicle. To develop
an operational vehicle would require an additional
program beyond NASP. A development cycle that
took full advantage of lessons learned in the X-30's
planned test program could not commence until the
late 1990s at the earliest. An operational vehicle
derived from the proposed X-30 would therefore be
unlikely until approximately 2005 or later unless it
were closely modeled on the X-30. However, if the
X-30 were designed to provide the maximum data

17Debates over NASP fWiding within the Administration and within Congress have left the long-tenn status of the program in doubt. In Spring 1989
DoD decided to cut its contribution to NASP by two-thirds for fiscal year 1990 and to tenninate funding for it in subsequent years. A reexamination
of the program by the National Space CoWicilled to the replacement of program fWlds, but delayed the decision concerning whether or not to proceed
with construction of the X-30 for 2 years, to 1993. Congress decided to appropriate $254 million for NASP research in 1990 ($194 from DoD; $60 million
from NASA).
18Mach 1 is the speed of soWid. Hypersonic usually refers to flight at speeds of at least Mach 5-five times the speed of soWld, or about 4,000 miles
per hour. Mach 25 (25 times Mach 1), is the speed necessary to reach Earth orbit.
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about the feasibility of an operational aerospace
plane, it would be unlikely to serve as an appropriate
prototype of an operational vehicle. Although the
X-30 would be piloted, aerospace planes based on
the X-30 could be designed to carry cargo autonomously.19
If the X-30 proves successful, the fIrst operational
vehicles that employ NASP technologies are likely
to be built for military use, possibly followed by
civilian space vehicles. Commercial hypersonic
transports (the "Orient Express") are a more distant
possibility. Recent studies have shown that from an
economic standpoint, commercial hypersonic transports would compare unfavorably with proposed
slower, Mach 3 supersonic transports based on less
exotic technology and conventional fuels. Therefore, the most economic route to commercial
high-speed air transport is unlikely to be through
the X-30 development program. However, the
X-30 program could provide technical spin-offs
to aerospace and other high-technology industries through its development of advanced materials and structures and through advances in
computation and numerical simulation techniques. It is too early to judge the economic
importance of such spinoffs.
Even assuming a rapid resolution of the myriad of technical issues facing the creation of an
X-30 capable of reaching orbit with a single
propulsion stage based on airbreathing technology, translating this technology into an operational spaceplane might come late in the period
when an AMLS could be ready, and perhaps
after the time when replacements for the Shuttle
would be necessary. With their less exotic technologies, rocket propelled AMLS vehicles could proba-

bly be funded in the mid to late 1990s and still be
developed in time to replace aging Shuttles. An
AMLS program begun in this period would also
benefit from the technical base being developed in
the NASP program, which is exploring concepts
based solely on rocket propulsion as well (see
below). However, the technical and economic
uncertainties of both programs suggest that
Congress would benefit from monitoring their
progress and comparing the probability of success of each before committing development
funds for operational vehicles in the mid-1990s.
The development costs of each program, as well
as other competing budget priorities, will play a
major role in such a decision.

Additional Reusable Launch Concepts
Routine flight to space with reusable vehicles
offers tremendous economies if the United States
can master the underlying technologies-materials,
structures, propulsion, and avionics to produce· a
highly reliable and maintainable reusable vehicle. 20
The technologies needed for fully reusable space
launch systems are being developed primarily by the
NASP program, although the ALS and AMLS
programs are also investing in reusable concepts.
Future operational cargo systems may combine the
best technologies developed by each program.
Ranging from rocket-powered vehicles that might be
available by the beginning of next century, to
airbreathing propulsion systems that would be
available later, such vehicles could support intermediate to near Shuttle-size payloads. Operated as fully
reusable vehicles able to fly to orbit without an
expendable stage, such vehicles offer some of the
economies associated with aircraft.

19'fhe Soviet shuttle Buran has demonstrated the feasibility of launching and landing a reusable space plane without a human crew.
ZOSee app. A for a discussion of the effect of reliability on life-cycle cost estimates of future launch systems.
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and China expect to be able to supply about 35 to 40
vehicles per year to launch only 15 to 20 commercial
payloads per year over the next decade.

COMPETITION
This decade has seen the rise of intergovernmental
competition in space transportation. The development of space transportation systems is a national
achievement that signals a nation's status as a space
power, able to develop and use advanced technology. The Soviet Union, Europe, Japan, and China
now operate launch systems capable of reaching
space with sizable payloads. Although only the
United States and the Soviet Union are currently
able to send humans to and from space, ESA, France,
Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom are all in
various stages of developing their own reusable
launch systems, which, if successful, would be
capable of transporting human crews.

A launch industry capable of competing on the
basis of price as well as capability in the world
market could contribute several hundred million
dollars per year toward improving the current strong
negative balance of payments with foreign countries, directly by making sales to foreign customers,
and indirectly by keeping U.S. payload owners from
going off-shore to purchase launch services. Congress could assist the U.S. private sector by helping
the Executive work to develop and maintain a' 'level
playing fteld" in the marketplace, in which prices
are arrived at by rules based on justiftable economic
rationales and agreed on by the launch providers. 3
The recent negotiations with China in which that
country agreed to price its launch services to reflect
actual manufacturing and launch cost have been a
step in the right direction, but similar arrangements
need to be negotiated with all launching nations who
are offering their launch vehicles in the commercial
market.

Recently, commercial competition subsidized by
governments has become an important part of space
transportation competition. Europe, the Soviet
Union, and China now compete with U.S. private
firms for the international space launch market. Each
government has developed its own mechanisms for
assisting its launch firms. For example, Glavcosmos
(U.S.S.R.) and the Great Wall Corp. (China) are
government corporations, for which sales of launch
services are an integral part of international policy.
Arianespace, S.A. (France) is a private corporation
owned in part by the French Government. 1 Although
it operates as a private firm, Arianespace receives
considerable indirect support from the European
Space Agency, which has developed the various
Ariane launchers, built the launch complexes, and
purchases launch services. The United States Government has assisted U.S. private firms by developing the expendable launch vehicles and launch
facilities (which are leased to the ftrms), by purchasing launchers and launch services from them, and in
numerous other ways. 2

COOPERATION
The United States has always maintained a
vigorous program of international cooperation in
space in order to support U.S. political and economic
goals. However, it has cooperated very little with
other countries in space transportation, in large part
because most launch technology has direct military
applications and much of the technology has been
classified or sensitive.
Today, because other countries have developed
their own indigenous launch capabilities, reducing
much of the competitive edge the United States once
held, and because progress in space will continue to
be expensive, cooperating on space transportation
and sharing costs could be beneftcial. Several
cooperative ventures have been suggested:

A number of experts have raised doubts about the
capability of the U.S. private sector to compete for
providing launch services in the world market,
especially in the face of a relatively small market for
commercial launch services. Projected launch services supply far exceeds expected demand. Launch
firms in the United States, France, the Soviet Union,

• Space Station resupply. The United States
could share responsibility for resupply of the
international Space Station with its Space
Station partners. In order for other countries to

IArianespace is owned by 35 companies, 13 banks, and CNES, the French Space Agency.
2The commercial market alone is insufficient to support more than one U.S. commercial medium-capacity launch system. No large launch system
has yet been privately developed, and at least for the next decade or two commercial traffic levels will probably not justify future private development.
JSee Public Law 100-657 (102 Stat. 3900), ''The Commercial Space Launch Act Amendments of 1988."
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Photo credit: British Aerospace

Artist's conception of British Aerospace's Hotol aerospace plane taking off. If successful, this space plane
would reach Earth orbit with a single propulsion stage.

use their launch systems to supply the Space
Station, or to dock with it, the countries will
have to reach agreement with the United States
on appropriate standards for packaging, docking, and safety. ESA and NASA have now
established a working committee to discuss
these matters. If successful, such cooperation
could be extended to include cooperation on
more sensitive aspects of space transportation.
In particular, because Europe and Japan have
now developed and operated their own launch
systems, they may have specific technologies
or methods to share with the United States in
return for access to some U.S. technology.
• Emergency rescue from Space Station. As
noted in an earlier section, NASA is planning
to provide some sort of emergency crew return
capability for the Space Station. NASA estimates that developing such a capability would
cost between $1 billion and $2 billion, depending on its level of sophistication. If properly
outfitted, the European Hermes or the Japanese HOPE might be used as an emergency
return vehicle. In addition, Hermes could

even back up the Shuttle for limited space
station crew replacement. However, such
international cooperation would also require a
degree of international coordination and technology sharing for which the United States has
little precedent.
• Cooperative space rescue efforts. At present,
the Soviet Union is the only country beyond the
United States with the capability to launch
people into space. As Europe and Japan develop their crew-carrying systems, the potential
for emergencies requiring rescue from a variety
of space vehicles will increase. Broad agreements on docking standards, and procedures for
space rescue,4 could increase astronaut safety
for all nations and lead to more extensive
cooperative activities in the future. Initial
meetings have been scheduled this spring to
discuss the nature and extent of such cooperation. Both this cooperative project and the use
of foreign vehicles to supply Space Station
have the advantage that they risk transferring
very little U.S. technology to other participants. s

4The United States, the U.S.S.R., the European countries and Japan have signed the Agreement on the Rescue ofAstronauts, the Return ofAstronauts
and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space-UST 7570; TIAS 6599.
5The Apollo-Soyuz Test Program, for example, was designed to minimize the potential for technology transfer.

--

Chapter 8-International Competition and Cooperation. 81

• Aerospace plane research and development.
With strong encouragement from their private
sectors, Gennany, Japan, and the United Kingdom are working independently toward development of ~e~osp.ace . planes .. The level of
foreign SOphlsucauon m certam areas of advanced materials, advanced propulsion, and
aerodynamic computation is on a par with U.S.
work. A joint development program with one or
more of these partners might allow the United
States to develop an aerospace plane faster and
with lower cost to the United States than the
United States could on its own. Although a
joint project would risk some technology transfer, if properly structured, such a joint project
could be to the mutual benefit of all countries
involved .
• U.S. use of the Soviet Energia heavy-lift
launcher. The U.S.S.R. has offered infonnally
to make its Energia heavy-lift launch vehicle
available to the United States for launching
large payloads. As noted throughout this report,
the United States has no existing heavy lift
capability. Thus, the Soviet offer could assist in
developing U.S. plans to launch large, heavy
payloads, such as Space Station components.
However, concerns about the transfer of militmly useful technology to the Soviet Union
would inhibit U.S. use of Energia for such
high-technology payloads. As well, NASA
would be understandably reluctant to make use
of a Soviet launcher because such use might be
seen as sufficient reason for the United States
to defer development of its own heavy-lift
vehicle.

Although cooperation in space transportation can
be expected to be more difficult than cooperation in
other areas of space endeavor, it could assist the
United States to achieve much more in space than

Photo credit: Arianespace

Night launch of Ariane 3 launcher from the European
Space Agency launch pad in Kourou. French Guiana.

this country can afford to attempt on its own.
However, it will require that NASA and the U.S.
aerospace industry make a greater effort to tap the
expertise and' technology now available in other
industrialized countries.
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The Sensitivity of Operational Aerospace Plane Costs
To Required Confidence and Actual Reliability

The proposed experimental National Aero-Space Plane
(NASP), the X-30,is being designed with a goal of 99.999
percent reliability-i.e., to have only 1 chance in 100,000
of failing catastrophically during a flight, assuming no
human error. NASP program officials have said that later
first-generation aerospace planes, which they term
NASP-Derived Vehicles (NOVs), would probably be
designed to have a similar reliability. Recognizing that the
design reliability does not account for possible human
error in maintaining and flying the vehicle, NASP
program officials assume the actual reliability of a
first-generation NOV would be lower-nominally 99.8
percent, but 99.9 percent in the "best case," and 99.5
percent in the "worst case."l

is actually unacceptably unreliable; operational vehicles
of similar design and reliability would probably fail often
enough to incur staggering failure costs. If, on the other
hand, too much confidence is required, a vehicle that is
actually highly reliable might be rejected, and the savings
potentially realizable by using operational vehicles of
similar design and reliability would be forfeit. 3
NASP program officials must also choose the type 0/
confidence to require. They could require statistical
confidence to be demonstrated, or they could calculate the
confidence level by Bayesian inference, which would use
the results of the flight tests to update a subjective prior
probability distribution over possible values of reliability
(see box A-A).4 The former choice would require a very
large number of flights to demonstrate the required
reliability with high statistical confidence.s A problem
with the latter choice is that there would be risks of
optimism and pessimism. If the prior distribution is
optimistic, the reliability might be low but the vehicle
would be accepted and later losses incurred. If pessimistic, reliability might be high but the vehicle would be
rejected and potential savings unrealized.

NASP program officials assume there is little risk that
an NOV of lower reliability would be flown on operational missions, because they expect NOV development
would be halted if the proposed X-30, or a later prototype
NOV, fails to demonstrate acceptable reliability (99.5
percent) in its flight test program. Thus, in their view, the
cost at risk would be not billions of dollars of greater than
expected failure costs but only those funds spent to
develop and build X-30s. 2

Because the type and level of confidence with which
99.5 percent reliability must be demonstrated has not been
specified, and because the actual reliability will never be
known precisely, this appendix shows how the life-cycle
costs of acquiring and operating a mixed fleet of launch
vehicles-including NOVs, if accepted-would depend
on the type and level of confidence required in testing and
on the actual reliability.

This argument hinges on a critical assumption: that if
the test vehicles tum out to be unacceptably unreliable, the
test program will detect that fact with high confidence.
The validity of this assumption cannot yet be decided,
because the NASP program office has not yet specified
what kind of confidence (statistical or subjective) they
require, nor how much is enough, nor how it will be
calculated from test results. These details are important,
because a test program cannot determine the reliability
precisely. The test flights might be a lucky streak, or an
unlucky streak; the actual reliability could differ significantly from the successful percentage of test flights.
However, a properly designed test program can determine
the confidence level with which the required reliability
has been demonstrated.

Cost Estimates,
If Statistical Confidence Is Required
The type and level of confidence required and the actual
reliability determine the probability that the test program
will be successful; if it is, NOVs will be acquired and
operated, and their actual reliability will affect the failure
costs incurred.
Figure A-I shows estimates of the probabilities with
which test vehicles of various reliabilities would demonstrate 99.5 percent reliability with various levels of
statistical confidence in 100 test flights. If 40 percent

In choosing a required confidence level, NASP program officials face a dilemma-as would any manager of
a launch vehicle development program: Requiring too
little confidence could allow acceptance of a vehicle that

iNASP Joint Program Office staff. personal communication. Jan. 18. 1990.
2Funhermore. they expect that the value of NOV technology "spun off' to other applications such as aircraft and launch vehicles would compensate
for some of the cost at risk.
31( more test flights were conducted. a reliable vehicle could demonstrate acceptable reliability with acceptable confidence and allow these potential
savings to be realized. but against this must be weighed the expense and delay of the extra tests.
4National Research Council. Post-Challenger Evaluation of Space Shuttle Risk Assessment and Management (Washington. DC: National Academy
Press, January. 1988). app. D.
sOne hundred test flights. if all successful. would provide only 39.4 percent statistical confidence in a 99.5 percent lower confidence bound on
reliability.
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Box A-A-Estimation of Reliability by Bayesian Inference
In classical probability theory, a system is assumed to have a definite reliability, even though the
reliability is not known precisely. The percentage of tests (or uses) that are successful is an estimate of
the reliability, and statistical confidence bounds indicate the uncertainty of estimates. If no tests have
been done, reliability cannot be estimated by statistical methods.
In contrast, the Bayesian view is that the
reliability of a system may be 10 percent, or
Four Subjects' Subjective Probability
90 percent, or any other possible value. A
Distributions Over Reliability
person's beliefs and uncertainty about the
reliability, even before tests have been conducted, may be expressed by a set of
A Priori
probabilities: the probability that the reliabil(Before testing)
ity is less than 10 percent, the probability that
it is less than 20 percent, and so forth.
Collectively, such probabilities specify what
Confident Pea,lml,t
is called a cumulative probability distribution
over reliability. Because it represents one
Uncertain Pe"lmlat
person's beliefs about the reliability, the
distribution is called a subjective probability
distribution (SPO). Another person may have
different beliefs about the reliability of the
same system; that person's beliefs would be
represented by a different SPO. The Bayesian
interpretation of probability does not require
the SPOs of different subjects to agree, but it
99""
100""
does require each subject's SPO to be selfR
consistent. For example, an SPO cannot
specify that a subject believes the reliability
to be less than 10 percent with 50 percent
probability and less than 20 percent with 30
A Posteriori
percent probability!
(After 9,900 successes in 10.000 tests)
SPDs which are not based on actual tests
of the system are called prior SPOs: they are
SPOs estimated prior to testing. Prior SPDs
80-.
may be based on expert judgement, considering tests of subsystems or analogous systems.
They may also reflect guesses, hunches,
60""
mysticism, or complete ignorance. When test
data become available, SPOs may be up40""
dated; however-and herein lies the value of
Bayesian inference-4!ach SPO must be up- 20""
dated in a logically consistent manner, using
Bayes's theorem, which is stated and proved
in many textbooks on probability. SPOs
100%
99""
R
Updated in this manner are calleo posterior
SPOs: they are SPDs estimated a posteriori
(after testing).
Differing prior SPDs become more similar after Bayesian updating, as the figures below illustrate. The figure on the left shows portions of the
prior SPOs of four subjects, who are identified as "Confident Pessimists," "Uncertain Pessimist,"
"Uncertain Optimist," ;md "Confident Optimist." The prior SPO of the Confident Pessimist indicates
that the Confident Pessimist is about 55 percent confident that the reliability is less than 98 percent and
almost 100 percent confident that the reliability is less than 98.25 percent The Uncertain Pessimist is

-
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Figure A-1-Probablllty That Test Vehicles Will Demonstrate Acceptable Reliability If
Statistical Confidence Is Required
Probability of Accepting Vehicle

100 %
80 %
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0l~18'99.5%
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97.5%
96.5%
95.5%
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93.5%
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"JD

20 %

o

%

/

Actual
Reliability

10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Required Confidence in 99.5% Reliability
Based on 100 Monte Carlo samples.
SOURCE: Offioe of Technology Assessment, 1990.

statistical confidence, or more, is required, a vehicle
would be rejected even if all flights were successful. If,
however, only 30 percent statistical confidence is required, a 99.5-percent reliable vehicle would be accepted
with a probability of about 80 percent

Figure A-2 shows how the expected present value of
the life-cycle costs of flying the missions in OTA's
Low-Growth mission model6 through the year 2020
would depend on actual reliability and required confidence, if statistical confidence is required. The greater the

6U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Launch Options for the
Government Printing Office, July 1988).

Futur~

Buyer's Guide, OTA-ISC-383 (Washington, DC: U.S.
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Figure A-2-Expected Present Value of Mixed-Fleet Life-Cycle Cost If Statistical Confidence Is
Required and NOV Costs Are As Estimated by NASP JPO

Present Value of Life-Cycle Cost (FY89$)
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Based on 100 Monte Carlo samples.
SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment and National Aero-Space Plane Joint Program Office.

X-30's reliability turns out to be, the greater the savings
can be.? If managers require at least 10 percent statistical
confidence, they risk little or nothing compared to the
costs if NDVs were not attempted (figure 1-2) if the
X-30's reliability turns out to be low, because there is little
chance that an unreliable vehicle would be accepted, and
no NOV development costs are assumed to be incurred
before the decision on whether to proceed with NOV
development. 8

Methodology
OTA calculated these estimates assuming that NDVrelated costs are uniformly distributed over ranges

estimated by the NASP Joint Program Office (JPO),
which are shown in table A-I. OTA also assumed:
1. X-30 development costs are sunk costs.
2. The test program will consist of 100 test flights to orbit
and back; other (e.g., suborbital) test flights may be
conducted but will not be used to estimate reliability
on orbital flights. 9
3. During the test program, the X-30s will not be
modified in any way, or operated in different ways,
that would make reliability differ from flight to
flight. 10
4. The government will decide in 2000 whether to
proceed with NOV development,ll based on whether

1The actual reliability of operational NDVs is assumed to be the same as that of the X-30s or prototype NDVs used to demonstrate reliability in the
flight test program.
8These estimates exclude the costs of developing the X-30 (or other prototype); if Congress decided now to forego development of an NDV, it could
save a few billion dollars by halting the NASP program. See U.S. Congress, Congressional Budget Office, Reducing the Deficit: Spending and Revenue
Options (Washington. DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. 1990). pp. 68-70.
'lThe JPO actually plans only about 75 to 100 test flights. most of them suborbital. Data from suborbital test flights and ground tests of vehicle systems
and components could be used to estimate reliability on orbital flights. but this would require developing a component -level reliability model that
describes how component failures could cause vehicle loss and how component failure probabilities depend on details of vehicle assembly. maintenance.
and operation (e.g .• on the speeds and altitudes at which the vehicle has flown).
lO'fhis assumption simplifies analysis. In fact, the X-30s could be modified-e.g., after a failure-in an attempt to increase reliability, but "wiping
the slate cJean"late in the test program might reduce confidence that the required reliability has been demonstrated.
IISome have suggested that ifthe X-30 is successful, NDVs might be developed privately to service the market for space tourism. For estimates of
the demand for round trips to orbit as a function of ticket price. see DoD & NASA. National Space Transportation and Support Study 1995-2010. Annex
B: Civil Needs DataBase. Version 1.1. vol. I-Summary Report. Mar. 16, 1986. pp. 3-31-3-32. and Gordon R. Woodcock. "Economics on the Space
Frontier: Can We Afford It?," SSI Update (Princeton, NJ: Space Studies Institute. May/June 1987).
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Table A-1-Ranges of Costs Estimated by NASP Joint Program Office (inde. year not specified)

-oevelopment ................................. .
Facilities (per NOV) ............................ .
production (first NOV) ......................... .
(% learning8) ....................... .
operations (per NOV-year) ..................... .
(per flight) .......................... .
Failures (per failure) ........................... .

Best Case
$3,000 MB
$25 M
$700M
85 %
$10 M
$0.8 M
$1,500 M

Nominal

\IIIorst Case

$4,000 M
$50 M
$800M

$6,000 M
$75 M
$1,100 M

90%

95 %
$3OM

$15 M
$1.2 M
$2,000 M

$2.2 M
$2,500 M

~.d~
.
b I.e., the incremental unit cost of the nth NOV will be (%/1 00)lag(n)l1og(2) times the incremental unit cost of the first NOV, where % is the percentage learning.

SOURCE: NASP Interagency Office, 1990.

the required reliability (assumed to be 99.5 percent) is
demonstrated with a specified statistical confidence.
S. If the government decides not to proceed with NOV
development, the missions in the mission model will
be flown by Shuttles, Titan IVs, and Medium Launch
Vehicles. Construction of facilities required for
launching Titan IVs at the rates required (which began
earlier as a hedge) will continue.
6. If instead the government proceeds with NOV development,
(a) Construction of only those Titan IV facilities
required for launching at the rates required to
complement the NOV will continue, possibly
after a delay. 12
(b) The actual reliability of operational NOV s will be
the same as that of the X-30s or prototype NOVs
used to demonstrate reliability in the flight test
program. 13
(c) Enough NOVs will be procured to make the
probability of losing them all to attrition no
greater than one percent, assuming a reliability of
99.5 percent 14
(d) NOVs will fly all the manned missions in OTA's
"Low-Growth" mission model on a 1:1 basis
(i.e., one NOV flight substituting for one Shuttle
flight) and half of Titan missions 1: 1, beginning
the year of initial operational capability, which
OTA assumes will be 2005.
(e) If and when all NOVs are lost to attrition, another
NOV will be procured at the same incremental
unit cost as the first NOV. IS
The probability that X-30s or prototype NOVs would
demonstrate the required reliability (99.5 percent) with

the required confidence during the flight test program was
calculated for each combination of actual reliability and
required confidence considered. This probability-tbe
"acceptance probability"-was used in calculating the
life-cycle cost of the mixed fleet. Titan and Shuttle costs
depend on the number of missions Titans and Shuttles are
required to fly, which depends on whether NOVs are
accepted and used to complement Titans and supersede
Shuttles.
For the case in which they are, the costs of NOV
development, facilities, production, operation, and failures are estimated by Monte-Carlo techniques-i.e.,
random-event simulation. For each of 100 scenarios,
values for each of the uncertain costs in table A-I were
generated pseudorandomly16 and used to calculate the
life-cycle costs of the NOV fleet. The number of
operational failures in each year was also generated
pseudo-randomly, based on the actual reliability assumed,
and used to calculate NOV failure costs. For each value
of actual reliability considered, the difference between the
70th percentile of NOV costs and the median value of
NOV costs was used as the "STAS cost risk"-i.e., the
cost risk as defmed in the Space Transportation Architecture Study17 -for the NOV fleet.

Sensitivity to
Greater-than-Expected NDV Costs
To gauge the sensitivity of the estimates in figure A-2
to greater-than-expected NOV costs, OTA estimated
costs by the same procedure but assumed NOV-related
costs are uniformly distributed over the ranges in table
A-2. The lower bounds of these ranges are as estimated by

12Because they may not be needed as soon, and delaying expenditures for facilities allows them to be more heavily discounted.
130perational NOVs could be designed to differ from the X-30s or prototype NOVs-e.g., to have more engines-with the intent of making them
more reliable. If so designed, detailed reliability models (footnote 9) of both X-30s and operational NDVs would be needed to estimate operational NOV
reliability on the basis of X-30 flight tests. If operational NOVs differ significantly from X-30s, X-30 flight tests may provide little information about
NOV reliability; in any case, the updating procedure would be much more complicated than updating based solely on test flights of similar vehicles under
similar conditions.
14According to this criterion, the fleetsize should be eight for the Low-Growth mission model (534 NOV flights).
15'fb.is is optimistic; it neglects procurement delay and the remote possibility that one NOV may be required to fly more flights than the NASP JPO
assumes it will be able to: 250 to 500, but nominally 400.
16'Jbe costs were assumed to be distributed uniformly between the worst-case and best-case values in table A-I.
17U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, op. cit., footnote 6.
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the NASP JPO (table A-I); the upper bounds of these
ranges are twice the upper bounds of the ranges estimated
by the NASP JPO (in the case of percentage learning, the
upper bound is twice as close to 100 percent). Figure A-3
shows the resulting cost estimates.

Cost Estimates,
If Subjective Confidence Is Allowed
OTA has also estimated savings and losses for cases in
which the government decides whether to proceed with
NDV development based on the subjective (rather than
statistical) confidence with which the required reliability
(assumed to be 99.5 percent) is demonstrated. The
confidence level is calculated by Bayesian inference. For
illustration, the estimates were calculated assuming the
prior distribution of the "Confident Optimist" of box
A-A, which implies an expected reliability of 99.8
percent-the same nominal reliability estimated by the
NASP JPO. Figure A-4 shows the proto-NDV acceptance
probabilities, and figure A-5 the life-cycle costs, estimated under these assumptions, assuming OTA's LowGrowth mission model and NDV -related costs unifonnly
distributed over ranges estimated by the NASP JPO (table
A-I).
To gauge the sensitivity of the estimates in figure A-5
to greater-than-expected NOV costs, OTA estimated
costs by the same procedure but assumed that NOVrelated costs are unifonnly distributed over the ranges in
table A-2. Figure A-6 shows the life-cycle costs estimated
under these assumptions.
Figure A-5 shows that if NOV costs are as estimated by
the NASP JPO, there is little risk that an unacceptably

Table A-2-Ranges of Costs Assumed by OTA
for Sensitivity Analysis
Development ................... .
Facilities (per NOV) ............. .
Production (first NOV) ........... .
(% learning) .......... .
Operations (per NOV-year) ....... .
(per flight) ........... .
Failures (per failure) ............. .

Best Case Worst Case
$3,000 M8 $12,000 M
$25 M
$150 M
$700 M
$2,200 M
85%
97.5%
$10 M
$60 M
$0.8 M
$4.4 M
$1,500 M
$5,000 M

aM=miliion.
SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1990.

unreliable vehicle would be accepted and, as a consequence, the mixed-fleet life-cycle cost (figure A-5) would
exceed that of the current mixed fleet (the Titan-IV option
in figure 1-2).
However, if NDV costs can range up to twice the upper
bounds estimated by the NASP JPO, figure A-6 shows
that there could be a significant risk of loss caused by
accepting an unacceptably unreliable vehicle. For example, if only 10 percent confidence is required and actual
reliability turns out to be 92.5 percent, the median
life-cycle cost would be about $16 billion more than if the
NOV were rejected, or not attempted, because the failures
that would occur in the test flight program would probably
not reduce the confidence in NDV reliability (over 98.9
percent, a priori) below 10 percent. If 90 percent
confidence were required (see figure A-6), or 10 percent
statistical confidence were required (see figure A-3), or
prior confidence in NOV reliability were lower, this risk
could be made negligible, but this would also reduce the
probability of accepting, and benefitting from, a reliable
NDV.

-
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Figure A-3-Expected Present Value of Mixed-Fleet Life-Cycle Cost H Statistical Confidence Is
Required and NOV Costs May Be 2X NASP JPO Estimates
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Agure A-4-Probablllty That Test Vehicles Will Demonstrate Acceptable Reliability If
Subjective Confidence Is Allowed

Probability of Accepting Vehicle
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Based on 100 Monte Carlo samples .
SOURCE: Offioe of Technology Assessment and National Aero-Space Plane Joint Program Office, 1990.
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Figure A-5-Expected Present Value of Mixed-Fleet lIfe-Cycle Cost If Subjective Confidence Is
Allowed and NOV Costs Are As EstImated by NASP JPO
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Figure A-~Expected Present Value of Mixed-Fleet LIfe-Cycle Cost If Subjective Confidence Is
Allowed and NOV Costs May Be 2X NASP JPO Estimates
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